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INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION 
 
1. THE NEED FOR A THEORY 
In late December 1989, the United States began Operation Just Cause, an invasion of 
Panama by 27,000 American troops aimed at deposing Manuel Noriega.  Noriega had 
been the de facto ruler of the country since 1983, heading a military dictatorship that 
routinely engaged in the arrest, kidnapping, torture, and assassination of political 
dissidents, and manipulated and ignored, respectively, the two nationwide elections held 
during his reign that would otherwise have removed him from power.  In the run up to the 
invasion, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Panama and demanded that 
Noriega respect the results of the May 1989 elections, which had overwhelmingly 
favored Guillermo Endara.  In response, Noriega had Endara publicly beaten, ordered the 
legislature to recognize a state of war between Panama and the United States, and had the 
army harass US civilians and military personnel within the country (one American 
marine was shot and killed).   
On the eve of the invasion, President Ronald Reagan addressed the people of the 
United States and offered four justifications for taking military action against Panama: to 
protect US nationals, to halt drug trafficking, to uphold the neutrality of the Panama 
canal, and, most strikingly, to defend Panamanian democracy.  The operation was 
successful in meeting these goals, and Panama remains a stable, though economically 
troubled, democracy today.  Approximately 200-300 Panamanian soldiers and 23 
American soldiers were killed in the invasion, as were between several hundred and 
several thousand Panamanian civilians.  An estimated 15-20,000 civilians were displaced 
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as a direct result of the invasion, and lasting harm was done to Panama‘s economy by the 
pre-invasion sanctions, the damage done to infrastructure in the invasion, and the looting 
and vandalism which occurred during the several weeks of lawlessness that followed. 
Democratic ideals had been used to justify military actions before, in cases 
ranging from the annexation of Hawaii, the post-World War II reconstruction of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan, during the Vietnam War, and in the US invasion of Grenada 
in 1983, but in these cases the goal of democratization was either downplayed in 
preference to other political goals, or understood to be a euphemism for strictly anti-
communist intervention.  That President Reagan invoked the defense of democracy 
among his Administration‘s rationales for invading Panama is striking, because it 
publicly and explicitly claimed democracy as a just cause of the use of international 
military force.  Since then, democracy has played a prominent role in public justifications 
for many other US interventions around the world—some of them authorized by the 
United Nations, and some of them not—including those in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and 
most recently, Afghanistan and Iraq.
1
   
Critics of US foreign policy are often quick to argue that these justifications are 
cynical and hypocritical, and that they fail to express the United States‘ actual 
motivations for engaging in armed interventions.  Be that as it may, the use of democratic 
ideals to justify the international use of military force warrants serious philosophical 
attention, for two reasons.  First, democracy is, or is at least believed to be, a great human 
good; governments would not attempt to justify foreign wars by reference to democratic 
                                                 
1
 For a brief introduction to Cold War and pre-Cold War forcible democratization, and a more lengthy 
treatment of post-Cold War attempts, see Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force: US Military 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War World. Cambridge University Press (2000).  
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ideals if it were not.  Given the likelihood that democracy will be used to justify armed 
interventions in the future, and given the death and destruction such interventions 
generally entail, we need to know whether, and if so, under what conditions the 
imposition of democratic political institutions on a foreign country could be morally 
justified, so as to know whether and when to accept democratization as an acceptable just 
cause for war.   Second, even if motives are relevant to moral evaluations of warfare, they 
are only part of the story.  As the intervention of Panama shows, governments can intend 
to democratize a target of intervention irrespective of whether they are motivated by 
democratic ideals, and the benefits of democracy could easily outweigh less worthy 
motivations in the final evaluation of the act.
2
 
Pro-democratic intervention, democratic regime change, or as I will typically refer 
to it, forcible democratization, is the use of armed force to establish or restore democratic 
political institutions in a foreign country.  There are two kinds of forcible 
democratization.  In ad bellum democratization, democratic ideals are taken to provide a 
positive rationale for armed intervention.  This contrasts with post bellum 
democratization, in which armed force is used to democratize a foreign country following 
an intervention justified on other grounds.
3
  My primary aim in this dissertation is to 
defend a normative account of ad bellum forcible democratization, although I do discuss 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion of the differential moral relevance of motivations and intentions in the context of armed 
intervention, see the exchange between Fernando Tesón  and Terry Nardin in Ethics & International 
Affairs 19/2 (Summer 2005), pp. 1-30: Tesón, ―Ending Tyranny in Iraq,‖ pp. 1-20, Nardin, 
―Humanitarian Imperialism: Response to ‗Ending Tyranny in Iraq,‖ pp. 21-26, and  Tesón, ―Of Tyrants 
and Empires: Reply to Terry Nardin,‖ pp. 27-30. 
 
3
 On this distinction, see Alyssa Berstein, ―A Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and Intervention,‖ 
in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia, Rex Martin & David A. Reidy, eds.  Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007, pp. 278-98, at 92. 
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the post bellum variety in the last two chapters.  In short, I argue that while ad bellum 
forcible democratization may be morally unjustified under most conditions today, if and 
when the international legal system acquires a greater ability to influence state behavior, 
it should gradually come to recognize democratization as a just cause for armed 
intervention, at least when that is the only way to secure democracy in a given country, 
and when it is unlikely to result in disproportionate harm.  In the remainder of this 
introduction, I make some brief preliminary remarks to set the stage for the rest of the 
dissertation.  First, I discuss neoconservativism—the political ideology most responsible 
for moving forcible democratization to the forefront of American public discourse—and 
explain where I agree and disagree with its fundamental precepts.  Second, I call attention 
to some major themes that underwrite much of my argument but are not always made 
explicit, and state some qualifications to make clear what it is I am not doing in the 
dissertation.  Finally, I offer a précis of the argument to follow by summarizing the main 
conclusions of each chapter. 
 
2. THE NEOCONSERVATIVE CONNECTION 
 
Neoconservativism as it exists today is not so much a single, comprehensive 
philosophical approach to global politics as it a collection of particular foreign policy 
positions on a range of international issues that have confronted the United States over 
the past several decades.  On matters of policy, neoconservatives have tended to reject 
both isolationism and internationalism, preferring to emphasize the primacy of American 
5 
 
military and economic power and advocating an independent and highly active, even 
aggressive role for the United States in world affairs.
4
 
Inasmuch as the fundamental principles of neoconservativism can be distilled from the 
various policy positions neoconservatives have taken over the years and divorced from 
their decidedly American perspective, three basic tenets emerge: 
 
Universalism   -  Human rights and democracy are moral norms applicable 
to all human societies. 
 
Interventionism   -  Armed intervention may be used in pursuit of universal 
moral norms. 
 
Exceptionalism   -  Not all political actors should be equally constrained by 
international legal institutions. 
 
 
I accept all of these tenets, and each of them plays an important role in the dissertation to 
follow.  However, first, the devil is in the details: my interpretation of the nature and 
value of human rights and democracy, my qualifications on how and when armed 
intervention ought to be used in their support, and my views on the extent to which 
political actors may justifiably break the law all diverge considerably from mainstream 
neoconservative thinking about these issues.  In short, I argue for a more cautious and 
progressive form of universalism, a more legally bounded and morally demanding form 
of interventionism, and a more constructive approach to international institutions than 
most neoconservatives would allow. 
                                                 
4
 For various expressions of neoconservative policy positions, see Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity 
in America’s Foreign and Defense Policy, Kagan and Kristol (eds.), San Francisco, CA: Encounter 
Books (2000), and The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq. Gary Rosen (ed), Cambridge 
University Press (2005).  
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Second, where neoconservatives are especially interested in how these tenets 
relate to and can be justified by reference to the national interests of the United States, I 
adopt a cosmopolitan perspective, from which the particular interests of any given state 
have no priority over those of other states.  What matters, from a cosmopolitan 
perspective, is the equal moral value of all individual human beings regardless of their 
country of origin.  Thus, while it might be true that American interests could be better 
secured, say, by promoting democracy abroad or by breaking international law, I do take 
those facts as neither necessary nor sufficient conditions on the circumstances under 
which democracy ought to be promoted or international law broken.   
Finally, neoconservatives have been closely associated with the ongoing wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and were among their most fervent supporters from the very 
beginning.  The view for which I argue in this dissertation should not be understood as a 
defense of these wars, or indeed, for any of the other specific policy proposals 
neoconservatives advance.  What I offer here amounts to a philosophical account of the 
possibility of justified forcible democratization and a discussion of the kinds of 
circumstances and institutions that would need to exist for such a justification to succeed.  
The only exception to the generality of my approach occurs in Chapter V, where I argue 
for a view concerning how political reconstruction under military occupation ought to 
proceed, and then apply my conclusions to the American occupation of Iraq.  As will 
become apparent, those conclusions would almost certainly be vehemently rejected by 
most neoconservatives.  In the end, I think it would be fair to say that the argument I 
defend here has one foot squarely within neoconservativism, and one foot outside it 
entirely. 
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3. THEMES AND QUALIFICATIONS 
There are two dominant themes in my approach to forcible democratization that deserve 
special emphasis here, because their role is not always apparent.  First, my approach is 
firmly grounded in the moral value of human welfare, and in connecting various actions 
and institutions to this value through instrumental justifications.  However, while I do 
tend to lean towards consequentialist, rather than deontological, forms of moral 
reasoning, I have not made my underlying ethical commitments explicit, both because 
spelling out a suitable account of consequentialism would have limited the space I had 
left to address matters more directly relevant to political theory, and because many of my 
arguments can be presented in both consequentialist and deontological terms.  Some 
readers might have preferred me to start a bit further upstream, and I hope to tackle the 
more fundamental normative ethical issues that pertain to forcible democratization in the 
future, but for the time being, allowing myself a broader base of justification seemed to 
be a more fruitful approach. 
Second, much of my argument is underwritten by my attraction to moral 
continuums and progressive institutional standards.  In my view, a large swath of moral 
and political issues are best understood as matters of degree rather than kind.  I am 
skeptical, for many reasons, about drawing bright lines between, for instance, basic and 
non-basic interests, between self-determining and non-self-determining groups, between 
democratic and non-democratic systems of government, and so on.  The source of my 
skepticism is not that I think we cannot draw those lines, but that our reasons for drawing 
them are almost always purely practical.  In my view, it is not as if the nature of 
democracy itself contains specific guidelines about how much free speech and free 
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association a government‘s subjects need to have in order for the regime to be considered 
genuinely democratic, or how well its electoral system needs to function—the truth is that 
there are more and less democratic systems, and the reason we need specific guidance 
about ―how much‖ and ―how well‖ is that we need to know when to take corrective 
action.  But as I explain in several places throughout the dissertation, when we ought to 
take corrective action has as much to do with external matters of social, epistemic, and 
institutional context as it has to do with the conceptual boundaries and moral categories 
of interests, self-determination, and democracy.  As I try to make clear in what follows, I 
believe keeping these two parts of practical moral reasoning distinct, and their proper 
relation in view, leads to some interesting conclusions. 
As for qualifications, I make several.  First, as I have already suggested, this 
dissertation should be understood as a work of political theory and philosophy, rather 
than as an exercise in legal reasoning, foreign policy, or descriptive social science.  I do 
present a broad overview of how I think international institutions should be developed in 
the future, but drawing inferences about specific ways to reform state practice and the 
international legal system would require premises that I do not argue for here.  Second, 
even at that more abstract level of theory, this dissertation does not pretend or aim to 
answer all of the philosophically interesting questions about forcible democratization.  
For instance, I largely neglect questions about the comparable relevance of intentions and 
motivations, about the ethics of aiding democratic revolutionaries and about democratic 
revolutions themselves, and about whom, of a range of plausible candidates, ought to 
intervene in cases where forcible democratization would be permissible.  I raise each of 
these and other questions, and in some cases point towards how I think they should to be 
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answered, but have not tried to give a fully satisfactory philosophical response to them.  
Finally, I do not take myself to be offering a novel philosophical account of the value of 
democracy.  The account I adopt, a largely instrumental view, is only one of several to be 
found in the literature.  My primary interest is in exploring the practical implications of 
valuing democracy in this way, rather than in democratic theory itself. 
 
4. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In Chapter I, I set out a theory of moral and legal human rights.  I begin by presenting a 
general account of ordinary moral rights, based on Joseph Raz‘s influential interest 
theory, and argue for what I call the Responsibility Principle: the view that the content 
and stringency of a duty, grounded on a given rightholder‘s interest, is proportional to 
both the importance of that interest to the rightholder‘s well-being, and the ease with 
which the duty-bearer can protect or promote it.  Next, I use this account to motivate a 
very simple, and to some extent deflationary account of moral human rights according to 
which they are rights grounded on shared human interests.  I call this the Flourishing Life 
Approach, to highlight the differences between it and a prominent view in the human 
rights literature sometimes called the Decent Life Approach.  Proponents of the latter 
require that human rights and their grounds must satisfy an Urgency Condition: on their 
view, only the most important, basic, or urgent shared human interests can ground a 
human right.  I argue that the Urgency Condition must be rejected because there are no 
good in-principle reason to accept it, and because the practical reasons for restricting the 
grounds of human rights apply only to legal, and not to moral rights.   
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Finally, I argue that legal instrumentalism—the view that the purpose of a legal 
system is to promote justice by securing individual moral rights—combined with 
considerations about the rule of law and the limits of enforceability, support the view that 
the international legal system should only recognize the rights it can enforce, and that it 
should place priority on enforcing rights grounded on our most basic interests (while 
acknowledging that there is no absolute line distinguishing basic from non-basic 
interests).  But since a legal system‘s limits of enforceability change from time to time 
and from place to place, the human rights it recognizes should also change.  So long as 
the extent to which international law can influence state behavior increases, and so long 
as consensus about the list of shared human interests grows, the limits of enforceability, 
and so, too, the scope of recognized legal human rights, should expand, gradually 
approaching the ideal of complete legal protection for all moral human rights. 
In Chapter II, I present an account of the conceptual and normative relationships 
between political self-determination, representative government, and democracy.  I argue 
that political self-determination is best understood as a group‘s capacity to make and 
implement collective political decisions.  After canvassing several alternative theories of 
the value of political self-determination, I settle on an instrumental view, arguing that 
external parties have prima facie reasons to refrain from interfering with a group‘s self-
determination because doing so will prevent those most familiar with and most motivated 
to pursue the relevant interests—the group members themselves—from making and 
implementing the decisions that affect them the most.  I go on to offer an account of 
representative government: representative governments are those whose actions, 
decisions, and policies reflect or accord with the collective political will of the people to 
11 
 
whom those actions, decisions, and policies apply.  I then argue that, so understood, 
representative government is either a conceptually or a practically necessary condition on 
political self-determination.  Finally, using Robert Dahl‘s list of the political institutions 
needed for large-scale democracy, I argue that democratic governments are better able to 
represent the collective political will of the people they govern than non-democracies are, 
and that therefore the political self-determination of democratic societies presents outside 
parties with stronger prima facie reasons against interference. 
The views presented in the first two chapters play an important role in Chapter III, 
where I argue that, under certain conditions, the goal of democratization can justify the 
international use of armed force, including the occupation and political reconstruction of 
another state.  I begin by distinguishing the two most important components of the so-
called ―right to rule,‖ political legitimacy and political authority.  I then develop an 
account of political legitimacy borrowed from Arthur Applbaum, which holds that a 
government‘s right to non-intervention should hinge on whether it (1) adequately secures 
its subjects‘ human rights, and (2) adequately represents their collective political will.  I 
place special emphasis on the notion of adequacy at work in these conditions, arguing 
that the standards of adequate human right security and adequate representation are 
context sensitive in the same way that standards of adequate parenting are: as knowledge, 
social conditions, and enforcement capabilities improve, the relevant standards of 
adequacy should rise.  Because of the empirical and conceptual relationships between 
democracy on the one hand and human rights security and representation on the other, I 
argue that democracies are superior to non-democracies along both dimensions of 
political legitimacy.  Therefore, since the standards of adequate security and 
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representation should continue to rise over time, we can expect that now or at some point 
in the future, governments‘ rights to non-intervention will depend on their maintenance 
of democratic political institutions.  Failure to do so will, at that time, provide a just cause 
for intervention by relevantly situated external parties, up to and including the use of 
armed force.  I close by addressing the serious but surmountable objections that forcible 
democratization is either practically infeasible or internally inconsistent—I argue that 
these claims are false. 
Chapters IV and V offer some elaborations on the basic view presented in the first 
three chapters.  In Chapter IV, I address the question of obedience to international law, 
and more specifically, whether international actors have a general, prima facie duty to 
obey international laws surrounding humanitarian intervention and regime change.  In 
effect, I argue that it does not matter.  If there is no duty to obey international law, then 
contrary to many critics of the war in Iraq, the illegality of humanitarian intervention (and 
ipso facto, of forcible democratization) is not in itself a moral reason to abstain from 
them.  On the other hand, if there is a duty to obey international law, then even if we 
assume a drastically more just and legitimate international legal system than the one we 
now possess, there is little reason to suspect that it carries enough moral force to override 
the positive case for humanitarian interventions which are justifiable on independent 
moral grounds.  In other words, if there is a duty to obey the law, that duty is so weak as 
to be practically irrelevant to moral deliberation about whether to launch a humanitarian 
intervention.  The relevance of such a duty to democratic regime change is less clear, 
since ad bellum regime change need not aim to halt or prevent urgent human rights 
abuses, and since post bellum regime change is not straightforwardly illegal.  
13 
 
Nevertheless, laws against regime change could still plausibly be thought liable to 
justified disobedience for the same reasons as are laws against humanitarian intervention. 
Finally, in Chapter V, I argue for a very controversial view about jus post bellum, 
the aspect of just war theory that deals with the aftermath of military conflict.  I argue 
that the traditional model of occupation is unacceptably democratic, because it fails to 
satisfy the Principle of Affected Interests.  In its most plausible form, that principle holds 
that everyone whose most important interests are certainly and significantly affected by a 
government‘s decisions have a right to participate in that government.  After clarifying 
the relationship between political participation and political representation, I use the 
Principle of Affected Interests to argue that an occupied people has a right to effective 
representation in the occupying government.  Such a right would reduce the risks inherent 
to traditional models of occupation—risks of unjustified paternalism, a lack of 
institutional accountability, and of a failure to attenuate the indeterminacy of an occupied 
people‘s collective political will.  In addition, I argue that effective representation for 
occupied peoples would undermine the actual and perceived legitimacy of insurgency 
movements, disincentivize wars aimed at the long-term subjugation of foreign 
populations, and foster a spirit of cooperation, self-ownership, and responsibility in the 
occupied people.   
14 
 
CHAPTER I 
A PROGRESSIVE THEORY OF MORAL AND LEGAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Human rights are the common currency of moral evaluation in contemporary 
international affairs.  For activists, policy-makers, and international lawyers, human 
rights discourse proceeds without explicit reference to, and without any real need for, 
philosophical justification.  The practice of human rights is largely autonomous from the 
theory, in part because the moral importance of the things human rights are usually 
thought to protect is so obvious that for practical purposes it hardly makes any difference 
how they are justified.  Nevertheless, when human rights conflict, either with each other 
or with other values, or when there are doubts about whether this or that right really is or 
should be considered a human right, then there needs to be some moral foundation from 
which to trace (or not) a line of justification back to the right or rights in question.  For 
that, we need a theory of human rights, and in this chapter I present and defend just such 
a theory. 
Central to my exposition will be three interrelated themes.  The first is the 
difference between moral and legal human rights, a distinction that many authors 
acknowledge but quickly forget in the course of developing their own views.  My theory 
exploits that distinction to motivate a division of labor in which the complete protection 
of moral human rights represents the ideal or goal towards which domestic and legal 
systems ought to progress, by gradually expanding the scope of the legal human rights 
they recognize as their capacity for enforcement increases.  I frame my discussion of 
moral human rights against the backdrop of a more general analysis of rights, one based 
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on Joseph Raz‘s influential interest-based account.  After distinguishing between a right‘s 
justification, or ground, and its content, I argue for the controversial view that any 
interest, no matter how trivial, is a potential ground for a right, so long as the costs of 
promoting or protecting that interest for potential duty-bearers is sufficiently low.  This 
conclusion underwrites much the argument for a progressive theory of human rights. 
The second theme concerns a prominent theory of human rights I will call the 
Decent Life Approach.  According to this view, human rights protect only our most basic 
or urgent interests—those whose satisfaction is a practically necessary condition for 
living a minimally decent human life.  I argue that there is no good, in-principle reason to 
restrict the grounds of moral human rights in this way, and that while there are good 
practical reasons to restrict the grounds of legal human rights, those grounds depend on 
the extent to which a legal system can enforce the law, not on some antecedent standard 
of decency.  This leads me to adopt a view of moral human rights I refer to as the 
Flourishing Life Approach. 
The third theme I address is the ubiquitous claim that human rights are universal 
and transhistorical.  On my view, it is true by stipulation that the grounds of moral human 
rights are universal and transhistorical, because they are defined by reference to the class 
of shared human interests.  But from this nothing follows about the contents of moral 
human rights, since the content of a given right depends on what relevantly situated 
moral agents can do to promote or protect the grounding interest and the cost they would 
incur by doing so.  Nor does anything follow about what human rights a legal system 
should recognize, or about how demanding those rights should be because, again, a 
detailed articulation of the human rights a legal system should recognize will depend on 
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the extent to which it can enforce them, and that capacity varies from time to time and 
place to place. 
The chapter unfolds roughly along the lines laid out above, although as I said, 
these three themes are closely interrelated and so not entirely separable in exposition.  In 
the first section, I focus on the nature and justification of rights simpliciter, and then use 
my analysis to develop the Flourishing Life Approach to moral human rights mentioned 
above.  In the second section, I argue that there is no good reason to believe that moral 
human rights must be matters of urgent moral concern, and that the Decent Life 
Approach is therefore  burdened by an unnecessary and independently problematic 
restriction on the potential grounds for human rights.  In the third section, I develop the 
legal aspect of my theory, arguing that the limits of a given legal system‘s capacity for 
enforcement should constraint the list of human rights that system should recognize.  I go 
on to argue that this counts in favor of a progressive theory of legal human rights—one in 
which the scope of those rights should expand as domestic and international legal 
systems gain a greater capacity to influence the behavior of their respective subjects. 
 
1. INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY PRINCIPLE 
If human rights are rights at all, we must find their foundations in a more general theory. 
But even the most preliminary assertions about rights are controversial.  Much of this 
controversy stems from a dispute between will theorists and interest theorists.
1
  Will 
                                                 
1
 For discussion, see Jeremy Waldron, ―Introduction,‖ in Theories of Rights, Waldron (ed.), Oxford 
University Press (1984), pp. 1-20, at pp. 9-12; Christopher H. Wellman, ―Feinberg‘s Two Concepts of 
Rights,‖ Legal Theory 11/3, pp. 213-226; Leif Wenar, ―The Nature of Rights,‖ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 33/3 (2005), pp. 223-252. 
 
 
17 
 
theorists believe that rights to protect the rightholder‘s will, and hold that to have a right 
is to have a kind of discretionary normative control, or power, over other agents‘ duties—
those agents must respect the rightholder‘s will within some specific domain of choice.2  
Interest theorists, on the other hand, believe that rights protect the rightholder‘s interests: 
to have a right is to have a valid claim against others such that they have duties to protect 
or promote some specific aspect of the rightholder‘s well-being.3   
Though I do not have the space to mount a full defense here, I adopt an interest 
theory of rights because I believe, first, that a theory of human rights must begin 
somewhere, and the interest theory is one of only two generally plausible alternatives; 
second, I believe that interest theories better accommodate our intuitions about the rights 
of animals, children, and the mentally disabled, since will theories render the possession 
of a rational will a necessary condition on being even a potential rightholder; and third, I 
believe that interest theories can subsume will theories by showing that many 
rightholders have a strong interest in having other agents respect their choices, especially 
their self-regarding choices.  To some extent, this debate is simply a matter of 
terminology—about the definition of the word ‗right,‘ and to that extent much of what I 
say may be transposed into the language of the reader‘s preferred theory of rights.  But to 
some extent the debate is also about normative principles, and any attempt to resolve the 
question of whether respect for a moral agent‘s will or choice has moral value 
                                                 
2
 For examples, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press (1961), and ―Are there Any 
Natural Rights?‖ in Waldron, Theories of Rights, pp. 77-90; Carl Wellman, Real Rights, Oxford 
University Press (1995). 
 
3
 For examples, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press (1986), esp. Ch. 7-8; 
David Lyons, ―Rights, Claimants and Beneficiaries,‖ American Philosophical Quarterly 6/3 (July 1969), 
pp. 173-185. 
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independent of its instrumental value to her well-being would take us far beyond the 
scope of this chapter. I will proceed on the assumption that an interest theory of rights is a 
plausible starting point for a theory of moral human rights. 
The interest theory I adopt is loosely based on an influential account originally 
developed by Joseph Raz.
4
  Raz defines rights in the following way: ―‗X has a right‘ if 
and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X‘s well-being 
(his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.‖5   
In other words, we can say that a right exists just when a rightholder‘s interest justifies, or 
as I will say, grounds a duty for one or more other agents.  While this provides truth 
conditions for assertions of the form ‗X has a right,‘ it leaves unclear precisely what the 
referent of the term ‗right‘ is supposed to be.  Commentators often gloss Raz‘s definition 
by claiming that on his view rights simply are duty-grounding interests, and Raz himself 
sometimes speaks as if that were the case.
6
  But this formula is incomplete. It fails to 
capture the sense in which rights are rights to something, some substance or activity not 
necessarily identical with the full satisfaction of the grounding interest.   
To take an example, the so-called ‗right to life‘ is grounded on the rightholder‘s 
interest in remaining alive.  But the interest in life cannot be identical to the right itself, 
not even when it grounds some duty to protect or promote it:  these duties are an essential 
component of the right to life even though they are not an essential component of the 
grounding interest.  Call the duties grounded on the rightholder‘s interest—what a right is 
                                                 
4
 Raz, The Morality of Freedom , pp. pp. 165-192 
 
5
 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 166. 
 
6
 My purpose here is not exegetical, so I will forego a discussion of how to best understand Raz‘s theory. 
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a right to—the right‘s content.  It is also worthwhile to note that the right is not identical 
to the set of duties that the interest grounds.  Conceptually, duties need not arise out of 
the moral claims that others have on us by virtue of their interests—actions commanded 
by God, for instance, would presumably be obligatory because of God‘s authority, rather 
than because of God‘s interests, since it is difficult to see how human agents could 
protect or promote God‘s well-being—so an interest theory need not be implicitly 
committed to the reducibility of rights to duties.  That a set of duties is grounded on 
someone‘s interest is a fact over and above the existence of the duties themselves.7  It is 
also important to make clear that the successful discharge of the duties grounded on an 
interest need not result in the satisfaction of that interest.  Having one‘s right to life 
respected does not guarantee that one will remain alive.  Under some circumstances, a 
rightholder‘s interest in life may only ground duties for others to refrain from 
intentionally killing her, to protect her from lethal harms insofar as they can, and so on; 
her death may simply be the result of an unavoidable accident, as sometimes even our 
best efforts to protect others are not enough.  Thus, we cannot understand a right fully 
without an understanding of both its grounding interest and the array of duties that it 
grounds. 
I assume that interests can ground both positive and negative duties—both duties 
to act and duties to refrain from acting.
8
  Much of what I say in the remainder of the 
chapter concerns positive duties, so we need to dwell for a moment on how such duties 
                                                 
7
 That the interest theory reduces rights to duties is a common objection to the view. 
 
8
 The distinction is conceptual, not necessarily normative; many recent authors have argued that there is no 
morally relevant difference between duties to act and duties to refrain from acting.  For a classic 
expression of this objection see Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 2
nd
 Ed. Princeton University Press (1980, 1996), pp. 35-64. 
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are to be justified.  A persistent worry about any theory that allows interests to ground 
positive duties is the suspicion that there is no upper bound to what the theory will 
require, in other words, that it will demand that we give ―ceaseless assistance‖ to those 
whose interests we can protect or promote, at the expense of our own plans and projects.  
I believe Christopher H. Wellman‘s response provides a good starting point for 
responding to the Ceaseless Assistance Objection.
9
  Wellman argues for Samaritanism, 
the view that ―one‘s failure to benefit another is wrong when the other is in [extreme] 
peril and one can rescue her at no unreasonable cost to oneself.‖10  Since the costs of 
rescue can be unreasonable, it follows that there are times when it is not required, even to 
save another from extreme peril, and this seems to disarm the Ceaseless Assistance 
Objection.   
All the same, Samaritanism is not as general an account as it could be, for as 
stated, it neglects the fact that both peril and cost come in degrees.  To deepen the 
Samaritan view of positive duties, I propose what I call the Responsibility Principle.  The 
Responsibility Principle holds that the content and stringency of the duty grounded by a 
particular rightholder‘s interest for a particular duty-bearer is proportional to (1) the 
importance of the interest to the rightholder‘s well-being, and inversely proportional to 
(2) the cost to the duty-bearer of protecting or promoting that interest.  So, in general, the 
                                                 
9
 Christopher H. Wellman, A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination. Cambridge 
University Press (2005), p. 13. I borrow the phrase ―ceaseless assistance‖ from Wellman‘s discussion. 
 
10
 Wellman, A Theory of Secession, p. 13, n. 11.  Wellman is quick to point out that this view is ―neither 
novel nor controversial,‖ citing John Stuart Mill‘s claim that ―[t]o make anyone answerable for doing 
evil to others is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evils is, comparatively speaking, the 
exception.  Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception.‖ (On 
Liberty. Ed. Elizabeth Rappaport.  Indianapolis: Hackett [1859, 1978], p. 11).   My aim in what follows is 
to generalize the operative principle to account for changes in the relative difference between the 
threatened degree of peril to the subject and the costs an agent would incur by preventing some or all of 
that peril from befalling the subject. 
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more important the interest, and the lower the cost to the duty-bearer of promoting that 
interest, the more stringent and robust the duty it grounds.  The stringency of a duty is 
essentially the duty‘s relative moral importance: to say that one duty is more stringent 
than another is to say that it is worse to violate the former than the latter.  The robustness 
of a duty, as I will use the term, is essentially the demandingness of the required action: 
to say that one duty is more robust than another is to say that the former requires more, 
more complex, or more strenuous actions than the latter.  To clarify both the foregoing 
theory of rights and how Samaritanism and the Responsibility operate in the context of 
actual cases, I will develop a series of examples that illustrate the various concepts in 
play.  Towards the end of the series, I will use one example to illustrate what I call 
‗restricted‘ and ‗unrestricted‘ versions of the Responsibility Principle.   Consider the 
following cases. 
 
Case 1:  Ishmael is drowning in a swimming pool.  No one who could do anything 
to save Ishmael knows that he is drowning. 
 
I accept the Kantian principle that ‗ought implies can,‘ which holds that in order for an 
agent to have a duty to perform some action, she must be able to perform that action.  
Since an agent‘s ability to discharge a duty presupposes that she is aware of the duty, and 
since being aware of that duty presupposes that she is aware of the interest at stake, 
ignorance of another‘s interests renders one unable to discharge duties that those interests 
would otherwise ground.  In this case, Ishmael is morally isolated in the sense that his 
interest fails to ground any duties, because there is no moral agent able to do anything to 
protect or promote his interest in not drowning.  For this reason it seems correct to say 
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that, strictly speaking, Ishmael has no right to be saved from drowning, because there is 
no one against whom such a right could be claimed. 
 
Case 2:  Ishmael is drowning in a swimming pool.  Jose cannot swim, but he 
could throw Ishmael a life preserver. 
 
 
According to Samaritanism, Jose has a duty to throw Ishmael a life preserver, because by 
doing so he can save Ishmael from extreme peril at little or no cost to himself.  Now, 
Ishmael might miss the life preserver and drown anyway—clearly a strong swimmer 
would be more likely to save Ishmael by diving into the water and pulling him out.  
However, since Jose cannot swim, he has no duty to get into the pool to try and grab 
Ishmael‘s arm with one hand while clinging to the side of the pool with the other, 
because he would risk his own life by doing so. 
 
Case 3: Ishmael is drowning in a swimming pool.  Kalia has training as a 
lifeguard.  She could throw Ishmael a life preserver or she could dive in 
and pull him out. 
 
In this case, Samaritanism claims only that Kalia would wrong Ishmael by failing to 
rescue him from peril at little or no cost to himself.  So, according to Samaritanism, Kalia 
only needs to perform one of the two actions: it is compatible with Samaritanism to say 
that whether she throws the life preserver to Ishmael or dives in to pull him out is a 
matter of discretion.  She can choose to throw him the life preserver even though she 
would be far more likely to save him from drowning if she jumped in and pulled him out.  
The Responsibility Principle, however, maintains that even though Kalia would incur 
slightly more cost to herself from jumping into the pool (after all, she had not planned on 
getting wet), she still has a duty to do so, because that cost is still slight, and the benefit to 
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Ishmael is very great.  The most important thing to see here is that Kalia‘s duties differ 
from Jose‘s duties as a direct result of Kalia‘s training as a lifeguard.  The greater her 
ability, and the lower the costs to her for exercising that ability, the greater the 
responsibility she bears for Ishmael‘s safety. 
 
Case 4:  Ishmael is about to fall into the shallow end of the pool.  Lamar can save 
Ishmael by speaking a word of warning to him. 
 
 
In Cases (1)-(3), the interest at stake was of great importance: rescuing Ishmael saved 
him from extreme, indeed, mortal peril.  Here, the interest at stake is trivial: Ishmael will 
not drown if he falls into the pool, but he will get an uncomfortable dousing.  The 
difference is important for distinguishing restricted and unrestricted versions of the 
Responsibility Principle.  According to the restricted principle, an interest must reach a 
threshold of importance or urgency before it can ground a duty, regardless of how easy it 
would be for a given agent to promote that interest. The unrestricted principle, on the 
other hand, holds that any interest, no matter how trivial, could potentially ground a duty, 
so long as the costs for a given agent of promoting that interest are small enough. 
Now, it seems clear that Lamar ought to warn Ishmael of his impending plunge, if 
only because Lamar knows Ishmael does not want to get wet, and because it is such a 
simple, small thing to say to him ―Stop!‖ or ―Look out behind you!‖  I should think that 
this is enough for us to to say that Lamar would wrong Ishmael by failing to warn him; if 
Ishmael fell into the pool and knew that Lamar could have warned him but chose not to 
he—and I think anyone else—would certainly feel wronged.  At first glance it seems 
unproblematic to say that Ishmael‘s interest in not getting wet grounds a duty for Lamar 
to warn him, and so to claim that Ishmael, in this particular instance, has a right to be 
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warned.  The unrestricted Responsibility Principle supports this conclusion, because so 
long as Ishmael has an interest, even a trivial interest, that it could ground a duty for 
another moral agent if the cost to that agent is even more trivial (I set aside questions 
about the relative degrees of triviality needed to trigger a duty.)  But the restricted version 
of the Responsibility Principle would say that Ishmael has no right to be warned because 
his interest is too trivial to ground a duty for Lamar.  While we may correctly judge that 
Lamar is acting unkindly, we should not think that he has wronged Ishmael or violated 
some right of his to be warned. 
It is difficult to see how one might argue for the restricted Responsibility 
Principle without begging the question.  For, first, the difference between Ishmael‘s 
interest in not drowning and his interest in not getting wet seems to be a matter not of 
kind, but of degree.  Some interests are more central to human welfare than others, but 
any attempt to draw a principled line between central and non-central interests, or as we 
shall say below, between basic and non-basic interests, is bound to fail.  Appeals to what 
constitutes ―peril‖ will be similarly vague—there seems to be nothing wrong with saying 
that Ishmael came ―perilously‖ close to falling into the pool, and attempting to stipulate 
this usage away would beg the question.  Second, a proponent of the restricted 
Responsibility Principle might think that claiming that Ishmael has rights both to be 
saved from drowning and to be warned before falling into the pool equates them in a way 
that it should not.  But there is nothing wrong with conceding that some rights and duties 
are more stringent than others, that is, that it is worse to violate some rights than others, 
and worse to fail at discharging some duties than to fail at discharging others.  For these 
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reasons, I will take the unrestricted version of the Responsibility Principle for granted in 
what follows. 
 
2. MORAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
With the foregoing interest-based account of rights in hand, we are a surprisingly short 
step away from a simple and plausible theory of human rights.  While there are few 
uncontroversial claims to be made about human rights, it is at least generally agreed that 
human rights are rights that human beings possess solely by virtue of their humanity, or 
in other words, solely by being the kind of creatures that they are.  Now, on the account 
just presented, this claim needs to be qualified, since the existence of an actual right 
depends on factors other than the rightholder‘s humanity, primarily the presence of a 
relevantly situated moral agent capable of protecting or promoting the rightholder‘s 
interests without incurring unreasonable costs.  Nevertheless, the grounding interests 
themselves are not dependent in this way.  Since human beings possess a class of shared 
interests, it remains sensible to delineate a class of rights by reference to those interests, 
and in a very straightforward and obvious way, the class of rights those interests ground 
are for that reason human rights.
11
  While the content of these rights will vary from one 
human being to the next, because each person stands in different relations to relevantly 
situated moral agents, we can say with only slight exaggeration that the grounds of these 
rights are both universal and transhistorical, at least to the extent that human nature 
                                                 
11
 Some might argue that human rights are inherently institutional, that is, that their function is not to 
protect private individuals against each other, but to protect them against ―official disrespect‖—abuses 
by the state or other political organizations.  For such a view, see Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and 
Human Rights, Polity Press (2002).  
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remains constant across space and time.
12
  A list of all shared human interests—a list of 
everything that contributes to human welfare—would not only constitute a complete list 
of the grounds of human rights, on this simple theory, but would also constitute a 
complete account of the human good.  Of course, there will always be disagreement 
about the nature of the human good, and so too, on this theory, about which interests 
ground human rights; but we can adopt a theory of human rights while leaving open 
precisely which rights it supports.  I will refer to this basic view the Flourishing Life 
Approach to human rights.
 
 
Two more points must be made about the Flourishing Life Approach.  First, since 
there may be trivial shared human interests, and since an unrestricted Responsibility 
Principle allows for trivial duty-grounding interests, the Flourishing Life Approach will 
support many equally trivial human rights.  On this approach, interests do not need to 
meet some threshold of urgency before they‘re taken to be a potential ground for a human 
right; nor must the correlative duties meet some threshold of stringency.  Any interest 
that contributes to human welfare could conceivably ground a human right.  The 
Flourishing Life Approach is deflationary in this respect, because it is so inclusive: most 
philosophers believe that human rights must protect matters of urgent moral concern.  I 
will address this issue momentarily. 
                                                 
12
 There probably needs to be some flexibility here in moving from general claims about human beings and 
their interests to strictly universal and transhistorical claims about them.  This is becausthe boundaries of 
any species are vague; minor variations in physiology and psychology across the human species will of 
necessity produce more or less slight variations in what things are good for creatures of that composition.  
It would perhaps be more accurate to label the grounds of human rights as ―species-typical‖ interests, but 
I will not pursue this matter here.  For ease of exposition I will retain the ‗universal‘ and ‗transhistorical‘ 
terminology.  See, e.g.,  Allen Buchanan, ―Moral Status and Human Enhancement,‖ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 37/4 (Fall 2009), pp. 346-381. 
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Second, other philosophers may worry that the Flourishing Life Approach is too 
inclusive for another reason.  Specifically, they might object that it is so inclusive that it 
expands to fill the domain of ordinary moral rights, or of well-being itself, and so fails to 
distinguish between the two.
13
  This is not really the case, for two reasons.  The first 
reason is that, on my view, not all rights are grounded on human interests.  So long as we 
accept the very plausible conclusion that the interests of non-human animals (including 
the possibility of intelligent extraterrestrial life) can ground moral duties, it follows from 
the general interest theory sketched above that animals can have rights.
14
 The second 
reason is that not all human interests are shared human interests.  Many rights might 
depend instead on subject-specific interests—the interests that arise, in part, out of our 
participation in particular agreements, contracts and associations, or the interests that 
arise as a result of abnormal biological or psychological conditions. It is true that at a 
high level of abstraction, many of these particular interests may collapse into more 
general categories of interest, since, for example, my particular interest in your following 
through on your end of an agreement is an instance of the general interest all human 
beings have in making agreements and having them kept.  But the problem of 
individuating interests along the continuum from general to particular is orthogonal to the 
proposed objection, because all theories of human rights must face the same problem on 
their own terms: how to square the concrete and highly specific claims that individuals 
have against one another, on the one hand, with the necessarily abstract and generalized 
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 James Griffin, On Human Rights, Oxford University Press (2008), pp. 51-56. 
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 See, e.g., Tom Regan, ―The Case for Animal Rights,‖ in In Defense of Animals, Peter Singer (ed.) 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Inc. (1985), pp. 13-26. 
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rights suited to universalization.  At any rate, on the hunch that there is some sensible 
way to navigate between the general and the particular for the purposes of human rights 
claims, and on the fairly standard view that non-human animals have duty-grounding 
interests, it should be clear that the Flourishing Life Approach does not fill the entire 
domain of moral rights. 
 I believe that the Flourishing Life Approach offers a simple and plausible theory 
of moral human rights.  But as I said, its support for relatively trivial rights will be 
unappealing to some, because both popular media and the philosophical literature tend to 
treat human rights violations as among the most serious injustices that can be visited 
upon human beings.  Human rights, it is claimed, must be matters of high moral priority.  
Call this demand on a theory of human rights the Urgency Condition.
15
  Notwithstanding 
its failure to satisfy the Urgency Condition, the Flourishing Life Approach can be easily 
modified, in an ad hoc way, to meet this objection. By simply restricting the class of 
interests that serve as the potential grounds of human rights to those most central to 
human welfare, we can ensure that the duties and rights they ground are matters of great 
moral importance.   The ‗Decent Life Approach‘ to human rights, as I will call it, holds 
that human rights are grounded on a class of basic interests.
16
  Basic interests are those 
whose satisfaction is a necessary condition for living a minimally decent human life, 
where ‗minimal decency‘ is defined so as to track whatever threshold of moral 
                                                 
15
 There are other ways to constrain the class of grounding interests; Griffin, for instance, restricts human 
rights to those which protect the interests human beings must have satisfied in order to constitute moral 
agents—this is the crux of his ‗Personhood‘ account of human rights.  See Griffin, On Human Rights. 
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 The most prominent versions of the Decent Life Approach to human rights can be found in Shue, Basic 
Rights; James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2
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 Ed. Blackwell Publishing, (2007); and Allen 
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importance is needed to satisfy the Urgency Condition.  In contrast to the Flourishing 
Life Approach, proponents of the Decent Life Approach, such as Allen Buchanan, argue 
that ―Human rights discourse does not require a specification of what the best sort of 
human life is.  It only requires that we have a grasp of what the necessary conditions for a 
minimally good or decent human life are.‖  ―Put negatively,‖ Buchanan writes, ―human 
rights are such that their violation makes it very difficult if not impossible for individuals 
to enjoy a decent human life.‖17   
Aside from satisfying the Urgency Condition, the Decent Life Approach offers an 
epistemic advantage over the Flourishing Life Approach.  As Buchanan suggests, while 
there is (and always has been) considerable disagreement over the requirements of the 
best or flourishing human life, the interests whose satisfaction is necessary for living a 
merely decent life are much less controversial.  Everyone agrees, for example, that our 
interests in subsistence and physical security are absolutely crucial for human well-being; 
most people agree that a modicum of personal autonomy is also important.  But as we 
move away from these fundamental interests, reasonable disagreement crops up quickly.  
Of course, reasonable disagreement about morality does not mean that we should be 
skeptics about the possibility of an objective human good—it is not as if disagreement 
about what constitutes a flourishing life means that there is no such thing, or that the 
Flourishing Life Approach is incoherent.  However, as I explain below, deep 
disagreement about what constitutes a flourishing life does act as one of several practical 
constraints on the extent to which the Flourishing Life Approach can be institutionalized.  
The Decent Life Approach quarantines itself from much of this disagreement by simply 
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 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, p. 128.   
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excluding controversial non-basic interests as potential grounds for human rights—here 
disagreement acts as a theoretical, rather than a practical, constraint.  Nevertheless, the 
Decent Life Approach to human rights faces two problems, at least insofar as it is offered 
up as a theory of moral human rights.  First, while distinguishing between basic and non-
basic interests protects the Decent Life Approach from (some) disagreements about moral 
ideals, it introduces a serious problem of vagueness.  ―Decency,‖ it turns out, is an 
enormously elastic concept, and so relying on it produces a wide range of borderline 
cases.  Second, while the Urgency Condition underwriting the reliance on decency serves 
a clear practical function, it is not clear why should limit the theory in addition to the 
institutionalized practice. 
That the concept of ‗decency‘ is vague should not be an especially controversial 
point, although I think philosophers who adopt the view are prone to underestimating the 
danger here.  Bare survival probably falls too low to be an adequate threshold for what 
constitutes a decent life, and living in the lap of luxury, having our each and every whim 
catered too immediately is certainly too high.  However, between these two kinds of life 
lies a continuum of lives of varying quality, and there does not appear to be any 
principled—nor even intuitively appealing—way to decide where, amidst this wide range 
of borderline cases, the line between decent and indecent lives should be drawn.  
Moreover, our intuitions about decency seem highly sensitive to context.  The standards 
we use to assess the decency of our own lives tend to include much that depends on the 
technological developments of the modern world, and seem grossly out of place when 
applied, for instance, to the ancient world, and the same holds true in reverse.  Squatters 
living in an abandoned building and scavenging for food from dumpsters do not seem to 
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be living decent lives by the standards to which most philosophers are accustomed.  But 
in many times and places such a life might not only have been thought to be not 
especially miserable, but positively comfortable.  The Decent Life Approach, as 
commonly understood, presupposes that some determinate sense can be given to the 
notion of a decent human life, and that this sense will remain good for all times and 
places.   
Perhaps the Decent Life Approach should be contextualized to particular 
societies.  But even if close attention to social and historical context can pare down much 
of the vagueness surrounding some plausible threshold of decency—and it is not clear 
that it can—that very concession will force a proponent of the Decent Life Approach to 
deny that the grounds of human rights are universal and transhistorical, which most 
philosophers take to be an intolerable result, at least for a theory of moral human rights.  
On the other hand, rejecting contextualism and adopting an absolute threshold reopens 
the concept of decency to an enormous range of borderline cases. Now, even this degree 
of vagueness is not necessarily intolerable; a proponent of the Decent Life Approach can 
certainly bite that bullet in order to satisfy the Urgency Condition.  The question I want to 
pose is why the Urgency Condition needs to be satisfied in the first place.  If there is no 
good reason to think that human rights are matters of urgent moral concern, then there is 
no reason an interest-based theory of human rights needs to satisfy the Urgency 
Condition, and therefore, no reason to prefer the Decent Life Approach to the simpler and 
more inclusive Flourishing Life Approach sketched above.  I will consider three reasons 
for thinking that satisfying the Urgency Condition is one desiderata for a theory of human 
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rights: the authority of ordinary usage, the problem of ceaseless assistance, and a view 
called Functionalism. 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to defend the Decent Life Approach‘s 
reliance on the Urgency Condition is by appeal to ordinary usage; a proponent might 
simply claim that the term ‗human right,‘ as it is used by the majority of competent 
English speakers, just is tied to especially high-priority norms.
18
  If, in practice, human 
rights discourse generally does presuppose this sense of urgency, then a descriptively 
adequate theory of human rights should attempt to capture that sense even if doing so 
inevitably involves chalking-in some extremely blurry lines.  There are several 
compelling lines of objection to this argument.  First, the empirical claim that human 
rights discourse is usually confined only to matters of urgent moral concern is open to 
doubt.  On one hand, prominent lists of human rights have always included relatively 
trivial items.  The Universal Declaration‘s infamous inclusion of a human right to paid 
holidays, its rights to the enjoyment of culture and the arts, and similar rights in other 
documents, seem to cut against the thought that the Urgency Condition is an integral part 
of some shared conception of human rights.
19
  On the other hand, the allegedly 
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 A similar argumentative strategy used to delimit the class of human rights attempts to fix the meaning of 
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 Article 24 of the Universal Declaration stipulates that ―Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, 
including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.‖  Most philosophers 
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unchecked ―inflation‖ of human rights discourse—much lamented in the philosophical 
literature—would point to a lack of respect for any such condition among activists, 
practitioners, and other popular sources of human rights claims.
20
  Even if this inflation 
were in part motivated by a desire to capitalize on the perceived urgency of human rights, 
the ordinary usage argument‘s own descriptivism would lead it to the conclusion that 
empirical support for the Urgency Condition it is attempting to establish is quickly 
eroding. 
Second, if ordinary usage did support the notion that the term ‗human rights‘ 
represents an especially urgent class of rights, it is not clear whether that fact would 
actually support the Urgency Condition. While human rights discourse is becoming a 
more familiar feature of our shared moral vocabulary, it lacks the pervasiveness and 
centrality that lead people to develop discernible views about its content and 
implications.  The concept of human rights found among the ‗folk‘ remains very thin: 
asking people their opinions about such matters is as likely to lead to invention, 
confabulation, and blank stares as it is to discover pre-theoretical convictions.    
Moreover, to the extent that such convictions can be discovered, it is not clear whether 
they will even be internally consistent, let alone consistent with the best philosophical 
theories of human nature, normative ethics, and moral and legal rights.  Thus, at the same 
time that ordinary usage is likely to be underdeveloped, to the extent that it is developed, 
it is also likely to harbor serious mistakes.  In short, while folk views may provide a point 
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of reference for theorizing about human rights, they are too indeterminate and too 
incomplete to provide much support for any specific theses, the Urgency Condition 
included. Finally, any empirical examination of the question would need to find out not 
just whether the folk viewed human rights as matters of moral urgency; it would also 
need to find out whether the folk thought this urgency attaches to moral human rights, to 
legal human rights, or to both. If it turned out, for instance, that human rights were 
thought to be urgent merely because legal recognition and enforcement of non-urgent 
rights would have negative practical consequences, it might be more reasonable to view 
the ‗folk‘ conception of human rights as tracking concerns relevant to institutional legal 
rights, rather than to moral rights themselves.
21
 
Another possible line of justification for the Urgency Condition‘s place in a 
theory of moral human rights relies on familiar worries about over-demandingness—a 
version of what I referred to above as the Ceaseless Assistance Objection.  A theory of 
human rights that rejected any sort of Urgency Condition, the objection runs, would 
demand that agents continually sacrifice their own projects and resources in order to 
secure more and more trivial human rights.  So long as their duties are only to protect and 
promote the interests necessary for living minimally decent human lives, rather than the 
wider class of interests shared by all human beings, these agents might seem to bear 
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limitless responsibilities to others.  James Griffin, for instance, argues that the claims 
resulting from the grounds of human rights require an upper bound in order to be 
―effective‖ and ―socially manageable.‖22  He therefore introduces a range of 
considerations he calls ―practicalities,‖ which function as a limitation or ‗cap‘ on the 
content of human rights claims. These practicalities are taken to be transhistorical and 
geographically universal considerations that include ―empirical information 
about...human nature and human societies, prominently about the limits of human 
understanding and motivation.‖23  For the same reason, a proponent of the Decent Life 
Approach may insist that restricting the grounds for human rights to a class of basic 
interests is the best or only way to establish this upper bound. 
The first thing to note here is that the unadorned interest theory of rights presented 
above is perfectly capable of recognizing human epistemic and motivational constraints; 
it is not as if the theory claims that for each right there must be some agent capable of 
fully satisfying the grounding interest.  Instead, the content of the duties these interests 
ground is heavily contextualized, because it depends, in large part, on the varied abilities 
of relevantly situated moral agents to influence the satisfaction of the interest—to 
promote or protect it, perhaps only by making it more likely to be satisfied, or by 
attempting to convince or compel other, more competent agents to satisfy it.  This is 
simply a restatement of the Responsibility Principle, to which any plausible version of 
Samaritanism is committed.  Second, and more to the point, as I argued in my defense of 
the unrestricted Responsibility Principle, there is no reason to suppose that there is a 
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single, absolute upper bound on the content of correlative duties.  As the ease with which 
an agent can promote or protect the rightholder‘s interest increases, and as her risk of 
incurring morally relevant costs in doing so decreases, her duties to protect and promote 
that interest become more stringent and more robust even when the interest is relatively 
trivial.  Still, this does not imply that the interest theory of rights presented above is 
committed to an uncompromisingly maximizing view of interest-satisfying correlative 
duties.  As I said above, where potentially duty-grounding interests are very trivial, the 
need to sacrifice one‘s own projects and resources becomes very unlikely.  And even 
when we are called to set aside trivial projects to protect or promote only slightly less 
trivial interests, the stringency of our duties is considerably less than that of the duties we 
bear to protect another person‘s more basic interests. 
Finally, an advocate of the Decent Life Approach can defend the Urgency 
Condition and the resulting distinction between basic and non-basic interests by adopting 
Human Rights Functionalism (hereafter, Functionalism): the view that the content of 
human rights is determined, in part, by the role those rights should or do play in 
international affairs.
24
  Most commonly, human rights are thought to be rights whose 
violation by a government provides a (defeasible) justification for coercive intervention 
by external parties.  The scope of the term ‗intervention‘ here may vary over a range of 
coercive measures.  John Rawls, for instance, argues that human rights articulate a 
threshold for military intervention.
25
  Others have reacted negatively to tying human 
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rights discourse so closely with this specific form of intervention, and have sought to 
broaden the range of actions human rights violations may justify, while simultaneously 
minimizing the role military intervention should play in a theory of human rights.
26
  For 
Raz human rights are those ―whose violation can justify any international action against 
violators: making conformity to rights a condition of aid, calling on states to report on 
their conduct re [sic] protection of human rights, condemning violation, refusing to 
provide landing or over-light rights, trade boycotts, and others.‖27   The fundamental 
thought unifying these positions is that since coercive intervention—whether armed or 
not—generally imposes a risk of serious harm on the subjects of the target government, 
the rights whose violation intervention is supposed to secure must be matter of great 
importance.  The concern is one of proportionality between the harms of intervention and 
the benefits it can secure; the more significant the threat posed by intervention, the more 
urgent the class of human rights must be to justify it.    
One might argue against Functionalism by claiming that it is just as unmotivated 
as the Urgency Condition, that is, that there is little reason to suppose there is some kind 
of analytic connection between human rights violations on the one hand, and the 
justifiability of coercive intervention on the other.  But the larger problem is that there is 
simply no consistent way to correlate specific kinds and scales of intervention with 
specific levels of harm.  This is because how much harm a particular intervention is likely 
to cause under a given set of circumstance depends on a wide range of contextual factors.  
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Suppose, for example, that we adopt the Rawlsian view, and make the list of human 
rights depend on which rights violations could justify armed intervention. The harm 
threatened by a given intervention will depend on, among other things, the scale of the 
intervention, the tactical competence, technological resources, and strategic positioning 
of the armed forces on either side, the location of crucial infrastructure and military 
objectives, the target government‘s ability and willingness to resist, the disposition of the 
civilian population, the disposition of other regional powers.  Armed interventions that 
differ significantly along any one of these dimensions impose drastically different levels 
harm on the affected parties.  The same holds true for non-military forms of intervention, 
including economic sanctions and other restrictions on sovereignty: though they may 
threaten serious harms for the populations of the target country, whether and to what 
extent they do depends, as above, on many factors specific to particular cases. It is 
therefore very difficult to see how Functionalism, justified by reference to the 
proportionality condition on coercive intervention, will enable the proponent of the 
Decent Life Approach to delineate a stable class of moral rights whose violation is 
consistently harmful enough to justify any specific kind of intervention.   
To be clear, I do not claim that stable generalizations cannot be made about 
correlations between given forms of intervention on the one hand and expected levels of 
risk and harm on the other.  In fact, I believe that such generalizations play a crucial role 
in specifying rules to guide the application of legal sanctions under international law.  
Instead, my claim is only that these generalizations have far too many exceptions to 
support the kind of in-principle restriction proponents of the Urgency Condition attempt 
to impose on the class of moral human rights.  I do believe, however, that the costs of 
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intervention and of legal enforcement more generally, provide practical reasons for 
limiting the range of rights a given legal system recognizes and attempts to enforce.  I 
now turn to questions about how to institutionalize moral human rights, that is, about how 
we ought to translate the Flourishing Life Approach to moral human rights into a 
normative account of legal human rights. 
 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In this section, I set out the case for a progressive theory of human rights—a theory in 
which the scope and content of internationally recognized legal human rights changes 
over time, becoming more demanding as the international legal system acquires greater 
enforcement capabilities.  I first articulate a legal ideal, the two main components of 
which are legal instrumentalism and the rule of law.  After explaining the relationship I 
think holds between legal recognition and legal enforcement, and after briefly comparing 
domestic and international legal systems, I use this ideal to motivate the basic argument 
for a progressive theory of human rights, and then offer three supplementary arguments 
to illustrate its advantages. 
Legal instrumentalism is the view that law and legal systems are a means to an 
end.
28
  While legal scholars often use the term to describe a view about how judges 
should decide particular cases, I use it here primarily to emphasize my belief that legal 
norms, like all political institutions, are human creations whose content and effects are 
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more or less under our control, and that it is therefore a sensible question to ask how the 
law ought to be used. I assume from the outset that the purpose of law—what it ought to 
do—is to promote justice by protecting individual moral rights.  Given that purpose, it is 
easy to see why the existence of any particular moral right provides a prima facie 
justification for a legal analogue, that is, a legal right which protects the same interests as 
a corresponding moral right, and places moral agents who bear moral duties to the 
rightholder under a corresponding legal obligation to do the same thing.  Ideally, a legal 
system and its body of laws would protect all individual moral rights. (Perhaps under 
such a system not all moral rights would need to have a direct legal analogue, but could 
instead be protected by a confluence of other legal rights.)  The human rights recognized 
and enforced under an such a legal system would exhaustively protect the moral rights 
human beings possess as such.  Non-ideal legal systems may be evaluated by how closely 
they approximate this ideal. 
I also assume from the outset that a legal system should respect the rule of law.  
According to Lon Fuller, the rule of law consists in eight requirements: (1) generality – 
they treat like cases alike (2)  promulgation – its laws must be made known  where they 
are to be enforced, (3) non-retroactivity – its laws may only be applied prospectively  (4) 
clarity – its laws must be stated in ways that can be understood by the general population 
, (5) consistency – its laws must not contradict each other (6) feasibility – its laws cannot 
require the impossible, (7) immutability – its laws should not be changed too frequently, 
and (8) congruence between official action and the law – its state officials must comply 
with the laws they are enforcing.
29
  These requirements may be viewed, as Fuller views 
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them, as internal constraints of the very concept of law, that is, as conditions which must 
be satisfied in order that law should exist at all, or they may be viewed instead as external 
and independently justifiable normative criteria for evaluating laws and legal systems.  
Presumably, an ideal legal system satisfies each of these conditions to the highest extent.  
In any case, legal reform should aim to move actual legal systems closer to this ideal, 
both in terms of the rights it protects, and in terms of the rule of law. 
The purpose of a legal system is to promote justice by protecting individual moral 
rights, and the primary way for it to do so is through coercive enforcement, that is, by 
inducing compliance from its subjects by the threat and use of sanctions.  Moreover, the 
rule of law requires that these sanctions be made public and explicit, and so the prior 
question facing a normative theory of legal rights is which individual moral rights a given 
legal system ought to formally recognize.  It is at least possible that a legal system might 
recognize all individual moral rights, supposing a list of these rights were available.  
However, there are limits to how much enforcement a legal system can actually 
accomplish.  These limits are largely set by two factors: the quantity and quality of 
resources the legal system has at its disposal, and its subjects‘ willingness to comply with 
its commands.  All things being equal, the more money, police, lawyers, courts, jails the 
system has at its disposal, and the more effectively and successfully it uses these 
resources, the more it will be able to induce compliance from its subjects.  Conversely, all 
things being equal, the more the subjects of the legal system are inclined to view it as 
weak, unreliable, or unjust, the less inclined they will be to comply with its commands 
(thus the practical importance of some degree of congruence between the moral rights 
protected by a legal system and the moral sentiments of its subjects).  The limits of a 
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legal system‘s enforcement capacity is important for a normative theory of legal rights 
because there are good reasons to think that legal systems ought not to establish laws they 
cannot enforce. 
First, a legal system‘s inability to enforce a given law to the point of general 
compliance leads to arbitrary and unfair treatment of its subjects, for several reasons.  
Since many non-compliant subjects will be caught and punished while many others will 
not, partial enforcement violates the condition of generality.  Moreover, since subjects 
will often be unable to predict whether and how likely their behavior will be to incur 
sanction, it violates the requirement that laws be accurately and clearly promulgated.  
Finally, since, ex hypothesi, it will be impossible for officials to enforce the law 
uniformly, they will necessarily act incongruently with its demands.  Second, even if 
unenforceable laws did not pose a threat to the rule of law, they would still hamper the 
legal system‘s ability to secure and promote justice.  On the one hand, such laws would 
tempt officials to overreach, sacrificing valuable resources trying and failing to enforce 
unenforceable laws at the expense of worse enforcement for other laws.  On the other 
hand, the largely idle threats that accompany unenforceable laws may erode a legal 
system‘s credibility, thereby decreasing its subjects‘ inclinations to comply with other 
aspects of the legal system.  Therefore, while a legal system could certainly recognize 
many unenforceable laws, including legal rights, there seems to be at least a prima facie 
reason for not recognizing them, and for eliminating them where they already exist. 
Since a legal system should neither recognize nor try to enforce all individual 
moral rights, choices must be made about which moral rights a legal system ought to 
protect.  It seems clear enough that a legal system ought to place priority on protecting 
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the most urgent moral rights, and on the interest theory of rights set out above, this means 
adequately protecting rights grounded on the interests most crucial to human welfare 
before expending resources on securing other rights.  Here we can see the beginnings of 
how the practical concerns that motivated the perceived need for the Urgency Condition 
will re-enter the picture as an important element in a theory of legal human rights.  The 
fact that legal systems can only enforce so many rights, and should not recognize rights 
they cannot enforce, means that there will need to be a line drawn between moral human 
rights which should and should not be institutionalized.  But it is important to see that this 
line will not be drawn by reference to some philosophical concept of ‗decency,‘ but is 
determined instead by the practical limits on enforceability within a given jurisdiction.  In 
fact, these practical limits might be taken to provide a suitable resolution to the vagueness 
of decency: various kinds of life are decent only relative to a society‘s institutional 
capacity to secure and promote its members‘ well-being.  As far as delineating a class of 
legal rights is concerned, however the concept of decency does no work whatsoever.   
Before moving on to my argument for a progressive theory of human rights, a 
word must be said about the differences and similarities between domestic and 
international legal systems.  The primary conceptual difference between them is that 
international legal systems include domestic governments among their subjects, and so 
protect individual moral rights from one level of political organization higher than 
domestic legal systems do.  The relationship is analogous to the relationship between 
state-level domestic legal systems and the legal systems of their administrative sub-units, 
although there is typically greater overlap and closer coordination between these two 
levels than between international and domestic legal systems.  This contributes to the 
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primary practical difference between the two, which at this point is largely a matter of 
effectiveness.  Where domestic legal systems, or at any rate the governments which they 
support, usually possess something close to a monopoly on the means of coercion within 
their territory, while international legal systems do not have anything like a monopoly on 
coercion within theirs.  However, the consolidation of coercive powers at the level of 
sovereign states is beginning to blur in both directions, as sub-national units acquire 
various forms of intrastate autonomy, and as international legal institutions gain more 
influence over state behavior.   
In any case, as in domestic law, the international legal system does have some 
ways to sanction those subject to its authority, and so to enforce compliance with its laws.  
It can incentivize compliance by offering sovereignty, recognitional legitimacy, and legal 
standing, financial aid, development assistance, and disaster relief, and it can also 
threaten to revoke these benefits.  Moreover, it can employ a range of coercive political, 
economic, and military sanctions through condemnation, exclusion, isolation, or 
intervention.  As with domestic legal systems, the international legal system must 
manifest the rule of law, which I presume entails publicly correlating specific classes of 
sanctions with specific classes of non-compliance, and then consistently applying those 
rules.  So long as it does, which sanctions should be correlated with which violations of 
the law appears to be a practical matter of determining which rules most effectively 
promote justice by protecting individual moral rights.  Adopting Functionalism, but 
applying it to legal rather than moral rights, I will say that the human rights which should 
be recognized under the international legal system are the moral human rights (or their 
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legal analogues) whose violation can (but does not necessarily) justify coercive 
intervention into sovereign states.  
The argument for a progressive theory of human rights can now be set out in its 
clearest form.  If Legal Instrumentalism is correct, then the purpose of the international 
legal system is to promote justice by protecting individual moral rights.  But the rule of 
law requires that the international legal system recognize only those rights it can enforce, 
and since its enforcement capacity is limited by the resources at its disposal and its 
subjects‘ native inclination to comply, it should only recognize institutionalize as legal 
human rights those moral rights it can adequately enforce.  However—and this is the 
crucial move—the international legal system‘s enforcement capacity varies from time to 
time and from place to place.  It follows that when and where the international legal 
system‘s enforcement capacity changes, so too should the range of legal human rights it 
recognizes.  As the international legal system gains more influence over state behavior, 
and as the norms its laws embody gain increasing acceptance from individual subjects, 
the range of legal human rights it recognizes and enforces should expand, starting with 
the most important protections for moral rights grounded on the most basic interests, and 
progressing outwards towards the ideal, in which the system would protect all moral 
human rights.  Of course, the rule of law demands a degree of immutability in a legal 
system, so progress should be slow and cautious.  Moreover, it is unlikely that the ideal 
will ever be reached, not only because persistent moral disagreement over the upper 
reaches of the non-basic interests will prevent a consensus from forming over the content 
of the legal ideal, but also because, even were such a consensus to form, the quality and 
quantity of resources needed for such robust enforcement would be astronomical.  
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Nevertheless, that idea provides a direction for change, and Legal Instrumentalism 
combined with the theory of human rights for which I have been arguing provide both the 
impetus and mechanism for that change. 
The case for a progressive theory of human rights can be brought out in three 
more ways.  First, it allows the human rights recognized by the international legal system 
to track the demands moral human rights place on states independently of the law.  As we 
saw above, the Responsibility Principle holds that the content and stringency of the duty 
grounded by a particular rightholder‘s interest for a particular duty-bearer is proportional 
to (1) the importance of the interest to the rightholder‘s well-being, and inversely 
proportional to (2) the cost to the duty-bearer of protecting or promoting that interest.  As 
moral agents themselves, states are very powerful, and it is often very easy for them to 
protect a great many shared human interests.  But if the content and stringency of the 
duties borne is inversely proportional to the ease with which the duty-bearer can 
discharge them, then as a state‘s enforcement capacity increases its duties to protect basic 
interests increases and it does more wrong by failing to discharge them.  Of course, the 
moral relationships that obtain between state and subjects changes far more quickly than 
the rule of law will tolerate.  But a progressive theory of human rights at least allows the 
content of international legal norms to follow longer trends in available resources, 
enforceability, and state power. 
Second, a progressive theory of human rights provides better incentives for states 
to protect more shared human interests, and to protect them better.  Since on such a 
theory many benefits of participating in the international community, as well as immunity 
against many kinds of intervention, are contingent on meeting a continually rising 
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standard, states would have compelling reasons to invest in securing the current list of 
legal human rights, as well as in prospectively developing their capacity to secure moral 
rights that will eventually be on that list.  Some, however, might believe that is it 
somehow unfair to require states to continually improve upon their protection for 
individual moral rights.  Isn‘t some level of protection for some finite subset of rights 
sufficient to garner those benefits and immunities?  But again, there appears to be little or 
no in-principle reason to believe that such absolute thresholds exist, and what practical 
reasons there are for demarcating them are sensitive to institutional context in the ways 
discussed above. 
Third and finally, a progressive theory of human rights would prevent the 
language of human rights, and the extraordinary consensus that has emerged regarding 
their centrality to the conduct and evaluation of international affairs, from becoming 
irrelevant as a result of setting unrealistic standards or of becoming obsolete.  Standards 
for international conduct we believe are appropriate today would have simply been too 
high for states that existed one hundred years ago; likewise, the standards that would 
have been appropriate for those states are ludicrously easy for most states to meet today.  
A transhistorical list of human rights, one whose content did not change relative to 
institutional context, would likely face one or the other of these fates, if not both, over the 
course of history.  By allowing the scope of legal human rights to change in ways that are 
sensitive to the capacity individual states and the international legal system have to 
enforce them, a progressive theory preserves the relevance of human rights. 
 In sum, the idea that human rights are or should be transhistorical and 
geographically universal standards is, at the very least, misleading.  While it is true that 
48 
 
the grounds of moral human rights—the underlying class of shared human interests—are 
independent of place and time, the content of those rights is highly sensitive to context.  
And when we turn our attention to the way human rights should be recognized and 
enforced under international law, we find that scarce resources and the rule of law require 
us to adopt a much narrower class of grounding interests, and tightly specify the degree 
of protections state must provide and the range of threats they must protect against.  The 
moral force of legal instrumentalism provides a justification for raising the standards of 
decency where and when resources allow; thus, on my view, a plausible theory of legal 
human rights will articulate a progressive and regionally varied class of rights.  This not 
only allows the international legal system‘s demands on its subjects to track the actual 
moral obligations those states bear to their constituents, but will also promote positive 
change, and prevent the language of human right from becoming irrelevant.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have set out a general, interest-based account of rights, and argued for a 
version of Samaritanism buttressed by the Responsibility Principle: the principle that the 
content and stringency of the duty grounded by a particular rightholder‘s interest for a 
particular duty-bearer is (1) proportional to the importance of that interest to the 
rightholder‘s well-being, and (2) inversely proportional to the cost to the duty-bearer of 
protecting or promoting that interest.  I then used this account to motivate a theory of 
moral human rights, according to which they are the rights grounded on shared human 
interests.  While the Decent Life Approach would restrict these grounds to only the most 
basic or urgent shared human interests, I rejected the Urgency Condition because there is 
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no principled reason to accept it, and because the practical reasons for restricting the 
grounds of human rights apply only to legal, and not moral rights.  Finally, I argued that 
the demands of legal instrumentalism and the rule of law, along with the limits of 
enforceability, support the view that the international legal system should only recognize 
the rights it can enforce, and that it should place priority on enforcing rights grounded on 
our most basic interests.  But since that legal system‘s limits of enforceability change 
from time to time and from place to place, the human rights it recognizes should also 
change.  So long as the extent to which international law can influence state behavior 
increases, and so long as the consensus about the list of shared human interests grows, the 
scope of legal human rights should expand, gradually approaching the ideal of complete 
legal protection for all moral human rights. 
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CHAPTER II 
SELF-DETERMINATION, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 
 
In this chapter, I present an account of the conceptual and normative relationships 
between political self-determination, representative government, and democracy.  I argue 
that a group‘s political self-determination, or at any rate, its right to political self-
determination, depends on whether it has a representative government—that is, a 
government whose decisions, actions, and policies reflect the collective political will of 
the people it governs.  I also argue that democratic governments tend to represent their 
people better than non-democracies, and that therefore the reasons we have for respecting 
and protecting political self-determination are stronger for societies arranged along 
democratic lines.  My argument proceeds as follows.   
In the first section, I clear some ground by elaborating on a stipulative and 
provisional account of political self-determination.  I explain that political self-
determination has both positive and negative aspects, and that both aspects are a matter of 
degree.  In the second section, I argue that the primary value of political self-
determination is instrumental: a group‘s self-determination should be respected and 
protected because it allows those most familiar with and most motivated to pursue group 
members‘ interests to do so.  In the third section, I set out an account of representative 
government, and argue that there are two importantly different ways to identify the 
members of a self-determining group.  On one of these ways, representative government 
turns out to be a conceptually necessary condition for political self-determination; on the 
other, it turns out to motivate or strengthen the reasons for respecting a group‘s political 
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self-determination.  Finally, in the fourth section, I offer a descriptive account of 
democratic political institutions, and argue that democratic governments are better able to 
represent the political will of the people they govern.  In combination with the forgoing 
arguments, it follows either that democratic societies are more self-determining than non-
democracies, or that there are stronger reasons to respect the self-determination of 
democracies than there are to respect the self-determination of non-democracies. 
 
1. THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
The concept of political self-determination is central to the law and conduct of 
international affairs, but canonical legal statements of what the concept entails are 
elliptical.  The International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights provide a prominent example.  The both adopt the same 
formulation, proclaiming that ―All peoples have the right to self-determination.  By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social, and cultural development.‖1  Though they implicitly distinguish the principle of 
self-determination from the concept—the right from what it protects—they do not give 
much indication of how to identify the relevant peoples, or what it means for them to 
―determine their political status‖ or ―pursue their development;‖ much less what it means 
for them to do so ―freely.‖ Philosophical discussion of political self-determination, on the 
other hand, tends to focus on the normative questions surrounding self-determination—
revolution, secession, intrastate autonomy, and so on—often glossing over the prior 
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 United Nations, ―International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,‖ and ―International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,‖ in Basic Documents on Human Rights, 5th Ed., I. Brownlie and 
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analytical question of what it is that makes a group self-determining.  Daniel Philpott‘s 
definition of self-determination as ―a legal arrangement which gives independent 
statehood or greater autonomy within a state,‖ is a case in point.2  Since Philpott is more 
concerned with justifying the moral importance of political self-determination, he 
explicitly leaves open the precise form that self-determination ought to take, on the 
grounds that ―different situations require different solutions.‖3 But there is much to be 
said about the nature of political self-determination between the formal, bare-bones 
characterizations often proffered in the literature and the particular legal arrangements 
that obtain in the real world, especially about the relationship between the self-
determining people and its political agent, the government.  In this section, my intention 
is to offer and elaborate on a provisional definition before turning to questions about the 
value of political self-determination and about the kinds of political institutions it 
requires. 
On my view, political self-determination is a group‘s capacity to make and 
implement political decisions that apply to all group members, and to do so free from 
interference by outsiders, that is, by persons and organizations who are not group 
members.   Political decisions, for our purposes, can be understood as decisions about the 
basic framework of rules and institutions that govern the conduct of persons in society—
about the content of the rules themselves, as well as about their legislation, adjudication, 
and enforcement.  It is important to see that these functions are both necessary to preserve 
order and safety for all members of society, and that they are essentially territorial.  As 
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 Daniel Philpott, ―In Defense of Self-Determination,‖ Ethics 105/2 (1995), pp. 352-85, at 353. 
 
3
 Ibid. 
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Christopher Wellman writes, ―Peace would be unavailable in the absence of a decisive 
and accepted method of enforcing common rules and adjudicating conflicts. Because 
conflicts typically occur between parties in spatial proximity...and because a judge can 
peacefully and decisively settle conflicts only if she has authority over both parties, a 
judge must have power over all those who share spatial proximity.‖4  While perhaps not 
every political decision deals with necessarily territorial functions, many if not most of 
them do, and for that reason I will limit my discussion to the political self-determination 
of territorially localized groups. 
Like liberty, freedom, and autonomy, political self-determination has both 
positive and negative aspects—the positive aspect being the group‘s native or internal 
capacity for choice and action, and the negative being the absence of interference from 
outsiders.  In what follows, I will for the most part be focusing on the former aspect, but 
it is worth pointing out how external interference can undermine or constrain a group‘s 
self-determination.  External agents can undermine self-determination by inhibiting or 
damaging a group‘s internal capacity for decision-making, for instance by deceiving, 
manipulating, blackmailing, or coercing individuals who occupy important roles within 
the institutions that allow for self-determination.  Or they may simply constrain the group 
as a whole, by threatening it with economic sanctions or intervention should it refuse to 
comply.  But many authors, particularly legal scholars, appear to place too much 
emphasis on this negative aspect of self-determination; for some, it is almost as if group 
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 Christopher H. Wellman, A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination. Cambridge 
University Press (2005), pp. 14-15.  Pogge call this the ―contiguity requirement,‖ writing that a ―key 
function of government‖ is ―to support common rules among persons who cannot avoid influencing one 
another through direct interaction and through their impact on a shared environment;‖ see Thomas 
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity Press (2002), p. 193.    
 
 
54 
 
self-determination is compatible with utter chaos and anarchy, so long as those outside 
the group refrain from interfering.
5
  Self-determination as mere non-interference is an 
anemic interpretation of the concept, because it fails to give proper attention to the ―self‖ 
of self-determination.  The positive aspect—the agential capacities to make and 
implement decisions—is just as crucial as the negative. 
 What is it, then, that enables a group to make and implement decisions?  By virtue 
of what do groups become agents?  In my view, the clearest analysis of group agency in 
the philosophical literature comes from Arthur Applbaum.
6
 Applbaum argues that there 
are three ways in which groups can acquire the necessary capacity: ―meshed aims and 
plans,‖ ―representation,‖ and ―procedure.‖  A group has meshed aims and plans when 
each member of the group shares the same goal, knows the other members of the group 
share that goal, and intends to coordinate his or her actions in ways that complement the 
others so as to achieve the goal.  This is the simplest way to form a group agent, though it 
is usually only sufficient for agency in small groups working towards concrete goals in 
fairly straightforward ways, as with small orchestras, sports teams, and so on.  
Applbaum‘s use of the term ―representation‖ differs slightly from my own, as he is 
referring to the way in which we can voluntarily allow or ―authorize‖ others to act on our 
behalf.  In Applbaum‘s words, ―under certain conditions, A can act for B in a way that 
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 Fernando Tesón offers a compelling attack on this overemphasis; see his classic Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality,3
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 Ed., Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers (2005), 
esp. Ch. 2-3.  
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 Arthur Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 35/4 (Fall 2007), pp. 359-
400, esp. 380-86.  For other recent work on group agency, see Frank Hindriks, ―The freedom of 
collective agents,‖ Journal of Political Philosophy 16/2 (2008) and David Copp, ―On the Agency of 
Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from Normative Autonomy,‖ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
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makes B the author of the action, and so the proper locus of responsibility for the 
action.‖7  Certain problems arise when we attempt to extend this model to political self-
determination, as it is doubtful that members of a self-determining group do or even can 
voluntarily cede this authority to their government, as I discuss below.  Finally, 
procedures—rules, practices, and institutions—allow individuals to compose group 
agents by providing a way to aggregate preferences and delegate responsibilities to group 
members to accomplish various tasks and goals.  Applbaum correctly notes that 
―Complex instances of shared agency typically will rely on all three routes,‖ and I 
assume throughout what follows that this is especially true for political self-
determination.
8
 
 One final point deserves emphasis.  Political self-determination, in my view, is a 
matter of degree.  That is to say, groups can be more or less free from interference by 
external parties, and they can have a more or less ‗robust‘ capacity for making and 
implementing political decisions.  What I mean by ―robust‖ is that the three ―routes‖ to 
shared agency just discussed can all suffer from various problems—the absence of shared 
plans, wayward representatives, broken institutions, and so on.  The scalar nature of 
political self-determination has two important implications.   First, if we have moral 
reasons to respect a group‘s political self-determination, the strength and extent of those 
reasons will depend on the degree of political self-determination a group has (or is able 
to) attain.  As with immature or mentally disabled individual persons, the decisions of 
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groups whose self-determination is highly compromised should not carry the same 
weight as the decisions of groups with a less-impaired capacity for self-determination.
9
   
 Second, that political self-determination comes in degrees can help us to see how 
it provides the continuum along which we can understand the increasingly important 
distinction in international affairs between what Philpott referred to earlier as 
―independence‖ and ―autonomy.‖  Naturally, there are many territorially localized groups 
that have little or no capacity for political organization at all.  But among groups that 
have the capacity for political self-determination, some possess a more or less ‗complete‘ 
self-determination—as self-sufficient internal capacity for group decision-making and 
action over all matters of political concern, and total freedom from external interference 
in those decisions.  Call this degree of self-determination ―political independence.‖  Other 
groups, however, have the capacity to make and implement decisions over some domains 
of political activity and not others, whether because they lack the resources, institutional 
sophistication, or some other part of the positive aspect of self-determination, or because 
their self-determination is limited, by agreement or by coercion, by some other, more 
independent group.  This kind of limited self-determination appears in many forms, 
ranging from municipalities and other administrative units within federal systems, to 
reservations for indigenous peoples, nationalist or separatist enclaves, and territories 
undergoing decolonization or post-conflict occupation and political reconstruction.  The 
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 As I suggested in Chapter 1, ―A Progressive Theory of Moral and Legal Human Rights,‖ and will discuss 
again in Chapter 3, ―Democratic Cosmopolitanism and Forcible Democratization,‖ while there may be 
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self-determination these groups possess is called ―political autonomy,‖ or sometimes 
―intrastate autonomy.‖10 
 In the next section, I address the value of political self-determination in general, 
without advancing any specific conclusions about the conditions under which groups may 
attempt to achieve varying levels of political autonomy or independence.  Much has been 
written on revolution and secession already, and although my arguments draw on those 
discussions, my purposes here do not require me to take a stand on these issues.  Instead, 
my focus will be on the moral reasons external parties have to refrain from interfering in 
the affairs of a group with a capacity for self-determination.  A note of caution is in order 
here: in subsequent sections, I aim to complicate the concept of self-determination I set 
out above.  Specifically, I will be concerned with how we ought to identify the members 
of a self-determining group, that is to say, with how we ought to identify the ―self‖ of 
such a group.  The substance of self-determination will remain the same, but how we 
understand the value of self-determination will turn out to hinge on the answer to this 
crucial question. 
 
2. THE VALUE OF POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
In this section, I present a general argument for the value of political self-determination.  
I claim that external parties have prima facie moral reasons to refrain from interfering 
with groups with a capacity for political self-determination—reasons to respect self-
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 For discussions emphasizing the potential benefits and harms of intrastate autonomy, respectively, see 
Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, 
Oxford University Press (2004), Ch. 9, and Svante E. Cornell, ―Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: 
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determination—because that capacity tends to promote to well-being of group members.  
This is true, I argue, because human beings are naturally most familiar with and most 
motivated to pursue their own interests and the interests of those with whom they 
associate and identify.  Obviously this is not always the case, and so the reasons external 
parties have to refrain from interfering in the political affairs of the group are defeasible.  
Nevertheless, the likelihood that external parties are less familiar with and less motivated 
to pursue the interests of group members supports a general policy of non-interference.  I 
will also canvass three other possible accounts of the value of self-determination, two of 
which I reject outright, while remaining agnostic about the third.  For the sake of 
rhetorical convenience, I will sometimes refer to group‘s right or claim to self-
determination; although these terms carry an extraordinary amount of theoretical baggage 
with them, I intend them to imply no more than that external parties have prima facie 
reasons to refrain from interfering.   
 Perhaps the most common and direct attempt to account for the value of political 
self-determination is by reference to the value of individual autonomy, and specifically, 
the right to freedom of association.  The argument is that a group‘s right to self-
determination is nothing more than the sum of individual group members‘ rights to 
associate and disassociate with whomever they please.  Since we may exercise that right 
at our discretion we may do so in concert with others, voluntarily forfeiting our 
membership in one group in order to acquire membership in a new group at our 
discretion.  For external parties to interfere with such a voluntarily composed self-
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determining group, or to prevent us from forming one entirely, the argument goes, would 
inevitably violate the rights of individual persons.
11
   
Now, there is no problem with this argument insofar as it is used to justify 
emigration, even massive emigration.  But a major problem appears when it is used to 
justify a group‘s right to political self-determination.  Recall that political self-
determination is essentially territorial, because many critical political functions, like 
administering a legal system, can only be accomplished when all those within a particular 
region are subject to the same rules.  The Freedom of Association argument, by claiming 
that the value of political self-determination is to be explained by reference to individual 
autonomy, must stipulate that individuals may voluntarily dissociate from another self-
determining group in order to join another—and in order for this argument to differ from 
the argument for emigration, it must also stipulate that these individuals can bring their 
territory with them.  This would inevitably erode the territorial integrity of a pre-existing 
self-determining group, thereby undermining its ability to perform the political functions 
they need to protect their members from severe harm (violating Pogge‘s ―contiguity 
requirement‖).  Of course, it is possible to argue that we could restrict this right to 
territorially localized groups, which would allow the pre-existing group‘s territory to 
remain contiguous (though of course not wholly intact).  But again, such a group would 
almost inevitably bring with its swath of territory individuals who wished to remain 
members of the prior group, thereby violating their rights to free association.  On the 
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 For versions of the Freedom of Association argument, see David Gauthier, ―Breaking Up: An Essay on 
Secession,‖ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1994), pp. 357-372 and Harry Beran, ―A Liberal 
Theory of Secession,‖ Political Studies 32 (1984), pp. 21-31.  Allen Buchanan presents a very clear, 
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assumption that individual freedom of association can trump neither itself, nor the right 
members of the pre-existing group have to the basic necessities only effective political 
institutions can provide, the Freedom of Association argument for the value of political 
self-determination must be rejected.
12
 
 The second argument for the value of political self-determination, rather than 
placing the onus of justification squarely on the individual, instead places it entirely on 
the group.  Collectivist arguments hold that political self-determination is valuable to 
groups in the same way that autonomy is valuable to individuals.  This account requires 
us to accept the view that groups, qua group, have a moral status analogous to that of 
individual human beings, and that this moral status entitles the group to an analogous 
sphere of moral dominion over its own affairs.  On the Collectivist account, it is the 
group itself, and not its members, that is wronged by interference.  The problem here is 
that it is difficult to see why groups as such should matter from a moral perspective.  At 
least part of why human beings matter is that they have a ―point of view‖ from which the 
satisfaction of its interests can be experienced, that is, from which that satisfaction makes 
a difference to the entity itself.  As L.W. Sumner writes, ―our common notion of an 
individual subject is of a unique, enduring centre of consciousness;‖ since groups as such 
do not possess any mental states at all, let alone the kind of consciousness that would 
allow it actually to experience harms or violations of its rights, it is not clear why we 
should extend to them anything like the moral status we extend to human beings and 
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 The foregoing objections to the Freedom of Association argument have been well-canvassed in the 
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other sentient life.
13
  But if groups cannot be moral subjects in any meaningful sense, 
then the Collectivist argument must also be rejected. 
 The Freedom of Association argument and the Collectivist argument for the value 
of political self-determination fail because they overestimate the justificatory work that 
can be done by one or the other side of the relation between individual group members 
and the self-determining group.  The remaining two arguments I want to discuss make a 
more explicit attempt to bridge that gap.  I endorse what I will call the Instrumental 
argument.  It begins by noting that individual human agents have epistemic and 
motivational advantages over others when it comes to their own interests: we are almost 
always more familiar with our own needs, desires, and preferences than other people are, 
and, too, we are almost always more concerned to promote those needs, desires, and 
preferences.  These premises are obvious that it is difficult to think of arguments for them 
that do not seem to belabor the point.  Suffice it to say that we have privileged access to 
our own mental states, have much more opportunity to observe our own behavior, often 
benefit from the feedback of close acquaintances, and know our own histories and future 
plans in more intimate detail than anyone else.  Moreover, concern for our own interests 
appears to be as close to a biological and psychological imperative as anything can be.  
An only slightly less banal claim—and for similar reasons—is that we are usually more 
familiar with and concerned to promote the interests of our families, friends, and 
extended circle of associates.  
 More interesting, perhaps, is why bases other than kinship and direct association 
should be expected to yield similar, though weaker epistemic and motivational 
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advantages vis-à-vis others‘ interests.  On the one hand, as Clifford Geertz has noted, we 
do appear to have such ―primordial attachments‖ grounded on ―the assumed givens…of 
social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the 
givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a 
particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social 
practices.  These congruities…are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering, 
coerciveness in and of themselves.‖14  Henry Shue cites this passage in order to illustrate 
how very strong attachments can form to ―groups much smaller than nation-states,‖ and 
yet they are still a powerful illustration of our familiarity and concern for individuals 
beyond our close associates.  On the other hand, similarly powerful attachments to larger 
groups are also common features of human psychology.  As Kai Nielsen writes, when 
one compatriot meets another abroad, ―normally there will be a sense of at-homeness and 
an affinity with her [compatriot] that is rooted in their having a common culture: the 
songs they sing, the structure of jokes, the memories of places, a sense of common 
history, literary references, political experiences, and the having of all kinds of common 
forms of intimate ways of living.‖15  Moreover, Nielsen suggests, membership in self-
determining communities fosters these forms of attachment through shared social, 
economic, and political experiences.  While the boundaries of a political community may 
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Geertz. New York: Free Press (1963), p. 109, cited in Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, 
and American Foreign Policy, 2
nd
 Ed.  Princeton University Press (1996), p. 145. 
 
15
 Kai Nielsen, ―Liberal Nationalism and Secession,‖ in National Self-Determination and Secession, 
Margaret Moore (ed.), Oxford University Press (1993), pp. 103-33, at 109. 
 
 
63 
 
cut across cultural lines, they cultivate new forms of attachment by placing members in a 
position where cooperation is necessary to confront mutual problems. 
 Here it would be appropriate to pause for a moment to clarify how this appeal to 
culturally-based attachment operates in the Instrumental argument, because it would be 
easy to conflate my position with nationalism.  Nationalists typically accept three theses: 
―(1) There is nothing inappropriate about identifying with one‘s nation and conationals; 
(2) conationals have special obligations toward one another; and (3) each nation has a 
right to political self-determination.‖16  I accept (1) and reject (2) and (3), but exactly 
none of these theses is necessary for my argument.  First, my claim is not that conationals 
ought to identify with one another.  It is perfectly compatible with my argument to think 
that conational identification is a regrettable and morally unjustifiable aspect of human 
psychology, and that we should take measures to prevent it from happening.  Second, I 
make no claim that conational identification grounds special obligations, obligations that 
we have over and above those we have toward other human beings.  Third, my argument 
neither relies on nor implies that each nation has a right to self-determination.  My only 
claim is that large numbers of conationals are often members of the same self-
determining groups, and that these individuals will tend to have epistemic and 
motivational advantages in promoting each others‘ interests.  While the three theses 
associated with nationalism are normative, my premise is purely descriptive.  
Furthermore, there is no reason to think that the kinds of attachment formed between 
members of a self-determining group need to be based on cultural similarity.  Members 
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of the same society often have mutual economic and ideological interests that could only 
tendentiously be brought within the realm of nationalist attachment. 
 In any case, from here the Instrumental argument is fairly straightforward.  I have 
claimed that the members of self-determining groups, owing to their personal and cultural 
attachments, as well as to their similar positions within the social, economic, and political 
units in which they find themselves, are generally more familiar with and more concerned 
to promote the interests of their fellow group members than outsiders are.  And they are 
beyond doubt more familiar and more concerned to promote their own interests.  But if 
this is so, then it seems reasonable to suppose that allowing those same people to make 
and implement the political decisions by which they are to live, they are more likely than 
outsiders to do so in ways that promote their welfare.  The corollary to this is that 
external parties are less likely to make and implement political decisions that promote the 
welfare of group members.  Thus, on the self-evident assumption that human welfare is 
something worth protecting and promoting, external parties have prima facie reasons to 
respect a group‘s political self-determination. 
 Now, clearly these reasons are defeasible.  Some group members will remain 
ignorant of some of their compatriots‘ interests as a result of physical or social distance, 
lack of education, or a lack of known, tangible mutual concerns.  More disturbingly, 
some group members, far from being ignorant of the compatriots‘ interests, will be 
indifferent to or even openly hostile towards them.  Religious resentment, ethnic hatred, 
regional jealousies, ideological polarization, and class warfare can, at their worst, rend 
asunder the general communal beneficence the Instrumental argument presupposes.  In 
fact, such conditions can undermine the possibility of group self-determination 
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altogether, as I explain below.  The existence of these regrettable circumstances is not 
itself an objection to the Instrumental argument and it seems reasonable that an account 
of the value of political self-determination should be sensitive to cases in which self-
determination would or does have disastrous consequences for members of the group in 
question.   
The real objection to the Instrumental argument is that it provides too flimsy a set 
of reasons against interference.  The intuition behind the objection is that grounding the 
value of political self-determination on instrumental reasons opens up the possibility that 
even if self-determination is beneficial to group members, interference by outsiders might 
be even more beneficial.  Thus, the objection claims, the Instrumental argument allows 
reasons to respect self-determination to be overridden too easily, both when there is 
sufficient internal division to render self-determination harmful, and when there are 
outside parties able to interfere in beneficial ways, regardless of the level of internal 
division. 
Two counterpoints must be borne in mind to accurately assess the force of this 
objection.  First, the mere presence of social conflict does not undermine the Instrumental 
argument; conflict and cohesion exist in all political communities, and for the 
Instrumental argument to fail to justify political self-determination in particular cases (as 
it surely does) the conflict must be severe enough to overcome the cohesive effects 
discussed above.  Social conflicts over religion, ethnicity, region, ideology, and class can 
be significantly dampened in communities where individuals typically identify with 
several overlapping social groups—it allows members of clashing ethnicities, for 
example, to find common ground in class solidarity, and provides a new basis for 
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familiarity and reciprocal beneficence.  Perhaps most important is a stable consensus 
about the political mechanisms through which such conflicts are to be resolved.  So long 
as both parties to a conflict continue to place value on the institutions and procedures that 
enable their political self-determination, they will share at least some values with their 
compatriots, and some motivation to refrain from actively undermining their interests. 
 Second, the Instrumental argument for political self-determination need not be 
taken as a case-by-case guide to the moral force of the reasons for non-interference.  That 
these reasons are defeasible does not mean that outsiders should consider intervening 
every time they are.  Instead, the Instrumental argument can be taken to support a 
heuristic, a rule of thumb, or a strong presumption against non-interference.  The familiar 
thought here is that even though a general policy of non-interference may err on the side 
of caution, leading outsiders to refrain from interference when it could do a considerable 
amount of good, it might promote human welfare better than a policy of consistently 
interfering whenever it appears that interference would benefit members of the self-
determining group, because this latter policy would lead outsiders to err on the side of 
temerity.  There are good reasons to think that this is generally true, namely, the fact that 
external parties contemplating interference are highly likely to overestimate their abilities 
and commitment to benefiting the self-determining group, and to underestimate the risk 
and uncertainty involved in such attempts, as a result of ignorance, hubris, bias, and self-
interest.   
Still, some philosophers remain troubled about the prospects for grounding the 
value of political self-determination on purely instrumental reasons, and prefer to search 
for deontological reasons to respect self-determination.  Wellman, for instance, believes 
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that both individuals and groups capable of self-determination ―retain their positions of 
dominion even when their decision making clearly does not maximize overall happiness,‖ 
and so believes that arguments based on the positive consequences of political self-
determination are insufficient because ―agents are entitled to their self-determination, and 
entitlement is a fundamentally deontological notion that cannot be fully cashed out in 
consequentialist terms.‖17  In my view, the most compelling deontological argument for 
reasons to respect self-determination is Altman and Wellman‘s view that those reasons 
stem from the importance of respecting collective achievement.
18
   
The Collective Achievement argument begins by noting that the capacity for self-
determination generally requires an enormous amount of coordination, which, in turn, 
requires great skill, effort, and commitment on the part of group members.  It is not easy 
to develop or maintain the social and political institutions necessary for responsible self-
government, as many failed attempts at doing so have shown.  Acquiring the capacity for 
genuine self-determination therefore represents a significant accomplishment, and to 
deny a politically viable group the opportunity to determine its own affairs wrongfully 
disrespects the efforts put forward by individual group members.  As Altman and 
Wellman point out, this disrespect becomes especially clear in the context of colonialism 
and forced annexation. ―Imperial domination is an affront to the colonized in the form of 
an attitude that says, ‗You cannot govern yourselves properly and so we must govern 
you.‘  As with forced annexation,‖ they write, ―this affront constitutes a serious wrong 
against the individuals who make up the colonized group. [It] denies to the group the 
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recognition respect that is owed to it in virtue of the fact that its members are able and 
willing to perform the requisite political functions of a legitimate state.‖19 
The Collective Achievement argument may appear to run afoul of value-
collectivism, because it claims that the politically viable group, qua group, is the holder 
of a right to self-determination.  But Altman and Wellman are quick to point out that 
while the argument attributes a moral right to the group, the parties actually wronged by 
the violation of this right are individual group members, rather than the group itself.  In 
denying a politically viable group the ability to choose its own path, a state derogates the 
members of that group by implicitly or explicitly acting as if they, the individual group 
members, are incapable or unwilling to coordinate their activities in the ways needed to 
form an independent, legitimate state.  Where group members are able and willing to do 
so, however, they are entitled to respect—a respect which gives other parties a strong 
deontological reason to respect their self-determination. 
 I remain agnostic about this argument not because I see in it any serious potential 
weaknesses—although as I explain below, if the Collective Achievement argument 
supports the self-determination of groups whose political decision-making systematically 
excludes many group members, it is not clear whether and to what extent those members‘ 
contributions to the achievement should count as a basis for respect.  Instead, I am simply 
unmoved by the alleged need to find a deontological basis for individual or group self-
determination, and am skeptical of the idea that we require the notion of entitlement to 
explain our very strong sense that individuals and groups should be left alone to make 
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their own self-regarding decisions.  Wellman anticipates such a response, writing that 
―Although thoroughgoing consequentialists will no doubt bristle at this explanation of the 
deontological reasons to respect autonomy, I suspect that most will find it congenial.‖20  
Despite my skepticism, the Collective Achievement argument at least does no damage to 
my claims in subsequent sections, so I am happy to remain agnostic on the matter.  In 
what follows, I present thumbnail accounts of representative government and democratic 
political institutions, and relate them back to the Instrumental argument for the value of 
political self-determination just discussed. 
 
3. SELF-DETERMINATION AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
In this section, I offer an account of political representation.  The account is not intended 
to be perfectly general since, following Pitkin, I believe that there are at least several 
plausible ways to understand the concept of representation.
21
  My intention, rather, is to 
use the concept of representation to explain the relationship that must obtain between a 
government and the people it governs in order for the group as a whole to be capable of 
the kind of political self-determination worthy of respect.  For my purposes, I will define 
a representative government as one whose decisions, actions, and policies reflect or 
accord with the collective political will of the people.  After detailing this view, however, 
I will—as promised—highlight an ambiguity that plagues the account of political self-
determination I set out in the first section.  This ambiguity concerns how we ought to 
delineate or ‗individuate‘ self-determining groups.  I will not attempt to resolve the 
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ambiguity, but will instead use it to motivate a constructive dilemma: either 
representative government is conceptually necessary for a group‘s political self-
determination, or it is practically necessary for a group‘s political self-determination to 
have value.  In this next section, I explain why democracies represent the collective 
political will of their peoples better than non-democracies. 
 Political self-determination is a group‘s capacity to make and implement political 
decisions, and as I said above, requires a form of group agency.  Central to the concept of 
agency is the notion of a ‗will.‘  In a causal story of intentional behavior, the will 
mediates between deliberation and action: an agent deliberates about her desires and 
about alternative ways to fulfill them, aggregating them into a more or less coherent and 
unified will, and that will is what moves the agent to action.  Following Harry Frankfurt, 
I will say that an individual agent‘s will is the effective subset of her desires: the desires 
that do, or will, or would move her to action given the operation of some deliberative 
faculty or procedure.
22
  When Alice orders steak from the menu instead of fettuccini 
despite her desire for both, her order indicates the content of her will: it is her desire for 
steak, and not her desire for fettuccini, that moves her to action.  Prior to her deliberation, 
her will was indeterminate, because (we are supposing) her desires for steak and 
fettuccini were evenly matched.  But it is important to see that even when considered in 
abstraction from the deliberative faculty or procedure by which Alice‘s desires are 
whittled down to their effective subset, her will is not completely indeterminate.  
Imagine, for instance, that Alice possesses an overpowering desire for steak, or that her 
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desire for steak, while not particularly strong, is simply uncontested, because she has no 
desire for anything else on the menu.  In cases like these, some of Alice‘s will is 
determinate independently of her faculty of deliberation because some of her desires 
would be effective under almost any reasonable deliberative procedure.  What this means 
is that deliberation is only partially responsible for creating the agents will; some of that 
will is predetermined by the structure of her desires, and to that extent the agent‘s 
deliberation serves only to discover and refine that structure. 
 A parallel account can be given for the will of a group agent.  I will say that a 
group‘s will is the effective subset of all of its members‘ desires: the desires that do, or 
will, or would move the group to collective action, given some aggregative and 
deliberative procedure by which those desires are assessed and prioritized.  The only 
difference between an individual and a group will, on this account, is that in the case of 
the group, the potentially relevant set of desires is distributed among all and only group 
members.  Again, the group‘s will is necessarily indeterminate when considered in 
abstraction from the procedure by which some desires are made effective and others are 
not.  Nevertheless, as with individual agents, the group‘s will need not be entirely 
indeterminate.  The clearest cases of this are when group members are unanimous in 
sharing some particularly strong desire regarding their collective action.  All things being 
equal, such a desire should move the group to action under almost any reasonable 
deliberative procedure.  Some readers may balk at this last claim, because it is possible to 
imagine group decision-making procedures that could prevent such a desire from 
effectively moving the group.  My full answer to this question will emerge from my 
argument in the remainder of this section; for now I will just say that my answer amounts 
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to the claim that such a decision procedure would not be deliberative in the right sort of 
way for the group to constitute an agent (although I will not make the argument in those 
terms). 
 In any case, having introduced the notion of a group will, it will be easy to explain 
what I mean by the term ‗representative government.‘  Recall that any large-scale, 
complex shared agency will require meshed aims and plans, authorized representatives, 
and procedures.  With respect to political organization, a government comprises the latter 
two: the formal rules, practices, and institutions that aggregate desires, delegate 
responsibilities, and so on, together with the individual agents who occupy the roles and 
offices of those institutions.  A government is therefore a locus of collective decision-
making, and I will call the group of individuals over whom its decisions are 
implemented—those to whom the decisions apply—the government‘s people.  As I 
suggested above, the group‘s will can be divided into two parts: the part that is 
determinable independently of any particular decision procedure for aggregating 
individual members‘ desires, and the part that can only be known once that procedure has 
been applied.  For the sake of rhetorical convenience, I will refer to the former part as the 
collective political will of the people, to distinguish it from the group‘s fully specified 
and institutionally embodied will. In Applbaum‘s terms, the people‘s collective political 
will would consist of only the group members‘ ―meshed aims and plans,‖ without 
reference to the procedures and officials who help give more determinate shape to those 
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aims.  A representative government, then, is one whose decisions, actions, and policies 
reflect or accord with the collective political will of the people it governs.
23
 
 Some caveats are in order here.  First, I mean to keep the concept of 
representative procedurally neutral.  I argue below that democratic political institutions 
are the best way to ensure that the government represents its people‘s will, so it would 
beg the question for me to stipulate that representation requires democracy.  Instead, 
representation should be understood as a success condition: so long as government policy 
is congruent with the people‘s will, it does not matter how this comes about.  This is 
compatible with a kind of ‗accidental‘ representation; in the same way that a broken 
watch is right twice a day, so too might randomly chosen government policies happen to 
reflect or accord with the people‘s will as a matter of mere coincidence.  Second, 
representation is clearly a matter of degree.  The people‘s collective political will might 
encompass many particular policy preferences, and government policies may reflect or 
accord with some of these and not others.  Moreover, government policies may reflect or 
accord with a given policy preference to a greater or lesser extent.   
Third, the people‘s will may be more or less internally coherent; all things being 
equal, when group members are evenly divided between different policies, the 
government will be equally representative no matter which of those policies it adopts, 
although it would be more representative if some mutually acceptable compromise could 
be found between the opposing sides.  To some extent, the existence of some set of 
overlapping desires and preferences, some meshed aims and plans, is necessary for 
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representation since in its absence there would literally be nothing to represent.  Along 
with effective institutions, the existence of a collective political will is a major social 
precondition for the possibility of representative government.  Fourth and finally, to say 
that a government is representative is not to say that it is ultimately good, justified, 
legitimate, or authoritative.  While representation may be a necessary condition on a 
government‘s being one or more of those things, it is clearly possible that people can 
collectively will things that are morally wrong.  A government whose policies reflected 
that will would do bad things, but it would not therefore be any less representative.  I will 
explain the value of representative government in terms of its relation to political self-
determination.  But before doing so, we must attend to a problem about how to identify or 
individuate politically self-determining groups. 
I have said that political self-determination is a group‘s capacity to make and 
implement political decisions.  The problem is that, as stated, this definition is ambiguous 
between two different ways to individuate the relevant group.  On one view, we pick out 
self-determining groups by first locating the capacity for making and implementing 
political decisions, and then ask which individual persons‘ desires or preferences have 
some sort of influence over the outcome of those decisions.  Those whose desires do are 
part of the self-determining group; those whose do not, are not.  Call this the Capacity 
First approach to the problem of individuation.  On another view, we identify self-
determining groups by first locating a group whose membership is settled by reference to 
something other than the ability to influence the outcome of collective decision-making 
processes—culture, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship, and so on—and then ask whether 
some portion of that group has the capacity to make and implement political decisions 
75 
 
that apply to the rest of the group.  If it does, then the group is self-determining, and if 
not, then not.  Call this the Group First approach to the problem of individuation. 
To see why this is a problem—why the right way to individuate groups is not 
obvious—consider the following example.  Suppose there are a number people across the 
street engaged in a task of considerable complexity: they are building a house.  
Completing the task requires a high degree of coordination between the individual 
workers; some workers are pouring concrete, others are constructing the frame, while still 
others are installing plumbing and electricity.  Facilitating this coordination is a project 
foreman, who consults the blueprints he has drawn up, occasionally making 
modifications, and who shouts orders to the workers and inspects their work.  The group 
appears to be—the group is—a collective agent.  Neither the foreman nor any of the 
individual workers could accomplish the task by himself.  Do we know enough to say 
that the group is self-determining?  On the Group First approach, we do.  There is no way 
that such an agent could function without having the capacity to make and implement 
decisions that apply to everyone engaged in the project, and on the Group First approach, 
this answers the question. 
But now imagine that all along, the project foreman has been coercing the 
workers to comply with his commands—he has a gun, and the workers believe he will 
shoot them if they do not do as he says.  Moreover, the foreman simply ignores any 
suggestions or requests that come from the workers.  They are given detailed instructions 
and they carry them out without question.  Note that this does not change the Group First 
answer: the group has the capacity to make and implement decisions, period.  But on the 
Capacity First view, the answer is different.  On that view, we first locate the capacity for 
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decision-making and then ask who has the ability influence the outcome of those 
decisions.  In this case, that includes the foreman and no one else.  For the Capacity First 
view, there are really two groups building the house.  The foreman is the sole member of 
the self-determining group (imagine the foreman and his wife are running the project 
together, if you have problems with single-member groups), and his decisions alone 
determine the behavior of the members of the other group. 
I suspect that most readers will be drawn to the Capacity First view, because in 
this case they do not want to describe the whole group—workers and foreman—as self-
determining. I am similarly drawn to that approach.  But there are two reasons to be 
skeptical of this intuitive response.  The first is that the Group First view is difficult to 
argue against on purely conceptual grounds. Of course we may have good moral reasons 
to prefer that the foreman not coerce his workers at gunpoint.  But why think such 
normative considerations are relevant to the question of self-determination?  Why not 
identify political self-determination with mere collective agency?  The question cannot be 
answered except by stipulation.  The second problem is that ordinary discussions about 
self-determination seem implicitly to adopt the Group First view.  We ask: are the Kurds 
in Northern Iraq capable of political self-determination?  Are Kosovars?  Are Texans?  
We are not looking at the government in Kirkuk and asking after the extent to which the 
preferences of the Kurdish inhabitants in Northern Iraq can influence the outcomes of 
political decision-making.  Instead, we are asking whether the government in Kirkuk is 
strong enough to implement its political decisions throughout Iraqi Kurdish territory.  I 
do not want to adjudicate between colloquial and philosophical senses of the term 
―political self-determination‖ for the same reason I do not want to adjudicate the 
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descriptive-normative issue: there are no decisive arguments on either side, and 
stipulating one or the other runs the risk of equivocation.  Pending arguments to the 
contrary, I will proceed on the methodological assumption that neither approach to the 
problem of individuation is unreasonable or unjustified.  My remaining argument about 
the relationship between self-determination and representative government will work for 
both approaches, although in slightly different ways. 
 There are two arguments for the view that representative government is necessary 
for valuable self-determination, that is, self-determination worthy of respect by outside 
parties; each argument corresponds to one of the two ways of individuating self-
determination spelled out above.  For those who adopt the Capacity First approach, I 
offer a conceptual argument.  According to the Capacity First approach, we are to 
individuate groups by first locating the capacity for collective decision-making, and then 
ask whose desires and preferences could potentially influence the outcome of those 
decisions.  Now suppose we have a representative government—a government whose 
decisions, actions, and policies reflect or accord with the collective political will of the 
people.  Since each group member‘s desires are potential components of the people‘s 
will, and since the decisions of a representative government reflect that will, it follows 
that under representative government, each group members‘ desires could potentially 
influence the outcome of that government‘s decisions.  And since each group member‘s 
desires could potentially influence the outcome of the government‘s decisions, according 
to the Capacity First view, that group is self-determining.  But the situation is different 
under a non-representative government.  The decisions, actions, and policies of such 
governments do not reflect or accord with the collective political will of the people, and 
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so some members‘ desires will inevitably lack even the potential to influence the 
outcomes of government decision-making.  But this implies that the group in question is 
not self-determining—the ―self‖ doing the determining excludes some group members.  
On the Capacity First approach to individuating self-determining groups, representative 
government is conceptually necessary for political self-determination because only under 
such governments is the scope of the group‘s ―self‖ coextensive with the group over 
whom the government implements its decisions.  Without representative government, 
there would always be one self-determining subgroup whose decisions unilaterally 
applied to the remaining members. 
 On the Group First view, however, representative government is not a 
conceptually necessary condition on the group‘s self-determination.  Instead, it is a 
practically necessary condition on the value of that group‘s self-determination.  On the 
Group First view, we first delineate the group based on some characteristic other than 
whose interests potentially influence government decisions—say, based on citizenship—
and then ask whether some subgroup of citizens has the capacity to make and implement 
political decisions that apply to the group as a whole.  Now,  recall that the Instrumental 
argument for the value of political self-determination held that self-determination is 
valuable because it allowed those most familiar and most motivated to pursue their own 
and their fellow group members‘ interests to make and implement the political decisions 
that affect those interests.  But while each citizen‘s desires potentially influence the 
collective political will, the decisions of a non-representative government will be 
unresponsive to some parts of that will, leaving some of those most familiar with and 
most motivated to pursue their own and their fellow group members‘ interests out of the 
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decision.  This implies that the extent to which a government represents the collective 
political will of its people is roughly the extent to which the epistemic and motivational 
advantages those people have vis-à-vis the promotion of their interests will accrue to the 
value of their self-determination.  In short, the more group members who go 
unrepresented, the less likely that group‘s political self-determination is to promote their 
interests, and so the weaker the prima facie reasons outside parties have to respect it.  On 
the Group First view, the degree of representation will roughly correlate with the value of 
the group‘s self-determination; or, put more simply: representation is practically 
necessary for a group‘s self-determination to have value. 
 It‘s also worth noting that a parallel argument can be made for the Collective 
Achievement argument.  According to the Collective Achievement argument for the 
value of political self-determination, outside parties ought to refrain from interfering in a 
self-determining group because to do so would disrespect individual group members‘ 
contributions to the group‘s ability and willingness to perform the requisite political 
functions.  But on the Group First approach to individuating self-determining groups, 
self-determination is compatible with many group members playing little to no role in 
those political functions.  Under a representative government, we might say that all group 
members play at least some role in the group‘s capacity for political decision-making, 
even if they are merely passive subjects, since their desires and preferences help compose 
the group will which in turn helps determine government policy.  So long as the 
government continues to represent the people‘s will, enough passive subjects could adopt 
policy preferences that would run the group‘s capacity for self-determination into the 
ground, or they could adopt preferences that would allow it to flourish.   
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Under a non-representative government, they would be incapable of even this 
kind of contribution to political decision-making.  True, they might be employed in the 
implementation of political decisions made by others.  But first, unless the government 
wields direct control over every sector of the society, it will remain the case that a great 
many people are not so much implementing the government‘s decisions as they are 
passively complying with them.  It seems a stretch to believe that private citizens going 
about their daily lives, working jobs and paying bills, are somehow contributing to the 
group‘s capacity for self-determination, and thereby worthy of respect on those grounds.  
Perhaps the case could be made that group members contribute by paying taxes, but 
again, this is done under threat of punishment.  Recall the foreman example from above: 
are the coerced workers disrespected by a passerby who interferes with the foreman‘s 
ability to make decisions and issue commands?  Clearly not. 
Second, even where it is not coerced, the extent to which active participation in 
the implementation of government policy warrants the necessary kind of respect is 
unclear.  The argument here must be that group members implementing government 
policy deserve respect for the same reason a wide receiver does for her participation in 
plays called by the quarterback.  But it seems as though the quarterback deserves 
considerably more credit for her role than the receiver does for hers—the appropriate 
degree of respect appears to diminish the less influence one has over policy decisions, 
which means that the contributions of many low-level officials warrant considerably less 
respect than the contributions of those with more responsibility.  The upshot is that, 
unlike non-representative governments, representative governments allow everyone they 
govern to have at least some potential influence over policy decisions, while requiring 
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(ceteris paribus) roughly the same level of participation in the implementation of those 
policies.  In other words, the individuals under a representative government will likely be 
more entitled to respect then their counterparts working under non-representative 
governments.  As with the Instrumental argument, the strength of the reasons outside 
parties have to respect a group‘s self-determination appear to depend, in large measure, 
on the extent to which its government represents the collective political will of the people 
it governs.  However, since my primary claim is based on the Instrumental argument for 
the value of political self-determination, I will prefer to say that ultimately the strength of 
those reasons derives from their connection to human well-being. 
 
4. REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRACY 
To this point, I have argued that political self-determination, understood as a group‘s 
capacity to make and implement political decisions free from outside interference, is 
valuable because it generally promotes the welfare of individual group members, and 
that, all things being equal, the better the government represents the collective political 
will of the people it governs, the better off those people will be.  I now want to argue that 
democratic governments are generally better at representing the collective political will 
of the people they govern, and so tend to make those people better off than they would be 
under non-democratic governments.  Before making that argument, however, it will be 
necessary to discuss how I intend to understand the concept of democracy. 
 Like self-determination and representation, democracy is an essentially 
contestable concept—one about whose broadest outlines there is some widespread 
agreement, but whose finer contours and content are subject to perpetual disagreement.  
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There are two very general ways to talk about democracy.  We might discuss democracy 
in terms of the core values it is supposed to embody or promote, or we might discuss the 
institutions needed to embody or promote those values in a specific context.  In my view, 
the best way to capture the sense of democracy is by reference to the value of political 
participation, and more specifically, to what Robert Dahl called the Principle of Affected 
Interests.
24
  The Principle of Affected Interests holds that all those affected by a 
government‘s decisions have a right to participate in them.25  This principle is prone to 
various counterexamples in which it is alleged that merely being affected by a decision 
does not entitle the affected party to participate, and the standard response is to qualify 
the principle in the appropriate ways.  For instance, by limiting the principle‘s scope of 
application only to those whose most basic or important interests are affected by 
government decisions, or to those whose most basic interests are significantly affected, 
which would prevent the implication that the (usually) relatively trivial affects a 
government‘s decisions have on distant foreigners have a right to participate in that 
government.  Or, rather than limiting the principle‘s scope by reference to the degree of 
affect a government‘s decisions have on potential rightholders‘ interests, it might be 
limited by reference to the kind of affect it has.  Many philosophers have thought that a 
more plausible version of the Principle of Affected Interests is the Coercion Principle, 
which holds that only those who are coerced by a government‘s decisions have a right to 
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participate in its decisions.  There is much more to be said about the Principle of Affected 
Interests, but I will leave that discussion for another time.
26
 
 But having fixed the concept of democracy around the concept of participation, it 
is important to note that the preconditions for effective participation by those who have a 
right to participate vary from one context to another.  Since I am interested in the political 
self-determination of whole societies, I will adopt Dahl‘s account of the political 
institutions necessary for large-scale democracy.
27
  This amounts to an operational 
definition of the concept, one that allows us to assess whether and to what degree 
particular societies are democratic by reference to a list of concrete, tangible institutional 
criteria.  According to Dahl, six kinds of institutions are necessary for a functioning 
large-scale democracy: 
 
1. Elected officials 
2. Free, fair, and frequent elections 
3. Freedom of expression 
4. Alternative sources of information 
5. Associational autonomy 
6. Inclusive citizenship 
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Clearly there is some overlap between these six kinds of institution, and below I hope to 
indicate at least some of the deep relations of mutual support and dependence between 
them.  But my main purpose here is to relate these institutions to the notion of political 
participation, and then to explain how they tend to produce more representative 
governments than do non-democracies, that is, societies in which some of these 
institutions are seriously hobbled, or missing entirely. 
 In very large groups, direct participation by every group member (participation in 
which group members assemble, debate, and decide about what actions to take and what 
policies to implement) is largely impossible.  There are simply too many people for 
everyone to participate in the same political forum at the same time.  But indirect 
participation (participation in which group members participate by proxy) remains 
possible by virtue of an electoral system embodied in criteria (1) and (2) from the list 
above.  Under such a system, group members select officials through majoritarian 
procedures to assemble, debate, and decide about political matters on their behalf.  Of 
course, in order for this system to work, voters must have accurate information about 
candidates‘ goals and values and about their elected officials‘ performance while in 
office, which in turn requires institutions that allow and protect the free flow of 
information between and among themselves, candidates for office, and office-holders—
institutions embodied in the freedom of expression (3) and a free and independent press 
(4).  The freedom to form political associations such as interest groups, fundraising and 
lobbying organizations, political campaigns, political parties, and so on (5), contributes to 
this free flow of information, as well as to the ability of individual group members to 
engage in effective political action.  Finally, the right to participate in these institutions 
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must be broadly inclusive (6); that is, everyone, or nearly everyone who falls within the 
scope of the government‘s decisions must have access to all of them.  Naturally, different 
democratic theorists will characterize, prioritize, and defend these institutions in different 
ways and by reference to values other that political participation.  But however we decide 
to motivate Dahl‘s criteria, I take it as given that the institutions he describes are the 
subject of a widespread consensus about what large-scale democracy requires in the real 
world. 
 Why are democratic governments more likely to represent the collective political 
will of the people they govern?  The answer is straightforward.  The institutions that 
structure the political affairs of a large-scale democratic society give the very people 
whose desires and preferences constitute the collective political will significant control 
over the government‘s decisions, actions, and policies.  First, owing to their freedom of 
expression and their access to a variety of independent sources of information, the people 
will be aware of what the government is doing and how it might affect them.  Second, 
when the government‘s behavior begins to diverge from what the people want, they can 
use the electoral system at their disposal to quickly replace the responsible officials at 
little cost to themselves.  (In non-democratic societies the only way to bring about 
comprehensive changes in government personnel is through revolution.)  Third, the fact 
that they can be quickly and efficiently replaced for failing to represent the collective 
political will of the people gives them strong incentives to avoid diverging from that will 
in the first place.  Fourth, associational autonomy buttresses both the free flow of 
information necessary to an informed policy, and provides a foundation on which to build 
the political momentum for change: the freedom to organize for political purposes 
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multiplies individual group members‘ ability to broadcast and promote their political 
views, and thereby influence the direction of government decision-making.  Finally, 
inclusive citizenship ensures that no numerically significant population whose desires and 
preferences partially constitute the collective political will are disenfranchised: no 
contributor to the collective will is prevented from taking action to ensure that his or her 
interests are given due consideration.  In short, democratic governments tend to represent 
the collective political will of the people they govern because when it does not, those 
people are aware of that fact, and have the means to correct it. 
 Another way to bring out the advantages democracy has for representative 
government is to consider how those advantages also mark out deficiencies in non-
democratic political systems.  Paradigmatic examples of non-democracies are societies 
that lack anything like the electoral system described above.  A government lacking in 
elections and elected officials may still protect freedom expression, freedom of 
association, and a free press, and may even extend those institutions to everyone.  But 
without a formal, effective, and peaceful mechanism by which the people can hold their 
government accountable for its behavior, the government is likely to flout or simply 
ignore their collective will.  This need not be a matter of exploitation, at least not 
initially.  Government officials will often share many desires and preferences for policy 
with the people they govern, and many of them will no doubt be motivated to represent 
the collective political will of their own volition.  But the fact is that such officials are 
often individually and collectively in a position to exploit their subjects, and repeated 
iterations of political decision-making will increase the opportunity and therefore the 
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likelihood of opportunism.  Lack of accountability will eventually lead to a lack of 
representation. 
 A similar dynamic is likely to occur even in societies that do have an electoral 
system, but whose system has too few offices open to electoral contest, or whose 
contestable offices are too insignificant to have much influence over political decision-
making, and likewise for systems in which elections are subject to voter coercion, or in 
which elections are a rare event.  Government officials need time to craft and implement 
new policies, so there is a danger of holding elections too often, but the lower the 
frequency of the elections, the less responsive to the collective political will the 
government will be in the meantime.  Infrequent elections pose the additional danger that 
officials will be able to consolidate enough power during their terms that they are able to 
affect the electoral system itself, essentially stacking the deck against potential rivals and 
securing their own positions. The same can be said for unelected officials.  If elected 
posts are merely symbolic, or if, taken together, they do not allow elected officials to be 
the key decision-makers on the most important matters of policy, then an unelected class 
of bureaucrats or hereditary rulers will have largely unaccountable, and therefore 
unresponsive control over government decisions.  The same is true for the absence of 
inclusive citizenship: widespread or subgroup-specific disenfranchisement can render a 
government systematically insensitive to important aspects of the collective political will. 
 But, finally, even with a reasonably uncompromised formal electoral system and 
inclusive citizenship, a government can fail to represent the collective political will of the 
people it governs if those people are misinformed about the available political options, or 
about the effect those options would have on them.  In the absence of freedom of 
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expression, access to independent sources of information, or associational autonomy, 
individual voters are more likely to be ignorant of important concerns facing their 
compatriots, ignorant of how the government is performing, and ignorant of the reforms 
political candidates for office are proposing.   Worse, the void left by a lack of 
information in such societies is often filled with government propaganda, which is 
intentionally designed to mislead voters about the government‘s behavior.  If the people 
cannot reliably translate their own or others‘ desires and preferences into electoral 
decisions likely to advance those desires, then there is no reason to suppose that the 
officials they elect will enact policies that represent the collective political will.  For all of 
these reasons, democratic governments tend to better represent the collective political 
will of the people they govern than do non-democracies. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that democratic political institutions—officials chosen in 
free, fair, and frequent elections, free speech and a free press, associational autonomy, 
and inclusive citizenship—tend to produce government actions, decisions, and policies 
that better reflect and accord with the collective political will of the people subject to that 
government‘s control.  Moreover, I have argued that such representative government is 
valuable insofar as it makes genuine political self-determination possible, or at any rate, 
insofar as it makes political self-determination valuable in the first place.  Of course, 
much of my argument has been instrumental, which inevitably leaves open the possibility 
that self-determination, representative government, or democracy might, in some cases, 
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fail to promote group members‘ interests to the extent that they might be under 
alternative political systems.  But again, on the one hand, a theory which claimed that any 
of those conditions were valuable even when they were seriously harmful to group 
members would be unappealing for that very reason. On the other hand, when the harm a 
self-determining people does to itself is relatively slight, the theory presented here is 
friendly to the suggestion that there may good reasons to refrain from interference so as 
to remain faithful to a rule of non-interference, one that promotes the overall well-being 
of group members in many groups, even when it fails to promote the well-being of group 
members in certain exceptional cases.  Articulating the proper conditions of this rule—
when exceptions are allowed and when they are not—is a task that lies beyond the scope 
of this chapter.  In the chapters to follow, I use the account of representative government 
developed here, and the theory of moral and legal rights developed Chapter I, to spell out 
a theory of political legitimacy I then use to argue for the moral, and eventually the legal 
permissibility of forcible democratization. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRATIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORCIBLE DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
Recent wars have led many to believe that the promotion of democracy cannot justify 
foreign intervention.  The American intervention in Iraq in particular has brought 
scholars, politicians, and the public to believe forcible democratization, the use of armed 
force to establish or restore democratic political institutions abroad, is unnecessarily 
destructive, ineffective, illegal, and fundamentally unjust.  I believe opponents of this 
practice—many of whom work from the same liberal, cosmopolitan perspective that I 
do—have been overly rash to rule it out completely in their (quite understandable) 
anxiousness to condemn the war in Iraq   
 Allen Buchanan briefly offers several reasons cosmopolitans should not dismiss 
forcible democratization so lightly: (a) sovereignty is not absolute, but conditional on 
adequately protecting human rights; (b) democracy is ―the most reliable arrangement for 
securing basic human rights;‖ (c) humanitarian interventions that do not aim at political 
reconstruction risk violence upon withdrawal; (d) if democratic revolution is morally 
permissible, then the same reasons may support forcible democratization from without; 
and (e) the requirement that armed force may only be used against an actual or imminent 
attack may become obsolete as institutional context minimizes the risk of preventive 
uses.
1
  But Buchanan does not attempt to develop these potential justifications further; his 
                                                 
1
 Allen Buchanan, ―Institutionalizing the Just War, ―Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34/1 (2006), pp. 2-38.  
For commentary on these themes and on other aspects of the morality and legality of forcible 
democratization, see Arthur Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 35/4 
(Fall 2007), pp. 359-400; James Bohman. ―War and Democracy,‖ in War: Essays in Political 
Philosophy, ed. Larry May and Emily Crookston. Cambridge University Press (2008); Simon 
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford 
91 
 
interest lies, instead, in a making a more general point about how empirical and 
institutional analysis should inform just war thinking, and he uses a discussion of how 
robust international institutions could mitigate the ―extraordinary risks‖ of using 
democratization to justify armed intervention to illustrate this larger point.  I accept most 
of what Buchanan has to say about the kinds of institutions that would be needed to 
justify legalizing forcible democratization, but my focus in this chapter is both narrower 
and further upstream.  In particular, I aim to develop a more detailed normative account 
of forcible democratization roughly along the lines of (a), (b), and to a lesser extent (e) 
above, and in a way that gives higher priority to the moral importance of political self-
determination than Buchanan does. 
I begin from an account of political legitimacy, which holds that a government‘s 
right to non-intervention should hinge on whether it (1) adequately protects its subject‘s 
human rights, and (2) adequately represents their collective political will.  I go on to 
argue that when and where the international legal system‘s ability to enforce human 
rights matures, and the social conditions for better representation emerge, the standards 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press (2001), esp. pp. 88-111; Tomas M. Franck, ―The Emerging Right to Democratic 
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for adequate protection and representation should rise.  Finally, I argue that since 
democracy significantly augments both functions of government, eventually the right to 
non-intervention should depend on maintaining democratic institutions.  Failure to do so 
will at that time provide a (defeasible) justification for pro-democratic intervention, up to 
and including the use of armed force. 
 In the first section, I offer a brief analysis of a government‘s so-called ―right to 
rule,‖ in order to highlight the important distinction between political legitimacy and 
political authority, and then motivate the two-pronged account of legitimacy mentioned 
above.  In the second section, I place special emphasis on the notion of ―adequacy‖ at 
play in this account, and argue that the standards of adequate human rights security and 
collective representation are context-sensitive in the same way that standards for 
adequate parenting are: as knowledge, social conditions, and enforcement capabilities 
improve, the standards of adequacy should rise.  In the third section, I argue for the view 
that, all things being equal, democratic institutions are superior to non-democratic 
alternatives with respect to both protecting a people‘s human rights and representing their 
collective political will.  Finally, I argue that since democratic institutions are superior to 
non-democratic institutions along both dimensions of political legitimacy, and since the 
standards of adequacy security and representation should progress along those same 
dimensions over time, we can expect that either now or at some point in the future the 
democratization of non-democratic governments will provide a just cause for armed 
intervention.  I close by addressing the serious but surmountable objections that forcible 
democratization is either practically infeasible or internally inconsistent. 
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1. LEGITIMACY, AUTHORITY, AND THE RIGHT TO RULE 
As with most philosophically interesting rights, we may divide a government‘s ―right to 
rule‖ into its constituent parts, or ‗incidents.‘ There are two primary parts to the right to 
rule.  The first is political legitimacy, which consists in a government‘s liberty to coerce 
its subjects through a system of law, and its claim against foreign intervention with that 
system.  The second is political authority, which consists in a government‘s discretionary 
power to waive, alter, or impose morally binding obligations.  In other words, political 
authority is a government‘s right to be obeyed, or as it is sometimes said, its ability to 
impose so-called ―political obligations‖ on its subjects.2  My concern in this chapter is 
with the concept of political legitimacy, and specifically with two important necessary 
conditions on a government‘s claim-right against foreign intervention.   
But before moving on, it is worth noting that this analysis of the right to rule, and 
the fairly conventional use to which I am putting it here, misleadingly suggests that the 
division of labor between political legitimacy and political authority neatly tracks what 
might be called the ‗internal‘ and the ‗external‘ aspects of that right.  That is to say, since 
the claim-right against foreign intervention appears to deal only with parties that fall 
outside the government‘s jurisdiction, and since the power to impose political obligations 
appears to deal only with parties that fall inside that jurisdiction, it is easy to think that 
theories of legitimacy and authority do and should deal exclusively with internal and 
external parties, respectively.  This is a convenient fiction for expository reasons, but the 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Allen Buchanan, ―Political Legitimacy and Democracy,‖ Ethics 112 (July 2002), pp. 689-719.  My 
analysis is structurally identical to Buchanan‘s, except that he uses the term ―authority‖ to refer to the 
entire right to rule, and the term ―political obligation‖ to refer to what I am calling authority.  While I 
think that my usage of authority is more in line with conventional and philosophical conventions, this is a 
terminological and not a philosophical difference.   
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truth is more complicated.  It is more complicated, because it turns out that on standard 
views governments not only hold a claim right to non-intervention by foreign parties, but 
may also hold a claim to non-interference against their own subjects--an internal aspect 
of legitimacy.  Likewise, governments are thought to wield some discretionary power to 
impose political obligations on their subjects, but it also seems intuitively correct that 
they also possess discretionary powers to, for example, waive foreign parties‘ duties of 
non-intervention--a form of authority over external parties.  Thus, the distinction between 
legitimacy and authority cross-cuts the internal-external distinction in ways that usually 
go underappreciated. 
I emphasize this point because my purpose in this section is to motivate an 
account of political legitimacy, but use it to justify only a part of the external aspect of a 
government‘s right to rule, leaving aside questions about the government‘s authority over 
foreigners (e.g. a right to invite foreign militaries into its territory), as well as questions 
about the government‘s claim right against interference from within (e.g. rights against 
revolution or secession).  All of these components of the right to rule could be relevant to 
the normative questions surrounding forcible democratization, but unfortunately, any 
attempt to spell out the relations between all of them would require a more 
comprehensive treatment than I have space for here.
3
  I have chosen to focus on the 
claim-right against foreign intervention because it seems to me to be the first and most 
                                                 
3
 The government‘s authority would be relevant to forcible democratization if it were possible for it to be 
transferred, by forfeiture, to the people it governs, thereby allowing the subjects of a government, rather 
than the government itself, to waive that government‘s claim right to non-interference.  A broader 
definition of forcible democratization would include internal attempts at establishing or restoring 
democratic rule, which would require a more detailed treatment of a government‘s claim to non-
interference against its own people, which, in turn might be used to justify forcible democratization by 
outsiders along the lines of Buchanan‘s point (d) above. 
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important moral question a theory of forcible democratization must confront.  Whether 
and under what conditions a government might waive its claim to non-intervention by 
foreigners, forfeit its claim to non-interference by its own subjects, or forfeits its 
authority over foreign parties I will leave for another time. 
Intervention, as I will understand the term, is the use of armed force in a foreign 
state without that state‘s permission.4  The claim-right to non-intervention implied by 
political legitimacy, then, amounts to a government‘s claim against the use of armed 
force within that government‘s territory and without its permission.  In the remainder of 
this section, I present a ―two-pronged‖ account of legitimacy borrowed from recent work 
by Arthur Applbaum.
5
  My intention is not to mount a comprehensive defense of this 
account, but instead is simply to motivate what I take to be two necessary conditions any 
government must satisfy in order to be legitimacy, and  so to have a (presumptive) claim 
against intervention by foreign armed forces.  In short, I claim that legitimacy requires 
that a government must (1) adequately secure its subjects‘ human rights, and (2) 
adequately represent their collective political will.  I address each condition in turn, and 
then offer some further clarification about the account and its role in what follows. 
The first condition on legitimacy requires that a government adequately secure the 
human rights of all those subject to its coercive control.  The justification for this ―prong‖ 
of legitimacy starts from the assumption that all human beings have shared interests in 
security, subsistence, autonomy, and so on, and that relevantly situated moral agents have 
                                                 
4
 This is a generalization of Holzgrefe‘s definition of humanitarian intervention; see J.L. Holzgrefe, ―The 
Humanitarian Intervention Debate,‖ in Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 15-52, at p. 18. 
 
5
 See Arthur Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free,‖ pp. 359-400.  While I adopt the broad outlines of 
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moral duties to protect and promote those interests.  Now, there are many different 
accounts of human rights, but on my view, to say that one‘s interests ground duties for 
other moral agents is just to say that one has a right—specifically, a claim right—to the 
performance of those duties; when that interest is an interest shared by all other human 
beings, the right in question is a human right.
6
 Some of the duties grounded on these 
shared human interests are negative, requiring only that the duty-bearers refrain from 
actions that would undermine the interest; the other duties are positive, requiring the 
duty-bearer to act in ways the further the interest.  Many of our interests, for example, our 
interests in social coordination, effective crime prevention, impartial conflict resolution, 
and collective self-defense, require the implementation of a government and a coercive 
legal system in order to be protected.  This requires relevantly situated moral agents to 
create and maintain these institutions, and it also requires the institutions themselves—
insofar as they are collective agents—to perform the requisite political functions.  A 
government which failed to perform these functions, yet continued to coerce its subjects, 
would therefore not only be neglecting its negative duties to refrain from harming its 
subjects, but would also abrogate the positive duties that justify its continued existence.  
We may therefore say that a government forfeits its right to coerce its subjects free from 
interference—forfeits its legitimacy—when it fails to adequately secure their human 
rights. 
                                                 
6
 I defend this view of human rights in Chapter 1, ―A Progressive Theory of Moral and Legal Human 
Rights.‖ In contrast to my interest-based theory of human rights, Applbaum appears to adopt a 
‗personhood‘ account similar to that found in James Griffin, On Human Rights, Oxford University Press 
(2008).  
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The second condition on legitimacy requires that a government adequately 
represent the collective political will of the people subject to its coercive control.  This 
condition begins from the assumption that a group‘s political self-determination—its 
capacity to make and implement political decisions—is morally valuable in the sense that 
outside parties have a prima facie reason to refrain from interfering.  There are a number 
of reasons to believe that outside parties ought to respect a group‘s political self-
determination in this way.  The value of political self-determination might derive from 
the importance of individual freedom of association, or from the instrumental benefits it 
provides to members of the group, or from the respect owed to group members by virtue 
of their collective achievement in acquiring the capacity for self-determination, or even 
from the idea that self-determining groups attain the same kind of moral standing that we 
attribute to individual human beings, and that their autonomy is worthy of respect for the 
same reasons.
7
  But genuine political self-determination requires a substantive connection 
between the government and its people.  A government which makes political decisions 
and then implements those decisions over those subject to its coercive control, and yet 
does so in ways that fail to reflect or accord with those subjects‘ collective political will, 
is not enabling their political self-determination, but undermining it.  In other words, 
genuine political self-determination requires that a government adequately represent the 
collective political will of the people it governs, and if political self-determination is an 
important political value, then a government forfeits its right to coerce its subjects free 
from interference—forfeits its legitimacy—when it fails to do so. 
                                                 
7
 I present an instrumental argument for the value of political self-determination in Chapter 2, ―Self-
Determination, Representative Government, and Democracy.‖ 
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In the next section, I will make heavy weather of the concept of ―adequacy‖ at 
work in both of these conditions on political legitimacy.  But for now, let me qualify the 
account just given by noting that there are a wide range of alternate justifications for both 
prongs of legitimacy.  For the purposes of this chapter, I intend to remain neutral between 
competing conceptions of human rights as well as competing justifications for the value 
of political self-determination.  Nor will I take a stand on whether and to what extent the 
two conditions are normatively related.  At some point in the correct lines of justification 
for human rights and political representation it may turn out that the two converge in a 
way that prioritizes one of them over the other, or even reduces one to the other, or 
reduces both of them to some other distinct value.  For example, it may be that the only 
reason legitimacy hinges on a government‘s representation of its people‘s will is that this 
is the best way to ensure that their human rights are adequately secure, in which case the 
second condition would ultimately be a mere corollary to the first.  My purpose here is 
only to motivate both conditions for the sake of the argument to follow. 
Moreover, I have not claimed that these conditions, as stated, are jointly sufficient 
for legitimacy.  In fact, legitimacy probably depends not only on a government‘s 
performance of these functions vis-à-vis its own subjects, but on its behavior towards 
foreign governments and their respective subjects as well.  Such additional criteria might 
be tacked on as further necessary conditions, or they might be folded into the two I have 
set out above, but I will not attempt to answer those questions here.  Finally, skeptics may 
argue that one or the other condition is not in fact a necessary condition on political 
legitimacy at all.  As I said, my intention here is not to mount a comprehensive defense of 
this account, since that lies far beyond the scope of this paper.  While I stand by the 
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account as presented, it is important to see from the outset how it is contributing to my 
overarching thesis.  Since my argument in subsequent sections will be that non-
democratic governments violate both of these conditions (or at least will violate them, 
once the standards of adequacy have reach a certain threshold), my case for forcible 
democratization will be weakened, but not defeated, if it turns out that one of them is not 
necessary for legitimacy after all.  
 
2. ADEQUACY, CONTEXT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
What exactly do adequate security and representation entail?  The problem—and it is a 
deep one—is that the concept of adequacy is inherently vague: governments can secure 
their subjects‘ human rights to a greater or lesser extent, represent their collective 
political will more or less completely, but there does not seem to be any way to draw a 
principled line on either continuum.  The illusion of an answer may be proffered by 
claiming that adequate security for human rights requires that most of a government‘s 
subjects are able to live minimally decent lives, or that adequate representation requires a 
government to make and implement political decisions that reasonably approximate their 
people‘s will.  But these and similar formulations only push the problem of back onto 
equally vague concepts like ―minimal decency‖ and ―reasonable approximation.‖  In 
whatever language the appropriate standards of adequacy are couched, they cannot tell us 
with any precision how much security and representation are necessary for political 
legitimacy.  I do not think the problem of vagueness can be eliminated or solved, and I do 
not aim to do so here.  Instead, I argue that the standards of adequacy necessary for 
political legitimacy, wherever they happen to be, are context-sensitive.  I submit that the 
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standards of adequacy for a government‘s political legitimacy should change depending 
on external agents‘ capacity to affect the degree of security and representation that 
government‘s subjects enjoy, whether indirectly, by giving the government sufficient 
reason to improve its protections for human rights and its representation, or directly, by 
coercive intervention aimed at reforming or replacing it.  Since an external agent‘s ability 
to affect the security and representation a government provides its subjects depends on a 
great many empirical factors, including, especially, the ability to monitor levels of 
security and representation from outside, the relative difference in coercive power 
between the agent and the government, and the social and economic conditions that exist 
within that government‘s domain, many factors will go into determining where standards 
of adequacy should be set. 
Before making this argument, however, some preliminary remarks are in order.  
First, we must distinguish two different kinds of standards so as not to conflate them.  
The question that distinguishes two of them is: adequacy for what?  When I address 
political legitimacy, I am concerned with whether a government‘s provision of security 
and representation are adequate enough for it to retain a right to non-intervention against 
external parties.  But it is easy to confuse this kind of standard with a standard of 
adequacy for moral responsibility, that is, whether the government‘s provision of security 
and representation are adequate enough for it to be praiseworthy, or at least not 
blameworthy, for its actions.
8
  Ignorance and an inability to do otherwise are the most 
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 We could also distinguish between different senses of praise- and blameworthiness; we might be referring 
to objective standards of moral responsibility, or to the practical and institutional standards by which we 
might hold agents responsible, and therefore liable to punishment (the legal notion of strict liability is an 
illustration of where these standards may diverge, since its seems to have no moral analogue). 
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common conditions that can undermine an agent‘s moral responsibility, and governments 
are no different.
9
  The problem is that these two standards of adequacy—legitimacy-
relevant and responsibility-relevant standards—can and do diverge: just because I might 
not be blameworthy for accidentally forgetting to feed my dog, or for being unable to 
feed him because all of my dog food was stolen, does not mean that you should not 
intervene and feed him for me.  The two kinds of standards are easy to conflate because 
they are two forms of agent-evaluation; the difference is in the implications that meeting 
or failing to meet those standards implies for other agents.  As I hope to clarify in what 
follows, blameworthiness and liability to intervention are largely independent of one 
another. 
Second, the inherent vagueness of adequacy might prompt an interesting, if 
somewhat too-easy response.  On at least one approach to vagueness, vague predicates 
are simply underspecified: for any given borderline case it is literally neither true nor 
false that the predicate applies.
10
  On this view, there just is no fact of the matter about 
the adequacy of some levels of security and representation for legitimacy—the question 
can only be resolved by stipulation.  But the inevitable arbitrariness of stipulation opens 
the door to a host of practical considerations about where to set the standard.  Of these, 
moral considerations should presumably take precedence:  all things being equal, we 
should set standards of adequacy wherever they will best promote justice and human 
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 For an excellent treatment of moral responsibility, see John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S.J., 
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 See Kit Fine, ―Vagueness, truth, and logic,‖ Synthese 30 (1975), pp. 265-300, David K. Lewis, ―General 
semantics,‖ Synthese 22 (1970), pp. 18-67, and (though he rejects the view) Michael Dummett, ―Wang‘s 
Paradox,‖ Synthese 30 (1975), pp. 301.  The Fine and Dummett articles are reprinted in Vagueness: A 
Reader, Ed. Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith, The MIT Press (1997). 
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well-being.  For instance, we might establish low standards when higher standards would 
license too many interventions, or when interventions are likely to impose heavy moral 
costs.  On the other hand, we might establish high standards when doing so would not 
license enough interventions, or where interventions would not be likely to impose heavy 
moral costs.  Note that this makes standards of adequacy entirely institutional; except for 
the limiting cases of genocidal dictatorships on the one hand, and well-ordered utopias on 
the other, the threshold is entirely a matter of convention.  Times and circumstances 
change, and so does what will be promote justice.  If our standards of adequacy are 
essentially institutional, then we can, and should, change them too. 
I find this view attractive, not least because it would make establishing my 
overarching thesis much easier, but also because I am generally skeptical of the kinds of 
precise thresholds philosophers often use to demarcate conceptual categories, moral or 
otherwise, and so am drawn to supervaluationism independently of my views about 
legitimacy.   But I am also aware that my skepticism about precise thresholds may be due 
solely to the epistemic barriers to knowing where those thresholds are. Some 
governments are clearly legitimate and others clearly are not, it seems overly hasty to 
infer from the wide swath of gray between them that there could not be some specific 
point at which a government forfeits the right to non-intervention.  My argument for the 
remainder of this section, then, will proceed on the methodological assumption that 
standards of adequacy are at least supposed to carve political legitimacy at some natural 
joint, however difficult it may be to determine precisely where those joints are.  My 
thesis is that wherever these extant standards of adequacy for security and representation 
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happen to be, they are not fixed at that point forever, but instead change relative to 
context. 
To set the stage for my argument about the context-sensitivity of political 
legitimacy, consider the way another set of norms are sensitive to context: the standards 
we use to evaluate the adequacy of parenting.  Not long ago, children were expect to 
work long hours of hard labor with little or no compensation; they were not taught to read 
or to write; they were often given barely enough food to survive; they were punished 
harshly or arbitrarily; and they were occasionally sold into indentured servitude or 
slavery.  However widespread and abhorrent these practices were, the point is that they 
were, in at least one sense, acceptable given their historical context.  First, people were 
simply ignorant of the harms many of these practices caused to children.  Second, some 
of those practices were unavoidable: where illiteracy and subsistence farming were the 
norm, education understandably took a back seat to producing enough food to survive.  
These two considerations might lead us to think that parents were not blameworthy for 
the low quality of their parenting.  But another consideration, and the one most relevant 
to my argument, is that relevantly situated moral third parties were either just as ignorant 
of the harms these practices caused to children, or lacked the resources, knowledge, and 
ability to intervene effectively.  In short, these practices were acceptable because 
nobody—neither the parents themselves nor surrounding moral agents—could be 
expected to do any better. 
Now, of course, parents are expected to know that these practices will harm 
children, and where the level of social and economic development allows, they are 
expected to ensure that their children are healthier and better educated than in times past.  
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But even if a particular set of parents were engaging in these practices today because they 
did not know that those practices were harmful, or because they lacked the resources to 
provide their children with a certain level of education, nutrition, and medical care—that 
is to say, even if those parents were blamelessly harming their children—we would 
expect third parties to intervene.  Teachers, counselors, and doctors are all expected to 
report suspected negligence or abuse to government officials, after which the government 
is expected either to force the parents to do a better job nurturing their children, or to 
remove the children from their care when it becomes clear that they are unable or 
unwilling to do so.  Whether the responsibility-relevant standards for parenting have gone 
up across the board, or whether some parents can still be excused for their ignorance or 
lack of resources, the standards by which we evaluate whether relevantly situated third 
parties should intervene have gone up, and they have gone up precisely because those 
standards ensure better lives for children.  It seems reasonable to suppose, and to hope, 
that this trend will continue into the future: that as our society becomes more 
knowledgeable about the needs of children, more sensitive to the moral claims those 
needs make on us, and more capable of providing social guarantees that these needs will 
be met, the standards for adequate parenting—the standards parents must meet to avoid 
liability to intervention by third parties—will continue to rise. 
I maintain that the same is true of the standards for adequate security and 
representation necessary for political legitimacy, and for parallel reasons.  As our 
understanding of how governments can best protect their peoples‘ human rights and 
represent their peoples‘ collective political will improves, and as the capacity for 
effective intervention by relevantly situated external agents increases, the standards of 
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adequacy for political legitimacy—for a government‘s right to non-intervention—should 
rise.  What does this entail in practical terms?  If human rights are protections for shared 
human interests, a rising standard of human rights security would demand that 
governments gradually broaden the range of interests they protect, broaden the range of 
threats they protect against, and enhance the protections they provide for particular 
interests against particular kinds of threats.  If genuine political self-determination 
requires a government to represent the collective political will of its people, a rising 
standard of representation would demand that governments gradually improve the 
procedures and institutions they employ to assess and integrate the desires and 
preferences of their subjects, and to ensure that they are increasingly accountable to the 
outcome of those procedures, both of which will improve the correspondence between 
government actions, decisions, and policies, on the one hand, and the people‘s collective 
political will, on the other. 
Note that I am leaving open precisely which ‗relevantly situated external agents‘ 
may or ought to intervene in illegitimate governments.  In the parenting example, I was 
able to appeal to background institutions to which private citizens could report suspected 
violations of acceptable standards of parenting, and which would then assume or delegate 
responsibility for interventions.  In what follows, I will frame the case for forcible 
democratization in terms that presuppose analogous background institutions of 
international law—institutions able to assume or delegate responsibility for coercive 
intervention.  But this should not be taken to imply that the existence of such institutions 
is a strictly necessary condition on the moral permissibility of forcible democratization, 
or that there are no conditions under which forcible democratization might be justified in 
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contravention to those institutions if they happened to exist.  Consider the question in the 
context of parenting.  Presumably, parents could engage in behavior that endangers their 
child so quickly and so severely that waiting for the proper authorities to intervene would 
result in unacceptable harm to the child.  Or, similarly, third parties might justifiably 
believe that the relevant background institutions are so unreliable, unresponsive, or 
unjust, and so permissibly assume the responsibility for rescuing the child themselves.  
Or, finally, the relevant background institutions might be as just as is practically possible, 
and yet still fail to protect the well-being of children to the extent that would be possible 
given some marginal law-breaking by third parties who intervene where the government 
cannot.   
My purpose here is not to argue that an analogous situations could or could not 
arise with respect to political legitimacy and intervention in the context of international 
affairs.
11
  I only mean to indicate that it is at least conceivable that a government or 
coalition of governments could have a liberty, or even an obligation, to engage in illegal 
intervention against a morally illegitimate regime, regardless of whether or not the 
background institutions of an international legal system agrees.  As I said above, my 
concern in this paper is with political legitimacy, rather than political authority, much less 
the authority of the international legal system, so I will remain neutral on the question of 
illegal intervention.  In what follows, I will assume that international legal norms guide 
and constrain state behavior, at least to some extent, and that this makes the content of 
internationally recognized norms surrounding non-intervention an important subject of 
application for my arguments regarding the context-sensitivity of political legitimacy. 
                                                 
11
 I take up this question in Chapter IV, ―Humanitarian Intervention and the Duty to Obey the Law.‖ 
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3. TWO ROADS TO DEMOCRATIC COSMOPOLITANISM 
In this section, I present two lines of argument for democratic cosmopolitanism. 
Democratic cosmopolitanism is the view that democracy is morally superior to all other 
systems of government and so worth protecting and promoting abroad.
12
  Of course, what 
democratic cosmopolitans mean by democracy will vary from one case to another, but in 
my view, democracy is essentially a matter of political participation.  The more an 
organization allows those affected by its decisions to participate in the decision-making 
process, the more democratic it is.  An ideally democratic government would allow 
everyone affected by its decisions to participate in its decision-making to the precise 
extent that they are affected by those decisions.  A comprehensive statement of this 
model of democracy—let alone a philosophical defense—would require a much fuller 
discussion of the nature and value of political participation, of the conditions under which 
participation may be justifiably curtailed, and so on.   
But for present purposes, a philosophical account of democracy will be 
unnecessary, since there is at least broad agreement about the kinds of political 
institutions democratic government requires in modern large-scale societies.  Robert Dahl 
offers what is perhaps the best and the briefest list of these institutions.   Dahl writes that 
democracy requires ―(1) elected officials, (2) free, frequent, and fair elections, (3) 
freedom of expression, (4) alternative sources of information, (5) associational autonomy, 
[and] (6) inclusive citizenship.‖13  I will assume here that the relationship between these 
                                                 
12
 Ian Shapiro.  ―Containment and Democratic Cosmopolitanism,‖ available at http://opus.macmillan.yale. 
edu/workpaper/pdfs/Containment_cosmopolitanism.pdf 
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 Robert Dahl.  On Democracy. Yale University Press (2000), Ch. 8: ―What Institutions Does Large-Scale 
Democracy Require?‖ pp. 83-99. 
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institutions and political participation is transparent enough not to warrant explanation.
14
  
Democratic cosmopolitans may differ as to how best to preserve and promoting 
democracy around the world, but I will assume that at a bare minimum it is this cluster of 
institutions they think should be protected and promoted. 
 
The Human Rights Argument 
The first line of argument for democratic cosmopolitanism maintains either that there is a 
human right to democracy itself, or that democracy is an especially important way to 
secure other human rights.  As I explained above, I understand any shared human interest 
to be a potential ground for a human right, so long as it grounds duties for other moral 
agents.
15
  This first line of argument for democratic cosmopolitanism, then, claims that 
either there is a shared human interest in democracy, or that other shared interests ground 
duties for moral agents to create and maintain democratic institutions because of the 
unique ways in which such institutions protect those interests against standard threats. 
I believe that there is a shared human interest in democracy, for both intrinsic and 
instrumental reasons.  The political participation which democracy allows is intrinsically 
valuable as an important venue for individual autonomy and public self-expression, in the 
same way as is participation in many other culturally significant aspects of communal 
life.  As Rawls says, ―other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their 
realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the 
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 I spell out the connection in some detail in Chapter 2, ―Self-Determination, Representative Government, 
and Democracy.‖ 
 
15
 See also Chapter 1, ―A Progressive Theory of Moral and Legal Human Rights.‖ 
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more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity.‖16  The opportunity to 
exercise and develop our capacities both for coordination and in coordination with others 
by engaging in work, education, entertainment and recreation, styles of dress and 
behavior, are all constitutive aspects of human well-being, and participation in the 
creation and maintenance of our social and political institutions is no different.  
Moreover, to be denied the right to participate can seriously affect one‘s social status in 
society.  As Thomas Christiano has argued, ―To be treated in a way that entirely ignores 
one‘s way of perceiving how one is treated constitutes a serious loss of status for a person 
in a society. A person whose judgment about that society is never taken seriously by 
others is treated in effect like a child or a madman.‖17  Political participation is special in 
that it allows individuals to make their views about society known, and to make them 
count in the process of political decision-making; to be prevented from such activity can 
undermine the self-respect of the disenfranchised.
18
 
Political participation has instrumental value, as well, because it allows people to 
protect and advance their other interests during the process of political decision-making.
19
   
Given that individuals are generally speaking much more familiar with and much more 
motivated to pursue their own interests than are other people, the kind of participation 
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 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Ed. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press (1971, 1999), p. 374. 
17
 Thomas Christiano, ―The Authority of Democracy,‖ The Journal of Political Philosophy 12/3 (2004), pp. 
266–290 at 273. 
 
18
 Cf. Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 386.  As Rawls says, ―finding our person and deeds appreciated and 
confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed‖ is one of the key supports 
for our sense of self-worth. 
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 Perhaps the best discussion of the instrumental value of political participation can be found in Henry 
Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2
nd
 Ed. Princeton University Press 
(1980, 1996). I develop the argument for the instrumental value of democracy more fully in Chapter 2, 
―Self-Determination, Representative Government, and Democracy.‖ 
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which democratic political institutions allow provides an important mode of social self-
defense—without it, those who are able to participate in political decision-making can 
use the government‘s coercive resources and legal system to neglect or exploit those who 
are not with impunity, creating a serious moral hazard. I claim that both the intrinsic and 
the instrumental value of democracy support the conclusion that there is a shared human 
interest in democratic institutions, which in turn can ground duties for other moral agents, 
and so too a human right. 
Some may argue that my conception of human rights is too inclusive.  Many 
human rights theorists, for example, believe that the grounds for human rights must be 
not only universal, but also either of exceptionally high moral priority, non-instrumental, 
or both.  Those who maintain that human rights protect only urgent human interests will 
be quick to argue that it is absurd to think that democratic political participation is urgent 
in any important sense; after all, many people appear to live perfectly decent lives 
without ever having or exercising rights to participate in political decisions.  What seems 
most important is that we be able to participate in a sufficiently wide range of meaningful 
activities, not that this range cover any specific activities. Tradeoffs between different 
kinds of cultural participation being possible, there is no particular need for specifically 
political participation.  To the instrumental argument, opponents of the human right to 
democracy will insist that only our interests in intrinsically valuable goods can ground 
human rights—that human rights must be grounded on essential human interests, those 
which are in some sense necessarily  related to the concept of human welfare, rather than 
merely contingently. 
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I think that both attacks on the human right to democracy are seriously flawed, 
first because I think that political participation is tied to social status in a way that other 
forms of cultural participation are not, and second, because I see no coherent way to 
restrict the grounds of human rights to purely intrinsic interests without threatening to 
collapse numerous particular rights into single, abstract, all encompassing and practically 
useless ―right to well-being.‖20  But rather than make responses to these objections a 
primary feature of my argument, it will be more useful to explain why even if they do 
hold, they would not undermine the human rights argument for democratic 
cosmopolitanism.  That is because democratic political institutions provide stronger 
protections against a wider range of threats to uncontroversially urgent human interests, 
especially our interests in security and subsistence.  There is now a growing body of 
empirical literature that strongly supports the conclusion that democracies are less likely 
to engage in state violence against their own subjects, less likely to subject them to 
famine, less likely to inhibit economic growth, less likely to go to war, and less likely to 
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 Consider the quite plausible human right to ―to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services‖ (Art. 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights).  The problem with restricting human 
rights to only intrinsically valuable goods, those essential or conceptually necessary to human well-being 
is that on such an account we do not actually have human rights to food, clothing, or housing, since 
nutrient pills and a persistently temperate climate could conceivably render these things unnecessary to 
achieving a fairly high standard of living.  The interests that remain standing on such an account are so 
few and abstract as to provide almost no practical guidance to moral agents, which I take to be of primary 
importance in constructing a list of human rights.  To avoid this conclusion, we might relativize the 
concept of human well-being to particular circumstances, like those found in ordinary or ―natural‖ human 
conditions, thereby bringing food, clothing and shelter back into the range of essential human interests.  
But now the scope of human rights depends a great deal on those assumptions; are exploitation and 
neglect by governments part of the natural human condition?  It seems to me that they are, but this would 
put our interests in protection against them back into the ―intrinsic‖ category, and to draw the line so as 
to include food and clothing, but exclude democracy seems ad hoc to me.  My complaint is not that the 
distinction between intrinsic and instrumental interests cannot be made, but rather that it is irrelevant to 
delineating an appropriately varied and concrete class of human rights. 
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experience violent resistance and civil war among their own populations.
21
  More and 
more, it seems that the instrumental value of democracy cannot be denied.  Therefore, 
either democracy is itself a human right or it appears to be an importantly robust 
protection for other human rights.  In both cases, a commitment to the value of individual 
welfare and autonomy leads us to democratic cosmopolitanism. 
 
The Self-Determination Argument 
The second line of argument claims that whether or not democratic governance is 
necessary for group self-determination, it improves the government‘s representation of its 
people, and so constitutes the kind of moral superiority over non-democratic government 
that should lead us to endorse democratic cosmopolitanism. 
As I said above, political self-determination requires the government to represent 
the collective political will of the people if governs, that is, it requires government 
actions, decisions, and policies to reflect or accord with the people‘s will.  Some authors, 
however, are inclined to see self-determination in almost entirely negative terms, 
emphasizing not a procedural connection between a government and its people, but only 
the absence of external interferences.  This view of self-determination implies that that 
each political community should determine not only substantive matters of policy for 
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 Thomas Christiano, ―Arguments for a Human Right to Democracy,‖ forthcoming, citing Steven C. Poe, 
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UP, 2000.  See also, Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, First Anchor Books (1999). 
 
 
113 
 
itself, but should also determine for themselves questions about how their political 
institutions go about representing the collective political will.  As Simon Chesterman 
writes, ―if the right to democratic governance means anything, it is that its content and 
the manner of its expression must be determined by the people in whom it vests.‖22  I do 
not deny that some groups are entitled to decide for themselves how they will structure 
their governments.  I want only to emphasize that certain forms of government, especially 
non-democratic forms, exclude large sectors of the population from participating in these 
decisions.  Views that rely too heavily on the strictly negative notion of non-interference, 
and recognize no positive, procedural criteria on constraints on the concept of group self-
determination, thereby risk equivocating between the group doing the determining, and 
the group being determined.   
Consider a dictatorship.  The dictator has unilateral control over all government 
policy, and does not consult with any of her subjects when making decisions.  If the 
dictator and her subjects are considered part of the same group, and if self-determination 
is construed in a purely negative sense, then this dictatorship counts as a self-determining 
community as long as it remains free from external interference.  But this cannot be what 
proponents of the value of self-determination have in mind, and examples like this one 
prompt most people to accept some procedural constraints.  Andrew Altman and 
Christopher Heath Wellman, for instance, argue that ―there is nothing wrong, in principle, 
with the establishment and indefinite perpetuation of [a] monarchy… as long as the 
constitution allows the people to force at any point a binding referendum on whether 
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 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. Oxford 
University Press (2001), p. 110.  
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democracy should replace [an] existing monarchical arrangement.‖23  They go on to 
explain that the reason for this (admittedly austere) resort to political participation is to 
ensure that future generations are not bound by the decisions of past group members: so 
long as a society retains the freedom to collectively opt out of its current institutions, 
nothing more than non-intervention is required for that society to be self-determining in 
the relevant sense.   
Note how much weight this argument places on the force the people are able to 
bring to bear on government decisions as a result of a constitutionally binding 
referendum.  Altman and Wellman‘s argument is plausible only insofar as we assume that 
such constitutional arrangements can remain effective during a prolonged concentration 
of political power in the hands of a monarch.  But this assumption gives the game away: 
we might as well stipulate that the monarch and her descendants will remain responsive 
to the will of their people in perpetuity, thereby negating the need even for the 
opportunity to vote them out of office.  Of course a people is self-determining when those 
in power are antecedently guaranteed to represent their political will—and this is 
precisely what such stipulations are intended to accomplish in the abstract and relatively 
uncluttered world of thought experiments.  The point to see here is that in the real world, 
different political institutions are differentially likely to protect political self-
determination, and historically, non-democratic governments have not represented their 
people‘s will very well for very long.  
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John Rawls resorts to a similar invention in order to defend the potential 
legitimacy of non-democratic societies; he imagines a people organized into a ‗decent 
consultation hierarchy‘:  
 
In political decisions a decent consultation hierarchy allows an 
opportunity for different voices to be heard—[though] not, to be sure, in a 
way allowed by democratic institutions... Persons as members of 
associations, corporations, and estates have the right at some point in the 
procedure of consultation (often at the stage of selecting a group‘s 
representatives) to express political dissent, and the government has an 
obligation to take a group‘s dissent seriously and to give a conscientious 
reply.
24
  
 
 
Again, I grant that such arrangements are conceivable.  It might even be argued that some 
actual societies have come close to approximating this kind of political system.  But the 
democratic cosmopolitan response is not that a decent hierarchical society cannot 
accurately represent the collective political will of its people; instead, the much more 
plausible objection is that these institutions will not represent the people‘s will as well as 
they might, and to the extent that they do, it is likely a temporary condition.  What 
incentive is there, after all, for the government to ―take a group‘s dissent seriously and to 
give a conscientious reply‖ if group members have no formally protected political 
influence?  To his credit, Rawls acknowledges that the plausibility of such benevolent 
non-democratic governments is open to empirical challenge. ―Should the facts of history, 
supported by the reasoning of political and social thought, show that hierarchical regimes 
are always, or nearly always, oppressive and deny human rights,‖ he writes, ―the case for 
liberal democracy is made.‖25  Still, the democratic cosmopolitan is not wedded to the 
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claim that non-democratic governments necessarily violate their people‘s human rights or 
flout their collective political will.  But all things being equal, democratic governments 
are better stewards and better representatives than alternative political systems. 
Now, there is a very minimal sense in which Altman and Wellman‘s monarchy 
and Rawls‘s decent hierarchical society are democratic, because neither entirely 
eliminates the people‘s ability to participate effectively.  But presumably neither view is 
sufficiently sanguine about democracy to be labeled democratic cosmopolitanism, and 
the difference appears to be a matter of degree: the less inclusive and secure a people‘s 
ability effectively to participate in political decision-making, the more likely the 
government is to misrepresent their political will.  By protecting broad and effective 
political participation through elected officials, free, frequent, and fair elections, freedom 
of expression, alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and inclusive 
citizenship, democratic institutions ensure that government policy represents the 
collective will, and thereby contributes to more genuine group self-determination.  
Insofar as we are committed to the value of political self-determination, and insofar as we 
are convinced that democratic institutions contribute to more genuinely representative 
government, we have good reason to adopt democratic cosmopolitanism.  If individual 
welfare and autonomy or political self-determination are universally valuable—and they 
are—then the preceding arguments provide good reason to adopt democratic 
cosmopolitanism.   
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4. THE CASE FOR FORCIBLE DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
The in-principle argument for forcible democratization can now be stated in its most 
general form. A government is legitimate just when it has a right to coerce its subjects 
free from outside interference; forfeiting this right renders a government liable to 
coercive intervention.  In order to be legitimate, a government must (1) adequately secure 
the human rights of its subjects, and (2) adequately represent their collective political 
will.  But as the ability of relevantly situated external parties to stage effective 
interventions increases—that is to say, as the international legal system and its members 
becomes more able to encourage or coerce governments to provide better security and 
better representation for its subjects—the standards for adequate security and 
representation should rise.  If democratic cosmopolitanism is correct, and democracies 
are morally superior to non-democracies along both of these dimensions, it follows that 
regardless of what present standards of adequacy require, we can expect that at some 
point in the future a government‘s right to non-intervention will depend on its 
maintaining democratic political institutions.  Failure to do so will at that time provide a 
(defeasible) justification for pro-democratic intervention, up to and including the use of 
armed force. 
To be clear, my primary conclusion here is institutional: that assuming present 
trends continue, international legal standards for the right to non-intervention will 
eventually include democratic criteria.  But the same argument could be run under pre-
institutional assumptions.  As matters currently stand, international law exists and all 
moral agents, state actors especially, must take the moral importance of those laws into 
account.  But if there were no background institutions, the question about the justifiability 
118 
 
of forcible democratization would remain.  Consider again the analogy to parenting, only 
this time imagine that families exist in something like a Lockean state of nature, in which 
individual agents still bear moral duties to one another, but lack the capacity for social 
coordination that governments provide.  Could relevantly situated third parties intervene 
in order to halt or avert negligent or abusive parenting?  I think so, but as Locke points 
out, moral agents acting independently to correct wrongs are likely to make serious errors 
about whether a wrong has actually been committed, and about the appropriate course of 
action to take in cases where one has been.
26
  Given the their lack of impartiality and their 
propensity to ―overpunish,‖ there is a strong presumption against intervention. The same 
holds true for forcible democratization.  Although standards for (moral, rather than 
institutional or legal) political legitimacy would still be sensitive to context, since 
capacities for effective third party intervention could and would change over time, the 
absence of relatively impartial international institutions would impose a much higher 
epistemic burden on would-be democratizers.
27
  Knowing that they are very likely to 
make mistakes about when forcible democratization is justified, and be prone to 
exploiting their intervention and occupation for their own ends, they would have to 
recognize a similarly strong presumption against intervention. 
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Another point of clarification: the defeasibility qualification mentioned in the 
conclusion of my general argument warrants special attention. Traditional just war theory 
typically invokes a list of conditions that need to be satisfied in order for a war to be just.  
Although the length and contents of this list vary widely from one theorist to another, the 
three most common conditions are just cause, necessity, and proportionality.
28
  In 
recognizing illegitimate governments as liable to coercive intervention, and then spelling 
out my account of legitimacy, I believe I have offered what amounts to a formal theory of 
‗just cause,‘ that is, the range of considerations which can provide a positive rationale for 
armed intervention.  But necessity and proportionality remain important limiting 
conditions on the use of force.  The necessity condition—which in the ad bellum context 
is often referred to as the condition of ‗last resort‘—holds that if a just cause can be 
achieved by less morally costly means than armed intervention, it should be.  The 
proportionality condition, on the other hand, holds that the (expected) moral costs of an 
intervention must not exceed its (expected) moral benefits.  I endorse both conditions, 
and agree that failure to satisfy either would override an otherwise justified instance of 
forcible democratization.  In the remainder of the paper I will consider the two most 
prominent and compelling objections against forcible democratization: the Infeasibility 
and Inconsistency Objections. 
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The Infeasibility Objection 
The Infeasibility Objection is the most common worry about forcible democratization, 
especially in light of the recent interventions, occupations, and attempts at reconstruction 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The objection holds that forcible democratization is 
impermissible because it simply does not work, or at any rate, cannot work without 
violating the proportionality condition.
29
  James Bohman deploys a typical, though 
unusually explicit version of the objection.  He writes,  
Whether or not a nondemocracy could become democratic by force is 
something for which there is a great deal of historical evidence.  In 
general, the answer is clearly no, given failure in every case after World 
War II except for small and very brief wars with Grenada and Panama.  In 
the case of larger states closer in size to Iraq and Afghanistan there is a 
resounding history of failure.  War is not an effective means to achieving 
democracy...
30
 
 
 
There are three reasons I am not persuaded by Bohman‘s allegedly categorical rejection 
of the feasibility of forcible democratization.  First, note that he is emphasizing cases that 
support his position while making light of cases that do not.  It is not clear why Bohman 
has ruled out of court the post-war democratization of the Axis powers, especially since 
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these countries had populations reasonably close in number to those of present day 
Afghanistan and Iraq during and after World War II.  Nor is it clear why Bohman thinks 
the small size of Grenada and Panama renders their successful democratization irrelevant 
to his conclusion.  Does Bohman take the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to be 
typical cases of forcible democratization?  Which other interventions is he including, and 
more importantly, excluding from his sample?  I do not mean to deny that the history of 
forcible democratization contains more failures than successes. But the data appear to be 
less one-sided than Bohman admits. 
Second, like many other opponents of forcible democratization, Bohman appears 
to assume that past failures were more or less inevitable specifically because they were 
attempts at democratization.  This assumption ignores the very real possibility that some 
of these failures had more to do with specific, avoidable errors made by intervening 
forces, rather than with their ultimate goals, or with the characteristics of the society they 
were attempting to democratize.
31
  Moreover, no proponent of forcible democratization 
would claim that military force is ―the proper means to the end of establishing a 
democracy.‖32  The fact that heart surgery is not always an effective way to cure heart 
disease does not imply that heart surgery is never permissible—presumably, the 
permissibility of heart surgery will depend on whether alternatives are available and the 
likelihood of error; once medical science comes to a better understanding of which 
                                                 
31
 Underfunding and underdeployment are especially relevant here.  The difference in initial and sustained 
money and manpower that went into (successful) post-WWII reconstruction and the (mostly 
unsuccessful) attempts at regime change during the 1980s and 90s is staggering.  Iraq and Afghanistan, 
on the other hand, whose combined price tags are now on the order of a trillion dollars, remain plagued 
by insurgency and instability. See n. 29 above. 
 
32
 Bohman, ―War and Democracy,‖ p. 108; my emphasis. 
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techniques are best applied in which cases, the frequency of botched surgeries will 
decrease (in fact, it already has).  Likewise, as social scientific knowledge about the 
social, political, and economic preconditions for democracy improves, and as the 
institutional context surrounding international relations and armed intervention changes, 
forcible democratization may become more likely to succeed, and therefore a more 
morally viable option. 
Third, once we turn our attention away from blatantly disastrous examples of 
forcible democratization, a range of plausible scenarios emerge in which its chances for 
success seem much higher than those the United States had with Iraq and Afghanistan.  It 
stands to reason that forcible democratization would be much easier, or at least much less 
risky, where large proportion of the target government‘s subjects are known to favor 
democratization, as when formerly democratic governments are overthrown by a military 
coup, or where democratic revolutionaries have already begun the attempt to overthrow 
an authoritarian regime.  Moreover, forcible democratization need not be identified with 
large-scale land-invasions, and the ensuing occupation and political reconstruction of 
foreign states.  It also includes pro-democratic interventions on a smaller scale—training 
and arming revolutionaries, conducting espionage and intelligence gathering missions, 
and engaging in covert efforts to destabilize trenchantly non-democratic governments.  
Finally, abstracting away from the necessity and proportionality considerations 
surrounding specific kinds and instances of forcible democratization, it is worth pointing 
out that the standards of adequacy may vary from one region to another.  Although I have 
been discussing legitimacy as if all countries would be held to the same standard, this 
need not be the case.  The international legal system might be well advised to recognize 
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that what counts as adequate security and representation in developed Western 
governments may not yet apply to the governments of more impoverished, or at any rate 
less socially and economically developed parts of the world. 
 
The Inconsistency Objection 
The Inconsistency Objection holds that forcible democratization is internally inconsistent.  
Forcible democratization, the objection runs, is undemocratic, because it betrays the very 
values it intends to promote.  There are several different versions of the Inconsistency 
Objection, and I will address each of them in turn.  The first version of the objection 
holds that mobilization for military intervention inevitably leads democratic states to 
abridge their democratic institutions, suspend important democratic freedoms, and to 
adopt undemocratic forms of hierarchy.  In Bohman‘s words, ―The institutional capability 
to wage war increases along with the heightening of executive and administrative powers 
within the state on matters of security, which often bypass democratic mechanisms.‖33  
While I concede that this is a possible, perhaps even likely outcome of forcible 
democratization, I find this version of the objection highly implausible.  First, not only do 
the kinds of small-scale interventions outlined above seem not to require much in the way 
of military mobilization, there is no reason to think that undemocratic compromises are 
inevitable, even for full-scale invasions aimed at occupation and reconstruction.  Second, 
supposing for the sake of argument that such compromises were inevitable, there is no 
reason to think that those compromises would be permanent—democracies might 
mobilize for war, sacrificing some of their subjects‘ democratic freedoms in the process, 
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 Bohman, ―War and Democracy,‖ p. 114. 
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and then return to normal once the war was over.  Third, even if such compromises were 
inevitably permanent (which they clearly are not), there is no reason to think that 
sacrificing some democratic freedoms for the sake of correcting a foreign population‘s 
lack of all democratic freedoms would be undemocratic.  It is perfectly consistent with 
democratic cosmopolitanism to claim that democratization has diminishing returns: the 
first steps towards democratic ideals are more important than the last. 
The second version of the Inconsistency Objection holds that forcible 
democratization is undemocratic because it does not permit the intended targets to 
participate in the decision about whether or not to intervene.  Put another way, it violates 
what I take to be a fundamental tenet of democratic theory, the Principle of Affected 
Interests, which holds that all those affected—or at any rate, coerced—by a government‘s 
decisions have the right to participate in them.  But there is something strange about this 
objection‘s reliance on the Principle of Affected Interests.  First, although the moral 
relevance of the principle is intuitively obvious, it is unclear why other considerations—
such as whether observing that principle will allow others to violate it in perpetuity, for 
example—could not sometimes override it.  Second, it is unclear whether the Principle of 
Affected Interests should apply to those who cannot participate because they are being 
prevented from doing so by forces beyond the decision-maker‘s control.  A parallel 
argument should make these two problems clear.  Imagine coming across a stranger who 
is bound, gagged, and locked in a cellar.  On the strong interpretation of the Principle of 
Affected Interests this version of the Inconsistency Objection requires, the stranger 
should not be released, because she cannot participate in the decision about whether to 
release her.  This is patently absurd, but if proponents of this version of the objection 
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were to weaken the principle to avoid that conclusion, that is, if they were to concede that 
decisions which affect those who cannot participate in the decision-making process need 
not respect the status quo, then that principle could no longer function in the sense the 
objection requires. 
The third and most promising version of the Inconsistency Objection draws again 
on the value of political self-determination, and exploits a dialectical instability between 
the two conditions on political legitimacy I have relied on throughout this chapter.  The 
question this version of the objection poses is what to say about what I will call 
profoundly illiberal peoples.  Profoundly illiberal peoples are those whose individual 
members are strongly and unanimously opposed to democratic political institutions, 
whether because they are deeply committed to a religious ideal that requires that political 
decisions be made by a theocratic states, because they place great value of an enduring 
tradition of monarchy that is built into the very foundation of their culture, or for some 
other reason.  Supposing for the sake of argument that the government of such a group 
would be able and willing to secure all of their human rights except their human right to 
democracy, how could a democratic cosmopolitan consistently claim, even in principle, 
that imposing democracy on such a group does not violate their right to political self-
determination?  If self-determination requires a government to adequately represent the 
collective political will of the people it governs, and if the collective political will of a 
given people is adamantly opposed to democracy, a government consisting of democratic 
institutions would, ipso facto, render it unrepresentative and therefore illegitimate. 
I find this objection compelling.  However, it is both weaker and more limited 
than it appears.  The first thing to note is that it relies on extraordinarily strong 
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assumptions.  On the one hand, the security and representation non-democratic 
governments provide to their people are unstable, for the reasons discussed above.  The 
lack of accountability such governments enjoy creates the opportunity for them to exploit 
or neglect their people‘s interests and preferences, and repeated iterations of political 
decision-making will multiply the likelihood that individual officials or governments as a 
whole will capitalize on their unilateral control for reasons of self-interest.  On the other 
hand, the assumption of unanimity requires a degree of homogeneity that does not exist 
in the real world, and the further from anti-democratic consensus the people‘s collective 
will gets, the less representative its governing theocracy or monarchy would become.  Of 
course, these practical worries merely demonstrate that forcible democratization would 
be internally consistent in the real world.  As a matter of pure theory, the objection 
remains standing.  Even when considered as a thought experiment, however, this version 
of the Inconsistency Objection has a very limited scope: it is not forcible democratization 
itself that is internally inconsistent, as with the other version of the objection, but only the 
forcible democratization of profoundly illiberal peoples.  There is nothing inconsistent 
about imposing democratic institutions where non-democracies fail to adequately secure 
human rights, or where the people they govern are divided in their preferences for 
democratic government. 
But a democratic cosmopolitan response could go even further, pending a 
complete account of how the two conditions for political legitimacy are normatively 
related.  As I said above, at some point in the correct lines of justification for human 
rights and political representation it may turn out that one is more important than the 
other, or even subsumes it.  I do not intend to take a stand on this question here, but it is 
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worth pointing out that if the value of political self-determination is reducible to its 
instrumental value for protecting human rights, or for promoting human welfare more 
generally, then the risk that the non-democratic government of a profoundly illiberal 
people might begin to fall seriously behind what a democratic government could 
accomplish with respect to human rights and human welfare might trump the non-
democratic preferences of that people.  This is in no uncertain terms an argument for 
paternalism, writ both large and small.  It tells not only a representative government, but 
also the individual subjects of that government, that they simply do not know what is 
good for them, at least when it comes to political systems.  But the argument is 
paternalistic implies neither that it is inconsistent, nor that it is unsound.  I will remain 
agnostic about whether such an argument could succeed, because it would require a much 
more comprehensive treatment of the relationship between human rights, human welfare, 
and democracy than I can provide here, or have even attempted to provide in the 
preceding chapters.  Nevertheless, this response is available to the democratic 
cosmopolitan. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that even if this in-principle argument for forcibly 
democratizing profoundly illiberal people could succeed, there are very strong 
infeasibility reasons why it would not be a good idea to actually try it.  First, the attempt 
would likely result in unacceptably high casualties, violating the proportionality 
condition on justified military intervention (it is unlikely that anything less than full-scale 
invasion and occupation could impose democratic institutions on a profoundly illiberal 
people).  Second, even supposing democratic institutions could be imposed on 
profoundly illiberal peoples, those very institutions would allow them to revert to their 
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preferred system of government in short order, the only difference being that they would 
afterwards have good reason to despise their departed democratizers.  The only way to 
ensure that such a people remained under a democratic government would be to 
effectively annex them, and I will assume here that the prima facie moral reasons against 
annexation and colonization are sufficient to put this option beyond the pale.  So if 
forcible democratization is not strictly inconsistent in the small range of hypothetical 
cases this version of the Inconsistency Objection holds that it is, democratic 
cosmopolitans should at least agree that imposing democratic institutions on profoundly 
illiberal people is generally a bad idea, if only for practical reasons. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, the permissibility of pro-democratic intervention depends on the standards of 
adequate human rights security and political representation which can be reasonably 
expected and reliably enforced by the international legal system and its members.  
Necessity and proportionality considerations will play a pivotal role not only in assessing 
the permissibility of particular instances of forcible democratization, but in determining 
the relevant standards for international law.  I have said next to nothing about what these 
standards should demand at present, and I concede that it is quite possible that the 
international legal system will never be able to enforce democratic norms of legitimacy 
with the same consistency and decisiveness with which the United States government 
would enforce them on its own constituent states, were one of them to be overthrown in a 
coup, or even democratically abolished and replaced with a religious theocracy.  On the 
other hand, it is also quite possible that the international legal system is not nearly as 
129 
 
aggressive as it could be in promoting democracy in regions where it might take root.  I 
will leave these matters to others.  My thesis here has been conditional: if the 
international legal system or other relevantly situated agents acquire the ability to enforce 
higher standards of adequate security and representation, they should do so.  Democratic 
cosmopolitanism gives us reason to think that if and when these standards continue to 
rise, they should eventually demand democratic governance.  At that time, failure to 
create or maintain effective democratic political institutions will provide a (defeasible) 
justification for pro-democratic intervention, up to and including the use of force. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW 
 
The American intervention and occupation of Iraq was (and continues to be) condemned 
for its violation of international law.  For some this condemnation was based on a merely 
prudential concern: non-compliance with international law would incur the disapproval of 
allies and erode respect for a mutually beneficial but fragile body of norms.  For others, 
the law codified, or perhaps simply coincided with what morality required the United 
States to do anyway, namely, to refrain from unnecessary warfare.  But for many if not 
most of these critics, the observation that the US was engaging in an illegal intervention 
took on a moral force of its own: the US was bound by international law.
1
 It had a duty to 
obey, and shirking that duty was wrong in and of itself, regardless of whatever other 
prudential or moral considerations counted against the intervention.  The implications of 
this view are striking, since it seems to provide grounds for condemning even 
interventions whose humanitarian credentials are far less suspect than those of the war in 
Iraq.   
                                                 
1
 Morality and legality are often run together in public discourse, so it can be difficult to infer the 
philosophical commitments of any given condemnation of the war in Iraq.  But the moral force behind 
invocations of illegality is often unmistakable in tone.  To cite just one example: in January and February 
of 2003, the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association passed a resolution, by an 
overwhelming margin, that expressed ―serious doubts about the morality, legality and prudence of a war 
against Iraq led by the United States.  Both just war theory and international law say that states may 
resort to war only in self-defense. Iraq has attacked neither the United States nor any other nation, and 
claims that it is about to do so are not credible.‖  Notwithstanding the resolution‘s plain 
misunderstanding of both just war theory and international law, any straightforward reading of text has it 
presenting the war‘s illegality as an independent reason for condemnation.  My aim in what follows is to 
explain why I think such claims are either negligible or false. 
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Whether there is a general duty to obey the law is a central preoccupation in 
political philosophy, and is possibly its oldest ground of contention.  But the question has 
almost always been approached within the domestic context, even in the contemporary 
literature.  The debate focuses on whether individual citizens or subjects have a duty to 
obey the laws of their states, and, with few exceptions, neglects the parallel question of 
whether states and other international actors have a duty to obey international law.
2
  The 
core philosophical problem concerns the twin concepts of political authority and political 
obligation, and while I cannot add much to the traditional debate about their nature and 
justification, I do aim to say something useful—and surprising—about their application 
in the international context, and more specifically, about their application to humanitarian 
intervention and democratic regime change. 
In this paper, I argue that even if there is a duty to obey international law—which 
is by no means certain, as I explain below—that duty is likely to make no difference to 
practical deliberation about the moral permissibility of intervention and regime change.  
In short, I claim that a duty to obey international law would be so weak as to be utterly 
negligible, next to the other moral considerations that ought to play a role in those 
deliberations.  Critics of the American regime change in Iraq may be right about its 
imprudence and its immorality, but they are incorrect if they think that its illegality was 
itself a moral reason to condemn it.   
                                                 
2
 Notable exceptions include Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law, Oxford University Press (2004), Ch. 7, David Lefkowitz, ―The 
Principle of Fairness and States‘ Duty to Obey International Law,‖ (forthcoming);  and Eric A Posner, 
―Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?,‖  Stanford Law Review 55 (2003), p. 
1901 ff. 
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My argument proceeds as follows.  In the first section, I describe a tension 
between the moral and legal norms surrounding the international use of force, focusing in 
particular on how current international law prohibits morally justified humanitarian 
interventions, and on why such a conflict is inevitable.  I use this tension to refine my 
guiding question—whether there is a duty to obey international law—into a more 
philosophically profitable inquiry: would states have a duty to obey a just and legitimate 
international legal system‘s prohibition against an otherwise justifiable humanitarian 
intervention?  In the next section, I transpose the language of ―a duty to obey the law‖ 
into the more precise and technical language of political authority and political 
obligation, and then use that language to explicate the differences between Authoritarian, 
Statist, Anarchist, and Abolitionist positions on political power and coercion (I co-opt 
these titles as terms of art; they are distinct from—though related to—their colloquial 
counterparts).  In the following two sections, I advance a destructive dilemma against the 
view that the duty to obey international law is relevant to practical deliberation about 
humanitarian intervention: either anarchism or authoritarianism is the correct view about 
the authority of international law.  If anarchism is correct, then there is no duty to obey 
the international law, and, ipso facto, no duty to obey international laws regarding 
intervention and regime change.  On the other hand, if authoritarianism is correct, then 
that duty is trivial enough to be irrelevant to deliberation about high-stakes international 
activity, including humanitarian intervention.  In the final section, I explain why 
democratic regime change may be a special case: the duty to obey international law may 
in fact be strong enough to render at least one kind of democratic regime change morally 
impermissible. 
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1. ILLEGAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Humanitarian intervention is the use of armed force to halt or prevent human rights 
violations in a foreign state without that state‘s permission.3  The consensus view among 
most political philosophers is that humanitarian interventions can be morally justified, 
provided that they are a necessary and proportionate means to halting or averting 
massive, widespread, and severe human rights violations.
4
  But this view is in clear 
tension with standard interpretations of international law, most conspicuously with 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.  Article 2(4) mandates that all Member states 
―refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.‖  The only notable standing 
exception to this general prohibition in the Charter is the use of force in individual or 
collective self-defense, a right protected in Article 51, which has been construed so as to 
allow for limited interventions into belligerent states when necessary.  Since 
humanitarian interventions by definition aim to defend the human rights of foreign people 
against internal attackers, it is fairly clearly ruled out by any straightforward 
interpretation of international law.
5
   
                                                 
3
 J.L. Holzgrefe, ―The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,‖ in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical Legal, 
and Political Dilemmas, Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Cambridge University Press (2003), pp. 15-52 at 
p. 18. 
 
4
 For commentary on this consensus, see Andrew Altman and Christopher H. Wellman, ―From 
Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence,‖ Ethics 118 (2008), 
pp. 228-257 and Michael Blake, ―Reciprocity, stability, and intervention: the ethics of disequilibrium,‖ in 
Ethics and Foreign Intervention, Chatterjee and Scheid (eds.), Cambridge University Press (2003), pp. 
53-71. 
 
5
 Which is not to say that no one has sought ways around these straightforward interpretations; in general, 
the first move in arguments for the legality of humanitarian intervention is to claim that the meaning of 
Article 2(4) is not fixed.  I cannot pursue the matter in more detail here.  The volume of legal scholarship 
surrounding the question of humanitarian intervention is enormous; for entries into the subject, see 
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Ad hoc exceptions to the general prohibition against the use of international force 
may occur under the authorization of the Security Council.
6
  But historically, that body 
has been reluctant to recognize domestic human rights violations as threats to the peace, 
as breaches of the peace, or as acts of aggression, any of which would legally warrant a 
Security Council response.  That reluctance may change in light of a recently published 
and widely discussed ICISS report entitled ―The Responsibility to Protect‖ (R2P), a non-
statutory document outlining appropriate responses to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and 
other crimes against humanity.
7
  While formally recognized by the UN General 
Assembly, it is not clear whether and to what extent R2P will influence Security Council 
recommendations and actions.
8
  In any case, what the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office said of the matter remains true: ―the best that can be said for humanitarian 
intervention is that it is not unambiguously illegal.‖9   
The tension between the moral consensus on humanitarian intervention on the one 
hand, and its straightforward illegality, on the other, threatens a dangerous dilemma for 
those who believe that there is a moral duty to obey the law.  If this duty applies not only 
                                                                                                                                                 
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford 
University Press (2001), esp. Ch. 2; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 2
nd
 Ed. 
Oxford University Press (2004), esp. Ch. 2; Larry May, Aggression and Crimes Against Peace, 
Cambridge University Press (2008), Ch. 14; and Fernando Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry 
into Law and Morality,3
rd
 Ed. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers (2005). 
 
6
 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII. 
 
7
 ―Responsibility to Protect,‖ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (2001). 
 
8
 See Alex J. Bellamy, ―The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,‖ Ethics & International Affairs 
24/2 (2010), p. 143-69 and Carsten Stahn, ―Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging 
Legal Norm?‖ American Journal of International Law 101/1 (January 2007), pp. 99-120. 
 
9
 ―Is Intervention Ever Justified?‖ Planning Staff of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1984), Foreign 
Policy Document No. 148, cited in Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, p. 86. 
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to the private subjects of domestic legal system, but also to states and other subjects of 
international law, then it seems as though it ought to play some role in moral deliberation 
about whether a state should engage in humanitarian interventions.  Indeed, if states have 
a moral duty to obey international law, then that seems to amount to a presumptive case 
against even those humanitarian interventions which would otherwise be morally 
justified.  For all practical intents, all that may be needed to dodge the dilemma is a 
plausible argument that the present international legal system is illegitimate, or if it is 
legitimate, that the prohibition on the use of force for humanitarian purposes is unjust.  
For instance, one might argue that Article 2(4) is too blunt an instrument, and that the UN 
should recognize a legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention on the part of 
interested states.
10
  Alternately, one might argue that such a right would be unnecessary if 
the Security Council were a more effective instrument of international justice, that is, less 
driven by the geopolitical interests of its key players, and more willing to authorize the 
use of force to halt or prevent human rights abuses where appropriate.  These are sensible 
responses to the current practical moral dilemma facing state actors with the capacity to 
stage effective humanitarian interventions. But they sidestep the deeper philosophical 
issue about what to do in cases where a just and legitimate international legal system 
nevertheless prohibits what would otherwise be a morally justifiable intervention.   
To prevent such evasive maneuvers, I will pose the question in a starker, more 
direct fashion, by assuming, for the sake of argument, a reformed international legal 
system, one which has corrected whichever of these defects we find to be a compelling 
                                                 
10
 For criticism, see Allen Buchanan, ―From Nuremberg to Kosovo: the Morality of Illegal Legal Reform,‖ 
Ethics 111 (2001), pp. 673–704; for a response, see David Lefkowitz, ―On Moral Arguments Against a 
Legal Right to Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention,‖ Public Affairs Quarterly 20/2 (April 2006), pp. 
115-34. 
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reason to reject the justice and legitimacy of contemporary international law.  It is neither 
methodologically useful nor descriptively plausible to posit a legal system whose laws 
are so just that they perfectly align with what states‘ independent moral duties would be 
in each and every scenario.  An international legal system idealized to that extent would 
be useless to a philosophical inquiry about the duty to obey international law, since if the 
laws of that system never contradicted the independent demands of morality, it would be 
impossible to determine whether that duty was doing any explanatory or justificatory 
work.  But such a system would be descriptively implausible in any case, since conflict 
between legal and moral norms is inevitable.  Legal systems must of practical necessity 
establish and maintain relatively simple rules and procedures incapable of mirroring 
morality in every detail—stark and enduring lines need to be drawn, formal procedures 
need to be followed, and as a result, discrepancies will arise.  Some lack of fit between 
legal and moral norms surrounding humanitarian intervention is therefore likely to 
remain, even in a just and fully legitimate international legal system.  We do not need a 
detailed picture of such a system to see why: on the one hand, general laws may prohibit 
otherwise morally permissible—or even obligatory—interventions, and on the other 
hand, adjudicative political bodies tasked with making exceptions to those general laws 
may still make serious errors about whether a case warrants exception or not. 
We are now left with the following question: would states have a duty to obey 
international laws pertaining to humanitarian intervention under a just and fully 
legitimate international legal system?  Or, to put this in terms echoing those used above, 
would the illegality of a particular humanitarian intervention provide an independent 
moral reason not to intervene?  I will argue that there is no duty to obey the international 
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law of humanitarian intervention even under such idealized conditions, or that even if 
there were, that duty would be so insignificant as to be totally irrelevant to practical 
moral deliberation about humanitarian intervention.  Moreover, it seems clear that even if 
states did have what I claim would be a rather trivial duty to obey the law under such an 
idealized international legal system, that duty would be far weaker under international 
law as we know it today.  It is important to say from the outset that my view is not as 
radical as it may first appear.  While I do believe that any alleged duty to obey 
international law would be too weak to play any significant role in moral deliberation 
about humanitarian intervention, I do not infer from this that international law itself 
should be ignored.  There may be strong reasons to cooperate with an ideal or a non-ideal 
international legal system and to comply with its commands, though these reasons are 
highly contingent on the vagaries of particular circumstances.  What these reasons are, 
and how they differ from a general duty to obey the law, will be explained below.  But 
before that, we must first situate our guiding question within the philosophical debate 
surrounding the duty to obey the law—a debate which centers on the closely related 
concepts of political authority and political obligation. 
 
2. POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 
Authority is a form of discretionary control over another agent‘s moral obligations—it is 
a Hohfeldian moral power to waive, alter, or impose those obligations by mere 
command.
11
  It is important to understand the difference between discretionary control 
                                                 
11
 My concern here is with political authority, the species of moral authority governments are said to 
possess.  Political authority must be distinguished from legal authority, which I understand to be a purely 
positive notion—an agent has legal authority when she can exercise discretionary control over another‘s 
legal obligations, which may or may not accord with moral obligations.  Political authority as I 
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and incidental control.  Incidental control is the ability to alter another agent‘s moral 
obligations by changing that agent‘s environment or circumstances in morally salient 
ways.  For instance, I could cause other agents to have an obligation to stop their cars 
simply by stepping into oncoming traffic, but I would not thereby exercise authority over 
them.
12
  Discretionary control, on the other hand, is direct.  An authority‘s control is 
unmediated by environment or circumstances—the authority‘s will, and the 
communication of that will to the subject, is sufficient to bring about the desired change 
in obligations. 
  Another way to highlight the characteristic feature of authority is to draw a 
distinction between obedience and compliance.  Compliance means merely acting in 
accordance with a command, but does not imply that the command was or should have 
been a reason for acting in that way.  Obedience is a form of compliance in which one 
acts in accordance with a command because that action was commanded.  Obedience 
does not rule out the possibility that there may be other reasons, perhaps sufficient on 
their own, to act in accordance with the command.  But to obey is to take the command as 
reason, in itself, for compliance.  To have a duty to obey means, in effect, that one has a 
duty to allow the authority‘s decision about how one should act count against (though not 
                                                                                                                                                 
understand it here must also be distinguished from what is often called de facto political authority, that is, 
a government‘s ability to exercise coercive control over the inhabitants of a given territory.  I will use the 
terms ―duty‖ and ―obligation‖ interchangeably throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
 
12
 Estlund offers another enlightening example: ―If a petulant child of a brutal dictator whimsically tells the 
minister to leave the palace, and the dictator will unleash brutality on the masses out of anger if the 
minister disobeys, then the child‘s command has created a moral requirement to obey. The child has the 
moral power to require action, but it sounds wrong to say that she has authority. One way of capturing 
this is to point out that in this case, when the minister considers what to do, the fact that the child 
commanded him to leave has no weight of its own…In cases of authority the fact that it was commanded 
is itself a moral reason for action.‖ David Estlund, Democratic Authority, Princeton University Press 
(2008), p. 118. 
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necessarily override) whatever independent prudential or moral reasons he has for non-
compliance.  The duty to obey an authority‘s commands, and therefore authority itself, is 
nearly always constrained in two important ways.  First, authority and the duty to obey 
are domain specific: they apply only within a more or less constrained scope or 
jurisdiction.  Except in cases of absolute authority—the kind of authority only God could 
hold—the duty to obey does not imply that subjects must forfeit their discretion in every 
aspect of life, which is just to say that subjects generally retain some significant sphere of 
personal liberty.  Second, the duty to obey is prima facie in the sense that conflicting 
moral considerations can override the authority‘s command, even when that command 
remains within the appropriate domain.  An authority‘s commands may have a kind of 
presumptive force, but once countervailing considerations become weighty enough they 
can override a subject‘s duty to obey.  All the same, within these two constraints a 
subject‘s duty to obey is content-independent: so long as the authority‘s command is 
within the appropriate scope, and is not overridden by conflicting moral considerations, 
the content of that command does not matter to whether the subject ought to comply. 
Political authority is authority held by a political entity over its subjects. 
(Paradigmatically, the debate over political authority focuses on states, though in 
subsequent sections I will be addressing the political authority of the international legal 
system.)  Given the relationship between authority and the duty to obey, it is no surprise 
that those who believe that states can or do in fact wield authority over their subjects—as 
well as their opponents—often frame their arguments in terms of political obligations.  
Political obligations are simply moral obligations imposed by, and (usually) owed to, 
political entities such as state, governments, legal systems, by virtue of their authority.  
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Since political authority and political obligation are logical correlates, proponents of the 
state‘s (potential for) discretionary control over their subjects‘ moral obligations are for 
that reason wedded to (the possibility of) a general, domain-specific, prima facie, 
content-independent duty to obey the law.  That is to say, debates over political authority, 
political obligation, and the duty to obey the law are, by definition if not by recognized 
convention, debates about the same thing.  For the sake of expository convenience, I will 
make use of all three terms. 
But before moving on, it is necessary to clear up two kinds of confusion relating 
to the distinction between authority and legitimacy.  The first kind of confusion is 
conceptual.  As I will deploy the term here, ―legitimacy‖ means that a political entity is at 
liberty to coerce subjects into compliance with a body of rules.
13
  Following Wellman, I 
understand coercion broadly and descriptively as a way to influence an agent‘s behavior 
by imposing disincentives on undesired actions: ―A coerces B when A pressures B to act 
in a manner X by attaching an additional cost to B‘s doing not X.‖14  Although state 
coercion is often backed by force, coercion does not necessarily imply the threat or use of 
physical compulsion or violence.  Legitimate states, or more generally and more 
precisely, legitimate legal systems are morally justified in coercing their subjects, given 
certain constraints on the exercise of that coercion.  On this understanding of legitimacy, 
it is clearly distinct from authority.  Authority implies that an agent has a power to waive, 
alter, or impose moral obligations on another, while legitimacy implies that an agent is at 
                                                 
13
 See Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, ―The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,‖ Ethics & 
International Affairs 20/4 (2006), pp. 405-37.  et al.  I explain in Chapter 3 that legitimacy is actually 
both a liberty to coerce and a claim against interference with that coercion.  I disregard the non-
interference claim because it is not relevant in this context. 
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 Christopher H. Wellman, A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination, Cambridge 
University Press (2005), p.133. 
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liberty to impose sanctions on another in order to induce compliance with a body of rules.  
The two are not only conceptually, but also logically independent: the possession of 
authority does not entail legitimacy, and vice versa. 
The second kind of confusion is terminological, and results from an ambiguity in 
the word ―anarchism.‖  Colloquially, it refers to the rejection of coercive political power; 
anarchists, in the popular vernacular, advocate for the abolition of political states.  On the 
analysis of authority and legitimacy set out above, this would commit anarchists to the 
view that states are universally illegitimate.  But owing to A. John Simmon‘s highly 
influential distinction between political and philosophical anarchism, the matter is 
somewhat more complicated.
15
  Political anarchism is the familiar form of anarchism—
the abolitionist variety.  Philosophical anarchism, however, refers not to the view that 
states are not, or cannot be legitimate, but rather to the view that states do not or cannot 
have authority.  Curiously, prior to the introduction of this term, it appears that neither 
side of the debate over political authority had a widely-accepted title; the opposite view, 
that some states do or could have authority, still doesn‘t.  I therefore propose the 
following taxonomy:  
 
i. Statism - Political entities are or can be legitimate; that is, they are or can be at 
liberty to coerce their subjects into compliance with a body of rules. 
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 See A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton University Press (1979). 
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ii. Abolitionism - Political entities are not or cannot be legitimate, and their 
exercise of coercive control is morally unjustified; this amounts to the view 
that political entities should be abolished (political anarchism). 
 
iii. Authoritarianism - Political entities do or can have authority over their 
subjects; that is, they do or can have discretionary control over their subjects‘ 
moral obligations. 
 
iv. Anarchism - Political entities do not or cannot have authority over their 
subjects, that is, they have no discretionary control over their subjects‘ moral 
obligations (philosophical anarchism). 
 
Proponents of the duty to obey the law may balk at being called authoritarians.  While I 
do believe that this is the most apt term for the view, because of its clear reference to the 
central philosophical concept at issue, I do not deny that it may appear tendentious to 
those who would prefer not to be saddled with a label that colloquially implies 
endorsement of oppressive and dictatorial regimes.  Needless to say, this implication is 
no part of how I intend to use the term.  However, it should also be noted that anarchism, 
in light of its association with violence and political disorder, suffers from symmetrical 
and equally negative connotations, so use of the word ―authoritarian‖ is not exactly 
unfair.  It is tempting to further justify these stipulative titles by spelling out how they 
relate to their more dramatic colloquial meanings—there are interesting connections to be 
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drawn—but I will instead return to the debate between authoritarians and anarchists and 
its application to international law and humanitarian intervention. 
 Before moving on I should explain my use of the cumbersome ―do or can,‖ ―are 
or can,‖ ―do not or cannot,‖ and ―are not or cannot‖ formulations in my taxonomy.  The 
problem stems from a divergence in different kinds of arguments for the relevant 
positions.  For instance, there are two kinds of argument for anarchism, a priori and a 
posteriori.
16
  On the one hand, an anarchist might argue on a priori grounds that political 
authority cannot exist, either because the concept is incoherent, or because to the extent 
that it is coherent, it is categorically overridden by conflicting moral considerations.  
Robert Paul Wolff, for example, argues that any general obligation to obey the law would 
conflict with the more important moral obligation to retain one‘s autonomy—we literally 
cannot forfeit or alienate the moral responsibility that comes along with our capacity for 
choice.
17
  Consent theorists like Simmons, on the other hand, believe that such a transfer 
is not impossible: we can and may voluntarily grant another agent discretionary 
normative control over our obligations, thereby giving them authority over us.  However, 
Simmons and like-minded anarchists believe that the kind of forfeiture required for 
authority simply does not happen between states and their subjects.   
An analogy might be drawn to a view in the morality of war known as contingent 
pacifism.  Contingent pacifists, as opposed to pacifists simpliciter, believe that just wars 
are possible, but that the conditions which would need to be met for one to occur never 
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actually obtain in the real world (at least, not under the conditions in which wars are 
fought today).
18
  Contingent pacifists are pacifists, but only because of considerations 
external to their theory of just war.  In the same way, a posteriori arguments for 
anarchism generate a kind of contingent anarchism—they are anarchists, but only by 
historical or sociological accident.  Because the distinction between a priori anarchism 
(and the remaining concepts in the taxonomy) and a posteriori (contingent) anarchism is 
irrelevant to my argument here, I have chosen to stick with the simpler taxonomy and 
retain the ―do or can‖ terminology in order to avoid the complications of adding an 
unnecessary third dimension to my analysis.  I turn now to the debate between anarchism 
and authoritarianism as it applies to the international legal system. 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL ANARCHISM 
Philosophical anarchism, when applied to the international legal system, maintains that 
states (or any other international actors, for that matter) have no general duty to obey 
international law.  I call this view ―international anarchism,‖ and its denial ―international 
authoritarianism.‖  While it is tempting to believe that the truth of philosophical 
anarchism at the level of domestic institutions would suggest that international anarchism 
is probably also true, that inference is not so easy to draw as it may first appear.  
Authoritarians have proffered many theories of political authority and obligation, and at 
least some of the objections philosophical anarchists have brought against those theories 
may depend on features unique to domestic legal systems and their individual human 
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subjects.  But it is not my purpose here to mount a defense of either ordinary 
philosophical or of international anarchism.  I aim only to examine the implications of 
international anarchism for moral deliberation about humanitarian intervention.   
International anarchists, as I said, hold that there is no general duty on the part of 
states to obey international law.  But this should not be taken to imply that international 
anarchists believe states are entitled to disregard the commands of an international legal 
system entirely.  In fact, philosophical anarchists are typically concerned to show that 
there are often a great many reasons to comply with the law other than a general duty to 
obey it.  Below, I present a brief list of potential reasons for compliance with domestic 
and international legal systems.  The items on this list are not intended to be exhaustive, 
and careful readers will note some overlap between them.  My point here is not to set out 
a rigorous taxonomy, but only to show how many and how compelling this class of 
reasons can be. 
 
1. Prudential reasons.  Legal requirements often overlap with self-interest.  Some of 
this overlap may be coincidental, but more often it is the deliberate result of legal 
sanctions: the prospect of state punishment provides subjects with strong 
incentives to comply with the law. 
 
2. In se moral reasons.  Legal requirements also often overlap with morality.  That is 
to say, the actions required or prohibited by law are often morally obligatory or 
morally wrong in and of themselves. (Again, this correlation is usually not 
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coincidental; coercive legal systems are established and maintained, in large part, 
to ―give force‖ to independent moral requirements.)  
 
3. Advisory reasons.  Legal requirements often indicate the existence of independent 
prudential or moral reasons of which subjects may not have been aware.  First, 
laws may alert us to danger, as when a ―No Smoking‖ sign is posted in an area 
containing flammable materials.  Second, the law may serve an adjudicative 
function: its relative impartiality can serve as a useful corrective to our individual 
biases and prejudices. 
 
4. Example-setting reasons.  In some contexts, non-compliance with legal 
requirements could make non-compliance by others more likely, which in turn 
threatens to undermine a valuable social norm.  Example-setting reasons carry 
special weight in the formative stages of a given norm—a necessary or beneficial 
norm may not take hold if too many subjects fail to comply early on. 
 
5. Habit-forming reasons.  In the same way that our non-compliance can make 
others more likely not to comply with the law, it can also make future non-
compliance easier for us.  Given our other reasons for compliance, we often have 
a secondary reason to inculcate a habit of compliance. 
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6. Expectation-based reasons.  Others may expect us to comply with legal 
requirements and will plan and act on those expectations.  By failing to comply, 
we can frustrate those expectations and in so doing cause considerable harm. 
 
Some clarification is in order with regard to expectation-based reasons.  It may appear to 
some that expectation-based reasons can imbue a legal system with authority, because by 
exercising its coercive capacities to enforce a new law, the system thereby changes the 
incentive structure within which subjects act, and, in turn, changes the expectations they 
have for each other‘s behavior.  Since others‘ expectations about our behavior can impose 
moral obligations on us, the state does indeed have a form of control over those 
obligations.  The crucial point to see here, however, is that this control is incidental, not 
discretionary.  The state can only influence the content of our expectation-based reasons 
for compliance by changing our external environment or circumstances, rather than by 
mere command.  Thus, our expectation-based reasons ground neither political authority 
nor political obligations. 
It is also worth pointing out that the existence of prudential, in se, advisory, 
example-setting, habit-forming, and expectation-based reasons could be taken as an 
inductive, demotivational argument against authoritarianism.  The intuition that animates 
the Authoritarian project is that most of us, most of the time, should not break the law.  
From here, they proceed to the natural assumption that a general moral duty to obey the 
law would elegantly account for this intuition.  One way to attack this inference to the 
best explanation is by showing that there is a better explanation—one that accounts for 
the same intuition via more obvious factors, and without any reference to a duty to obey 
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the law.  In the same way that a more comprehensive understanding of biology, 
neurology, and cognitive science have made recourse to an immaterial soul unnecessary 
to explanations of human behavior, so too might a more comprehensive understanding of 
the reasons we have for complying with the law tend to erode what reason we had for 
positing a duty to obey the law in the first place.  Of course, many philosophers remain 
committed to the existence of political authority and obligations for other reasons, so it is 
still incumbent on anarchists to continue refuting candidate theories.  Nevertheless, 
insofar as what motivates the search for such theories is the sense that we usually should 
not break the laws of just and legitimate regimes, to that extent the foregoing list of 
reasons for compliance weakens the authoritarian position. 
International anarchists need not claim that the commands of an international 
legal system are irrelevant to moral deliberation about humanitarian intervention.  In fact, 
it is perfectly compatible with anarchism to argue that since the constraints effective legal 
systems place on our behavior promote the overall good, and since non-compliance with 
those constraints can weaken them, we often have good reason to comply.  However, the 
importance of the distinction between the claim that there are reasons for compliance, on 
the one hand, and a duty to obey, on the other, should not be understated.  In short, 
international anarchism holds that there is no general moral presumption against law-
breaking.  All of the reasons for compliance mentioned above are heavily contingent on 
the vagaries of particular circumstances in a way that a duty to obey the law is not.  Since 
international anarchism denies that there is a general duty to obey the laws of even a just 
and legitimate international legal system, the fact that such a system would legally 
prohibit this or that humanitarian intervention is not, in itself, a reason to refrain from that 
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intervention.  In no case is the difficult business of weighing the morally relevant reasons 
for compliance against those for non-compliance obviated by some overarching duty to 
obey.  In the next section, I argue that even if there is such a duty, and even if it does 
have some moral weight for state actors, it is probably still too weak to have much if any 
effect on the correct outcome of moral decisions about humanitarian intervention. 
 
4. INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM 
As I mentioned above, on plausible theories of political authority, the duty subjects have 
to obey the law is prima facie—it can be overridden by conflicting moral considerations.  
It would be absurd to claim that the duty to obey the law is absolute, and that there are no 
circumstances under which another duty could be sufficiently important to override it.  
Thus, the frequency or likelihood that we must actually obey the law depends crucially 
on how strong that duty is, relative to other duties.  But authoritarians have thus far been 
concerned primarily with justifying the existence of a duty to obey the law than with its 
relative strength.  This comes as no surprise, given the lack of any systematic way to 
determine the relative strength of our moral obligations.  The only way I know of to 
estimate the strength of a particular duty is by testing our intuitions about pair-wise 
comparisons between it and the duties with which it could come into conflict.  However, 
I believe it is fairly easy, in the domestic case, to arrive at an approximation of an upper 
limit for the strength of the duty to obey the law.  As in all such intuition-testing 
procedures, I will proceed by way of a thought experiment. 
Suppose Alice is subject to a legitimate government that enforces just laws, and 
so has a duty to obey.  Among those laws is a law that prohibits swimming at a given 
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beach (the rationale for this law does not matter, so long as it turns out the government is 
in fact justified in enforcing it). One day, while walking along the beach, Alice sees a 
stranger drowning about a hundred meters offshore.  Alice is aware of the prohibition 
against swimming, but she also knows that she could rescue the drowning stranger by 
swimming out to him and pulling him to shore.  Is Alice‘s prima facie duty to obey the 
law stronger than her prima facie duty to save the stranger‘s life?  I think not, and I 
suspect most people would agree. Of course, in order to placate those who disagree, we 
could manipulate the example in order to place Alice‘s duty to obey the law in conflict 
with her duty to save many more people—ten, fifty, one hundred—but note that the 
plausibility of the alleged duty to obey the law decreases as its strength increases, that is, 
as it comes closer to being absolute.  At some point, our political obligations can be 
overridden, even easily overridden, by conflicting moral obligations. 
This is not meant to imply that the duty to obey domestic laws, if it exists, is 
always trivial.  We are not often faced with choices in which the moral stakes are as high 
as they were in the example above.  If there is a duty to obey the law, that duty is 
probably still relevant to moral deliberation in a wide range of circumstances.  Had 
Alice‘s reason for swimming at the beach been to salvage her drifting canoe, or perhaps 
even to save the life her drowning pet dog, she may not have been morally justified in 
breaking the law.  However, when the stakes are high enough, the prima facie nature of 
political obligations renders them liable to being overridden.  My purpose in the 
foregoing example was merely to indicate the approximate strength of those obligations.  
When human lives do not hang in the balance, there is room for reasonable disagreement, 
but, to me at least, it seems to make a fetish of obedience to claim that we must obey the 
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law even at the expense of human lives.  In any case, I will assume that the duty to obey 
the just laws of a legitimate domestic government can be overridden by the duty to save a 
stranger‘s life, if the only way to do so is by breaking the law. 
Now, political philosophers are accustomed to a kind of analogical reasoning that 
takes interpersonal morality and the domestic affairs of states to be a model for 
international relations.  Walzer calls this the ―domestic analogy,‖ and its implicit 
comparison between international and domestic societies might easily lead us to believe 
that the duty to obey domestic law somehow ―scales up‖ when we turn to the duty to 
obey international law.
19
  In this mode, it is easy to take for granted the thought that the 
strength of a state‘s duty to obey international law is greater than an individual‘s duty to 
obey domestic law in proportion to the relative moral importance of state actions in 
international affairs.  After all, states can deprive thousands of people of food, send 
thousands of people to war, save thousands of people from natural disasters by their 
actions, while only in the rarest of cases can individuals even hope to affect such 
momentous changes. Therefore, the argument goes, since the consequences of state 
action usually carry with them a greater potential for both harm and benefit than do the 
actions of private individuals, their duty to obey the laws that regulate and coordinate 
their behavior is correspondingly stronger.   
But this argument is mistaken.  It is mistaken, because it conflates reasons for 
mere compliance with reasons for genuine obedience.  As I said above, the distinction 
between the two is that with obedience one‘s reason for compliance with a command is 
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that it was commanded—the state‘s authority lends moral force to the command 
independent of the prudential, in se, advisory, example-setting, habit-forming, and 
expectation-based reasons subjects may (or may not) have to comply.  To be sure, 
international actors have those reasons to comply, and those reasons may often be 
stronger at the international level, owing to the high moral stakes of state action. But this 
has no bearing on the strength of the state‘s duty to obey international law.  In fact, it is 
not clear what factors could increase or decrease the strength of any subject‘s duty to 
obey the just laws of any legitimate legal system, since authoritarians have tended to 
focus on establishing the existence of political obligations rather than on what factors 
contribute to their relative strength.  But without such an account, it is difficult to see any 
principled reason to believe that saving a single human life is any less of a reason for 
states to break international law than it is a reason for individuals to break domestic laws. 
If this is correct, then states‘ duties to obey international law do indeed begin to 
look rather trivial, precisely because the consequences of state action can affect 
momentous change.  As in the case of individual action, when the stakes are high enough, 
political obligations are easily overridden.  But if the strength of the duty to obey the law 
does not increase when we move from the domestic to the international arena, then the 
stakes are high very often, and the triviality of international political obligations is 
especially perspicuous in the case of humanitarian intervention.  Again, the received view 
is that humanitarian interventions are only justified when they aim to halt or prevent 
serious human rights abuses—usually, this will imply that they are only justified when 
they aim to halt or prevent the loss of many (often very many) human lives.  What this 
means is that any case in which humanitarian intervention is justified for strictly moral 
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reasons (i.e., reasons which do not include the duty to obey the law) is also likely to be a 
case in which the duty to obey international law is easily overridden.  In short, the duty to 
obey international law, if such a duty exists, is practically irrelevant to moral deliberation 
about humanitarian intervention. 
It bears repeating that the irrelevance of the duty to obey international law to 
practical deliberation about humanitarian intervention does not imply that international 
law is itself irrelevant.  Again, there may be compelling prudential, in se, advisory, 
example-setting, habit-forming, and expectation-based reasons to comply with laws that 
prohibit humanitarian intervention.  But if the duty to obey international law is as trivial 
as my argument seems to show, then the difference between international anarchists and 
authoritarians on this score is minimal: in both cases whether a state ought to obey 
international law is highly contingent on the circumstances of particular cases.  Since the 
aforementioned reasons may fail to apply in a wide range of cases, even international 
authoritarians must admit that morally justified illegal humanitarian interventions may 
not be anywhere near as rare as the law would make them.  In the next section, I apply 
these conclusions to a special class of humanitarian interventions: those which aim to 
establish or restore democratic political institutions abroad. 
 
5.  ILLEGAL DEMOCRATIC REGIME CHANGE 
There is no duty to obey international law, or if there is, it should probably be a 
negligible factor in moral deliberation about humanitarian intervention.  That conclusion 
was based on the premise that humanitarian interventions paradigmatically aim to halt or 
prevent massive violations of basic human rights.  But not all interventions, not even all 
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humanitarian interventions, have such unambiguously just causes.  Democratic regime 
change of the sort attempted in Iraq is one especially salient example.  But in order to 
assess whether and to what extent a duty to obey international law should play a role in 
moral deliberation about democratic regime change, we must distinguish between two 
different ways the use of armed force may be used to establish or restore democratic 
political institutions in a foreign country.  Specifically, as Alyssa Bernstein writes, 
 
…it is important to distinguish clearly the question of whether forcible 
intervention can be justified on the ground that its primary aim is to 
transform a [non-democratic] society into a democratic society, from the 
related question of whether in rebuilding an invaded country it is 
permissible or even mandatory to establish a democratic political system.
20
 
 
 
Call a democratic regime change in which the intervention itself is defended on the 
grounds that it will establish or restore democracy in the target state ―ad bellum‖ regime 
change; call a democratic regime change in which the intervention is defended on other 
humanitarian grounds (halting or preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing, etc.), but in 
which specifically democratic political reconstruction is thought to be either permissible 
or obligatory, ―post bellum‖ regime change.  I will address each kind in turn. 
Among legal scholars who believe that humanitarian intervention is consistent 
with current international law—by far a minority view—are a considerably smaller 
number who believe that democratization provides valid legal grounds for armed 
intervention.  The general argument for this position usually begins by noting that the 
UN‘s Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes what amounts to a legal human 
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right to democracy, and then arguing that intervention in order to halt or prevent 
violations of this right is either consistent with the purpose of the UN and with the legal 
obligations imposed by Article 2(4), or that state practice has generated a new customary 
norm that supersedes Charter statutes.  The first argument is weak because, as with the 
legal argument for humanitarian intervention in general, it depends on a convoluted 
interpretation of Article 2(4).  The second argument is weak because only very rarely 
have states made any reference to democratization in their formal legal justifications for 
armed intervention, and in some cases have explicitly acknowledged and rejected the 
possibility of such justifications.
21
  In any case, I assume that ad bellum democratic 
regime change is illegal under current international law, and could be under a less 
controversially just and legitimate international legal system as well. 
In the present context, then, there are two questions for ad bellum regime change.  
On the one hand is the question of whether it could be morally justified independent of 
legal considerations; on the other hand is the question of whether, if it could be morally 
justified, whether the reasons that count in its favor would be strong enough to override 
the alleged duty to obey (idealized) international law.  There is reasonable disagreement 
on both points.  Elsewhere, I have gone some distance towards showing that there are 
conditions under which ad bellum democratic regime change can be morally justified.
22
  
My basic strategy was to argue, first, that a state‘s right to non-intervention requires that 
it (1) adequately protect the human rights of its people, and (2) adequately represent their 
                                                 
21
 See Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
Oxford University Press (2001), esp. pp. 88-111; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of 
Force, 2
nd
 Ed. Oxford University Press (2004), pp. 49-52 
 
22
 See Chapter III, ―Democratic Cosmopolitanism and Forcible Democratization.‖ 
 
 
156 
 
collective political will. Next, I argue that, at least under some conditions, satisfying 
those requirements depends on having functioning democratic political institutions.  One 
way to see this is as an argument that ad bellum regime change is an instance of 
humanitarian intervention, but one that aims to halt or protect rights violations which do 
not fall within the scope of the ―massive, widespread, and severe‖ human rights 
violations, whose halting and prevention the consensus view takes to be a paradigm case 
of just cause for intervention.  In addition to placing the threshold for intervention-
justifying rights violations much higher than I do, detractors from this view object that 
democratic regime change is likely to be infeasible and is inherently inconsistent with 
democratic principles.  I do not have the space here to mount a defense of ad bellum 
democratic regime change, so I will instead merely suppose for the sake of argument that 
I am correct, in order to move on to what those who disagree should see as a welcome 
concession. 
Unlike paradigmatic cases of morally justified but illegal humanitarian 
interventions, ad bellum regime change does not necessarily aim to save many lives—in 
fact, it does not necessarily aim to save any lives at all.  Since non-democratic states can 
and do often refrain from killing or enslaving their subjects, the moral case for ad bellum 
regime change does not require such serious wrongs in order to be justified.  Of course, 
large-scale armed interventions of the kind able to defeat, occupy, and reconstruct a 
foreign state are likely to result in many casualties, so ―pure‖ cases of ad bellum 
democratization—cases in which democratization functions as the sole just cause, and is 
not buttressed by concurrent just causes like halting genocide—are likely to be 
disproportionate in any case.  But even if proportionate ad bellum democratizations are 
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possible, the reasons that count in their favor are much weaker than those that count in 
favor of interventions with more urgent humanitarian causes.  I argued above for the 
provisional conclusion that the moral significance of saving a single human life indicated 
a kind of ceiling for the strength of any plausible duty to obey the law.  It is perfectly 
consistent with that view to believe that only saving one or more lives can justify 
breaking the just laws of a legitimate legal system.  Since I have no decisive grounds on 
which to argue against such a position, I must concede that the duty to obey international 
law could preclude (pre-institutionally justified) ad bellum regime changes.  
 But note well: this concession is only necessary if, first, international 
authoritarianism is correct, and second, the strength of the duty to obey the law falls just 
short of the strength of moral reasons for life-saving instances of lawbreaking.  
International anarchism, which remains a highly plausible alternative to authoritarianism, 
would undermine the case for obedience to international law from the outset.  And even if 
it did not, the strength of the duty to obey domestic and international laws may be 
considerably weaker than I have posited for the sake of argument.  Moreover, as I and 
others have argued elsewhere, one of the virtues of democratic political institutions is 
their empirical correlation with a relatively low incidence of other, more serious human 
rights violations.  Democracies are less likely to engage in state violence against their 
own subjects, less likely to subject them to famine, less likely to go to war, and less likely 
to experience violent resistance and civil war among their own populations—all factors 
that will make a difference to the survival of many people.  If the existence of a duty to 
obey international law is in question, if the strength of such a duty could easily be weaker 
than I have assumed, and if the imposition of democracy has the potential to save many 
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lives, then my concession to authority-based arguments against illegal, pure, ad bellum 
democratization seems to be considerably less damaging than it might at first appear.   
Post bellum democratization avoids many of the justificatory barriers that ad 
bellum democratization encounters, since it seems clear that the same causes which 
uncontroversially justify humanitarian intervention from a moral perspective can also, in 
some circumstances, justify the occupation and political reconstruction of the target 
state.
23
  This is so primarily where the target state has institutionalized norms that make 
genocide and other atrocities more likely, or even promote them.  All the same, post 
bellum democratization is also generally illegal under international law, though 
customary norms since the reconstruction of the Axis powers following World War II 
have weakened these prohibitions somewhat, as the 2001 R2P document demonstrates.
24
  
The clearest statutory example of the prohibition against so-called ―transformative 
occupations‖ appears in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, which, though commanding 
occupiers to secure public order and safety, mandates that they do so ―while respecting, 
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.‖  The relevant questions 
here concern whether the duty to obey international law may be overridden by the moral 
case for replacing the target state‘s government where this is not ―absolutely‖ necessary, 
and whether democratization should be the presumptive mode of political reconstruction. 
The normative landscape surrounding the first question is similar to that 
surrounding illegal ad bellum democratization, in that it presupposes answers to questions 
about whether there is a duty to obey international law, the strength of that duty, and the 
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 See, e.g., Gary J. Bass, ―Jus Post Bellum,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 32/4 (2004), pp. 384-412. 
 
24
 R2P, Sec. 5: ―The Responsibility to Rebuild.‖ 
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relative strength of the countervailing moral reasons in favor of democratization.  Again, 
since I have offered no decisive arguments about these matters, I cannot rule out the 
possibility that the duty to obey outweighs the positive case for unnecessary 
democratization, though neither can we rule out the contrary.  The second question is 
more interesting, because present international law gives little to no guidance regarding 
how occupiers ought to reconstruct an occupied society when reconstruction really is 
necessary.  But this also serves to put the question beyond the scope of this paper, since 
there is no reason to think that democratization would or should be illegal under those 
conditions.  The prima facie moral argument, of course, would be that in the absence of a 
native government able to adequately represent the political will of the occupied people, 
occupiers may, within certain limits, permissibly use their own discretion in deciding 
how to proceed with reconstruction.  Perhaps the moral case for democratization even 
imposes on them an obligation to democratize the occupied society, if at all possible, as 
Bernstein suggests.  But again, this is a subject for another time.  In this section, I have 
endeavored only to map out the conceptual and normative space in which arguments for 
and against the duty to obey international law regarding democratic regime change must 
take shape. 
 
CONCLUSION 
To recapitulate, states may or may not have a duty to obey international law, even 
assuming a drastically more just and legitimate international legal system than exists at 
present.  If there is no duty to obey international law, then contrary to many critics of the 
war in Iraq, the illegality of humanitarian intervention and democratic regime change is 
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not, in itself, a moral reason to refrain from or condemn such actions.  On the other hand, 
if there is a duty to obey international law, there is little reason to suspect that it carries 
enough moral force to override the positive case for humanitarian interventions which are 
justifiable on independent moral grounds, which renders that duty practically irrelevant to 
moral deliberation about whether to intervene on humanitarian grounds.  The relevance 
of a duty to obey international law with regard to democratic regime change is less clear, 
since ad bellum regime change need not aim to halt or prevent very urgent human rights 
abuses, and since post bellum regime change is neither clearly illegal, nor even 
objectionable in the obvious ways that would provide good reasons for making it illegal.  
Nevertheless, laws against democratic regime change may still plausibly be thought liable 
to disobedience for the same reasons as are laws against humanitarian intervention.  In 
the next chapter, I address the question of how occupiers—including those engaged in 
regime change—ought to treat the occupied people.  
161 
 
CHAPTER V 
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF AFFECTED INTERESTS 
 
Jus post bellum is an aspect of just war theory that addresses normative questions 
surrounding the aftermath of military conflict.  Given that wars often end in occupation, 
the treatment of an occupied people is of central concern to this line of inquiry.  Recently, 
several authors have suggested a number of plausible guidelines surrounding the need for 
self-restraint, reconciliation, and reconstruction when dealing with post-conflict societies; 
however, they implicitly assume a highly undemocratic conception of occupation.  As 
traditionally conceived, occupation involves an occupier‘s unilateral exercise of coercive 
control over the inhabitants of the occupied territory.
1
  This control ought to be benign, of 
course, but the fact is that an occupied people generally has no influence over how it is 
treated, and so falls easy prey to neglect, abuse, and exploitation.  The traditional 
conception encourages us to think that this ‗democracy deficit‘ is an inherent feature of 
military occupation, and is therefore simply another item on the long list of necessary 
evils that attend even the most justified of wars.   
                                                 
1
 To my knowledge, traditional occupation is universally assumed in the legal and philosophical literature 
on jus post bellum; see, e.g., Arthur Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free,‖ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 35/4 (Fall 2007), pp. 359-400, esp. 380-86; Gary J. Bass, ―Jus Post Bellum,‖ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 32/4 (2004), pp. 384-412; Allen Buchanan, ―Institutionalizing the Just War,‖ Philosophy & 
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Humanitarian Law and Regime Change,‖ Ethics and International Affairs 18/3 (2004), pp. 51-64; Robert 
E. Keohane, ―Political authority after intervention: gradations in sovereignty,‖  in Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, Holzgrefe & Keohane (eds.), Cambridge 
University Press (2004), pp. 275-98; Brian Orend, ―Justice After War,‖ Ethics and International Affairs 
16/1 (2002), pp. 43-56; John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1999); 
Stefano Recchia,  ―Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: How Much External Interference Can Be 
Justified?‖ Ethics & International Affairs 32/2 (2009), pp. 165-187; and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3
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But military occupation is not inherently undemocratic.  An occupied people can 
and should have influence over their own occupation, particularly when the occupier 
aims at political transformation and reconstruction.  In this paper, I argue that an 
occupied people has a right to effective representation in the occupying government.  I 
set the stage for my argument by examining moral and practical problems inherent to 
traditional occupation as it is embodied in international law and contemporary just war 
theory.  Next, I motivate a basic tenet of democratic theory known as the Principle of 
Affected Interests, and show how even a tightly restricted version of this principle 
supports the aforementioned right.  Finally, using the recent occupation of Iraq as a case 
study, I address a range of foreseeable objections. 
 
1.  TRADITIONAL OCCUPATION 
A military occupation occurs when a hostile army acquires coercive control over some or 
all of a foreign state‘s territory and inhabitants.2 The coercive control characteristic of 
what I call ‗traditional occupation‘ has three important features.  First, the occupier‘s 
control is direct, in the sense that it is not mediated by the occupied people‘s government.  
Occupying forces always retain de facto political authority over and within the occupied 
territory, though they may sometimes co-opt local security and administrative divisions 
instead of ignoring, suppressing, or dissolving them.  Second, an occupier‘s control is 
temporary.  That occupation is not (or is not intended to be) permanent is what 
distinguishes it from annexation and colonization.  Finally, and most importantly for our 
purposes, traditional occupation is unilateral.  Implicit in this conception of occupation is 
                                                 
2
  Cf. Hague Regulations 1907, Art. 42.   
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the thought that the occupied people have no effective influence over how the occupiers 
exercise their coercive control.  It is this last feature of traditional occupation that makes 
it undemocratic; the primary aim of this paper is to explain why and how it should be 
changed.
3
  Before moving on, however, it will be useful to point out the extent to which 
international law, as well as recent philosophical work on jus post bellum, have implicitly 
or explicitly recognized and sought to address the potential problems posed by unilateral 
military occupation without abandoning the traditional model.
4
 
The international law of occupation imposes a number of legal obligations on 
occupying forces, and some of these pertain directly to the treatment of occupied 
peoples.
5
  The Hague Regulations require occupiers to ―restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws 
in force in the country.‖6  Subsequent articles direct them to respect local cultural and 
religious institutions, and to refrain from annexation, pillage, and collective punishment.  
The Geneva Conventions elaborate on these obligations by providing more specific 
guidance regarding the treatment of children and the provision of food and medical 
                                                 
3
 The term ‗unilateral‘ is ambiguous in the context of international affairs.  In some contexts it refers to a 
single state acting alone (as opposed to multilateral occupations), and in others it refers to a state or a 
coalition of states acting in the absence of UN authorization.  Though the argument I present here has 
interesting implications for both multilateral occupations and for the international law of occupation, I do 
not have the space to address these complications in much detail here.  In this paper, I use the term 
‗unilateral‘ to refer to an unreciprocated or one-sided distribution of political power.   
 
4
 The forgoing account of occupation is not intended to describe the formal legal criteria for occupation; on 
my account it is entirely possible for an occupation to begin and end independent of its formal 
recognition as such under international law.  
 
5
 The primary instruments of occupation law are the 1907 Hague Regulations (esp. Sec. III) and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, 1949 (esp. Part III, Sec. iii). 
 
6
  Hague Regulations, Art. 43. 
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supplies.
7
  It also prohibits colonization, conscription, and ethnic cleansing (i.e., ―mass 
forcible transfers‖) of civilian populations.8 But in general, statutory international law 
remains fairly conservative with respect to political reconstruction and so-called 
‗transformative‘ occupations, as we can see from the Hague Regulations‘ insistence on 
―respecting‖ the ―laws in force in the country,‖ and related articles in the Geneva 
Conventions.
9
   
When coupled with the assumption that occupations will be relatively brief, the 
presumption against changing local laws might seem to undercut the need for occupying 
forces to consider the collective and individual preferences of the occupied people during 
the occupation.  Since international law apparently legislates against causing long-term 
structural changes to the occupied society, and since it is safe to assume that the occupied 
people place priority on having their most basic needs met, there appears to be no reason 
to take their preferences about other matters into account.  But customary norms—now 
formally articulated in a 2001 ICISS report entitled ―The Responsibility to Protect‖—are 
considerably more permissive with respect to transformative occupation than the Hague 
Regulations and Geneva Conventions indicate, particularly where an occupied people has 
been liberated from authoritarian rule.
10
 The Allied occupation and reconstruction efforts 
                                                 
7
  Geneva IV, Art. 50, 55-57. 
 
8
  Geneva IV, Art. 49, 51. 
 
9
 E.g., ―The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be 
repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or 
an obstacle to the application of the present Convention‖ (Geneva IV, Art. 64).  For a thorough 
discussion of transformative occupation under international law, see Adam Roberts, ―Transformative 
Military Occupation: Applying the Law of War and Human Rights,‖ American Journal of International 
Law 100/3 (2006), pp. 580-622. 
 
10
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), ―The Responsibility to 
Protect.‖  December 2001 (http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp).   See esp. Sec. 5, ―The Responsibility to 
Rebuild.‖ 
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in Germany and Italy following World War II, for example, were widely recognized as 
legal despite their deeply transformative aims.
11
  Moreover, it is not uncommon for 
occupations to last many years, especially where significant reconstruction is necessary.
12
  
Given the possibility of long-term occupations, and of structural changes to local 
institutions that last far beyond withdrawal, the law‘s failure to protect the political will 
of occupied peoples appears to be a serious omission. 
Recent philosophical literature is simultaneously more open to the idea of 
transformative occupation and more sensitive to its potential abuse.  Gary Bass, for 
instance, has argued not only that occupiers have an obligation to reconstruct the 
occupied people‘s government where necessary, but also to ―work throughout any 
occupation of foreign soil to make their actions accountable and transparent to the 
citizens of the vanquished state and to win the consent of the conquered population.‖13  
Similarly, Allen Buchanan invokes individual autonomy and consent when he argues for 
an ‗Anti-paternalist Principle‘ to guide the transformation of authoritarian regimes.14  
Such a principle holds, at the very least, that the intervening and occupying forces ―would 
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 Roberts, ―Transformative Military Occupation,‖ pp. 601-03. 
 
12
 Adam Roberts, ―Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli Occupied Territories Since 1967,‖ American 
Journal of International Law 84/1 (1990), pp. 44-104. 
 
13
 Bass, ―Jus Post Bellum,‖ p. 388 
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 Buchanan, ―Institutionalizing the Just War,‖ pp. 26-7. In Buchanan‘s article, the Anti-paternalist 
principle is geared specifically to forcible democratization, rather than political transformation in general, 
but I presume that it also applies in the broader context.  To be clear, I am not arguing here that occupied 
societies should be permanently democratized, or that respecting an occupied people‘s right to 
representation would necessarily promote that goal.  Instead, my claim is only that representation would 
allow the occupied people an opportunity to participate effectively in decisions about which form of 
government the occupier should help them achieve.  This leaves open the possibility that they might 
decide to ‗opt out‘ of permanent democratic government.  Whether an occupier may permissibly prevent 
them from doing so, or even restrict their right to representation in order to prevent them from doing so, 
is a question I will not attempt to answer here. 
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have to have good reason to believe that the intended beneficiaries could reasonably 
accept the risks‖ of armed intervention, occupation, and political reconstruction.  Both 
Bass and Buchanan are also quick to point out that in addition to the moral reasons for 
avoiding paternalism during the reconstruction phase of an occupation, there is a strong 
practical reason as well: ignoring the will of the occupied people can easily provoke 
violent resistance.
15
   
It seems plausible to believe that an occupying force ought to respect the will of 
the occupied people; but neither author recommends institutional mechanisms sufficient 
to ensure that this occurs.  Given the potential conflict of interests between occupied and 
occupier, it is reasonable to worry that occupiers will often have strong incentives to 
ignore the will of the occupied people, and take their chances with an insurgency.  
Buchanan goes further than Bass in this regard, arguing that intervention and 
transformative reconstruction (in his view, democratization) would only be permissible 
against a backdrop of international institutions designed to hold ‗would-be‘ state-builders 
accountable for their actions.  But Buchanan‘s institutional proposals are geared more 
towards forcing occupiers to make their final goals explicit and ensuring that those goals 
are pursued in a timely fashion, rather than towards ensuring that they are in accordance 
with the will of the occupied people. 
In contrast to Bass and Buchanan, Arthur Applbaum argues that respecting an 
occupied people‘s will may be impossible, claiming that a people without a government 
                                                 
15
 For a synopsis of the practical problems facing transformative occupations, see W. Michael Reisman, 
―The Manley O. Hudson Lecture: Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea,‖ American 
Journal of International Law 98/3 (July 2004), pp. 516-525. 
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does not, in fact, have a will coherent enough to be worthy of respect.
16
  Standard 
accounts of collective agency require group members to have shared aims, authorized 
representatives, or decision procedures functionally capable of emulating the capacities 
of individual persons (―considering, willing and doing‖), and since complex forms of 
collective political agency typically require all three, a people deprived of its government 
literally lacks the agency necessary for it to be even a potential subject of paternalism.  
―Strange as it may sound to ears that conflate cultural sensitivity with political respect,‖ 
Applbaum writes, ―until individuals are constituted in the normative sense as a free 
people, nothing is owed to the people in the anthropological sense qua people.‖17  If this 
is true, it seems to support the view that the unilateral coercion characteristic of 
traditional occupation is largely inevitable.
18
  But even if it would not paternalize the 
occupied people qua people, would it not still paternalize individual group members? 
Applbaum agrees that even if their encompassing group lacks normative agency, 
individual group members ―can complain that as…mature, competent individual agent[s] 
it is up to each to decide whether to accept the grave risks of violence, destruction, and 
upheaval that an invasion and occupation would bring.‖19  But he argues that even though 
respect for individual consent could conceivably ―trump‖ occupiers‘ views about the 
appropriate goals of reconstruction, still, ―how disagreement among individuals is to be 
                                                 
16
 Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free.‖ 
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 Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free,‖ p. 398. 
 
18
 I doubt that the distinction between the possession or lack of collective normative agency is as stark as 
Applbaum makes out, because it seems to me that agency as a matter of degree.  Nevertheless, traditional 
occupation is necessarily unilateral to the degree that the occupied people lacks agency. 
 
19
 Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free,‖ pp. 391-92 
 
 
168 
 
resolved necessarily is underspecified in the absence of legitimate decision rules for 
resolving disagreements‖ (ibid., p. 398).  By way of analogy, it would be as if we were 
trying to respect the ‗will‘ of an individual whose multiple personalities disagreed among 
themselves.  Even if each of her personalities were entitled to respect (as are the 
individual members of an occupied society), the absence of psychological mechanisms 
capable of unifying such disparate beliefs and desires into a single, coherent will would 
make it impossible for us to determine which of her apparently contradictory demands we 
ought to follow.  Though inclined to respect her choices, we would be forced, as the 
occupier is forced, to choose as best we can by our own lights. 
Traditional occupation, then, is beset by at least three problems.  First, its 
unilateral nature is worrisome in its own right, because it threatens unjustified 
paternalism by administering and reconstructing the occupied people in ways they (qua 
individuals or qua group) would not choose for themselves.  Second, traditional 
occupation suggests no institutional mechanisms able to ensure that occupiers adequately 
discharge their duty to respect the will of the occupied people.  And third, even if 
occupiers did selflessly strive to discharge this obligation, its content is ―underspecified,‖ 
because in the absence of native political institutions, the collective will of the occupied 
people is nonexistent, and how occupiers ought to respond to disagreement among 
individual wills is indeterminate.  In what follows, I argue that democratizing the 
traditional conception occupation can resolve these problems.  In the next section I set 
out what I take to be a basic tenet of democratic theory, the Principle of Affected 
Interests.  This principle has its own conceptual challenges, and is of considerable 
philosophical interest in its own right.  But by restricting it to a very basic and plausible 
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formulation, I aim to show that it nevertheless presents a compelling case for an occupied 
people‘s right to effective representation in the occupying government. 
 
2. THE PRINCIPLE OF AFFECTED INTERESTS 
Robert Dahl‘s formulation of the Principle of Affected Interests holds that, ―Everyone 
who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to participate in 
that government.‖20  The right to participation has deep roots in liberal political theory 
and the social contract tradition, and though there are competing lines of thought about its 
ultimate justification, few deny its normative significance.
21
  Political participation has 
been defended on both intrinsic and instrumental grounds.  First, to deny people the right 
to participate in decisions about the structure of their society disrespects their status as 
free and equal persons, because it strips them of an important venue for self-
determination and arbitrarily subjects them to the will of others.  Second, widespread 
participation is a way to reduce bias, error, and predation in public policy, because it 
allows people to assess and defend their own interests in the process of political decision-
making.  Governments which prevent many of their constituents from participating are 
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 Robert Dahl, After the Revolution?: Authority in a Good Society, Yale University Press (1970)., p. 49.  
Many others have adopted the same principle, with slightly different wording; see David 
Held, ―Principles of Cosmopolitan Order,‖ in The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, Brock and 
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 Ed., Princeton University Press (1996), pp. 
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therefore likely to be neglectful, abusive, and/or objectionably paternalistic.  These 
justifications for the right to participation lend the Principle of Affected Interests 
considerable intuitive appeal.  But Dahl‘s formulation is too loose for it to serve in my 
argument for democratic occupation. In this section, I introduce a more tightly restricted 
version of the principle by elaborating on the content and scope of the right to 
participation. 
The right to participation requires that the rightholder wields some actual 
influence over the creation of policy—that, in Waldron‘s words, ―his voice be heard and 
that it count in public decision-making.‖22  But we should not think that the Principle of 
Affected Interests requires every public decision that affects an individual‘s interests to 
admit of direct participation by that individual.  On one hand, the scale and complexity of 
modern political communities renders this impractical. On the other hand, individuals can 
participate indirectly by wielding influence over those who do participate directly.  This 
is just the familiar connection between participation and representation.
23
  So long as 
representatives effectively participate on behalf of their constituents, those constituents 
can influence decision-making indirectly, and their rights to participation have been 
satisfied.  It bears emphasis that in order to satisfy the Principle of Affected Interests and 
the right to participation, representation must be effective, and not merely nominal or 
symbolic.   
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 Waldron, ―Participation: The Right of Rights,‖ p. 236. 
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 Dahl takes this connection for granted in his discussion (Dahl, After the Revolution? p. 49 ff).  There is a 
vast literature on the nature and purpose of political representation—the classic treatment is Hanna F. 
Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press (1972), but for the purposes of my 
argument the following brief remarks will suffice.   
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There are at least two ways representation can fail to be effective.  First, a 
representative may be prohibited from participating in some of the ways needed for her to 
exercise the appropriate level of influence over decision-making.  This can occur through 
a variety of institutional mechanisms: her vote may be given reduced weight or subject to 
veto by others, she may be denied important information, she may be barred from 
initiating or participating in certain procedures, or even sidelined entirely.  Second, 
representation is ineffective when representatives can simply ignore the interests of their 
constituents with impunity.  An advantage of democratic systems of representation is that 
they tend to provide the right incentives for representatives by allowing constituents to 
replace them through regular elections when their performance is unsatisfactory.  In 
contrast, systems in which representative positions are assigned or inherited tend to lack 
these incentives.  For example, in the decades leading up to the American Revolution, 
British Parliament justified its disenfranchisement of the colonists by reference to the 
doctrine of ‗virtual representation.‘  The argument was that members of Parliament did 
not merely pursue the interests of their regular constituencies, but magnanimously 
pursued the interests of all British subjects—even those not afforded a separate 
representative.  The problem, of course, is that the kind of general benevolence supposed 
by this doctrine rarely motivates political actors, especially when they are weighing the 
interests of those to whom they are accountable against the interests of those to whom 
they are not. The celebrated colonial slogan ―No Taxation without Representation‖ was 
an implicit rejection of virtual representation by the colonists, and a demand for 
representatives who would reliably pursue their interests.   
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To satisfy the Principle of Affected Interests with respect to a given set of affected 
persons, a government must ensure that their representatives are able to participate on 
roughly equal footing with other members of the relevant legislative bodies, and that 
those representatives are likely to pursue the interests of the people they are supposed to 
represent.  It is important to note that effective representation can be increased or 
diminished by degrees along both of these dimensions.  Under most real-world 
conditions, the Principle of Affected Interests should not expect perfectly effective 
representation.  As I discuss below, it may be difficult to establish fair democratic 
procedures among people who lack basic security and a functioning civil society, and 
various institutional constraints can make it difficult to provide all similarly ranked 
representatives with equal influence over policy decisions.  Nevertheless, the Principle of 
Affected Interests provides good reason to think that such discrepancies are only 
permissible when they are practically unavoidable.   
Having made the connection between participation and representation explicit, I 
turn now to the principle‘s scope of application.  Dahl‘s formulation might lead us to 
believe that the Principle of Affected Interests should categorically grant an equal right of 
participation to everyone affected by a government‘s decisions.  However, there are two 
reasons not to adopt such an inclusive interpretation.  First, the right to participation is 
neither absolute nor strictly universal.  It is pro tanto, in the sense that it may be 
overridden, forfeited, or fail to apply.  For example, the right to participate may be 
overridden when the moral costs of extending it would be egregious, as when 
democratization threatens to destabilize an entire society, exacerbate ethnic strife, and so 
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on.
24
  It may be forfeited, as when criminals are denied the right to vote.  And it may fail 
to apply to young children, the severely mentally disabled, and other subjects of justified 
paternalism.  The important point is that in the absence of such exceptional 
circumstances, relevantly affected individuals are presumed to hold a right to participate: 
withholding it always requires special justification. 
Second, we should recognize that a government‘s decisions affect different people 
in different ways and to different degrees.  Ideally, the Principle of Affected Interests 
should apportion rights accordingly, although as we shall see below, this is often difficult 
to accomplish in practice.  Moreover, we may want to rule out certain kinds of interests 
as a basis for extending a right to participation.  The principal complications I want to 
avoid here involve trivial interests, whose satisfaction has little affect on one‘s welfare, 
external interests, whose satisfaction depends on whether someone else’s interests are 
satisfied, and merely possibly affected interests, whose satisfaction may or may not 
actually be affected by a government‘s decisions.25  A highly inclusive interpretation of 
the Principle of Affected Interests—one that offers participation even to those whose 
interests in a given decision are trivial, external, or merely possibly affected—runs the 
risk of reductio, because it seems drastically to overextend the right.  If the principle were 
to grant everyone with even a passing preference for the outcome of domestic policy 
decisions in foreign countries a right to participate in those decisions, it would lead 
quickly to a robust form of world government few scholars seem ready to endorse.   
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To avoid this implication, I will provisionally adopt a tightly restricted, and 
correspondingly simpler and more widely palatable formulation.  For the remainder of 
this paper, I only assume that, at the very least, the Principle of Affected Interests 
attributes a pro tanto right to participate in a government to those whose most important 
interests are certainly and significantly affected by that government‘s decisions.26  Of 
course, I do not mean to imply that this principle will prevent the need for some kind of 
international institutions.  Some domestic decisions in some countries do have the 
capacity to significantly affect the most important interests of a large percentage of the 
world‘s population—decisions about carbon emissions, nuclear non-proliferation, and so 
on, still, on this formulation, require that the affected parties be represented in the 
decision-making process.  But it is less clear whether a world government would be 
necessary to provide that kind of representation, or whether something closer to the 
relatively decentralized system of international law we have now would be sufficient.  
My point is only that the lower the threshold for inclusion in political decision-making, 
the greater the demand for more robust international institutions; by setting that threshold 
at certainly, significantly, and highly important interests, I intend merely to resist the 
most immediate worries about the need for a centralized world government. 
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 My aim in restricting the relevant class of interests to those certainly affected is to avoid complications 
Goodin observes in a principle that grounded a right to participate on actually affected interests (Goodin, 
ibid).  The Principle of Actually Affected Interests, he argues, is incoherent, because whether one‘s 
interests are actually affected depends on what cannot be known in advance of the decision, namely, the 
outcome of the decision itself.  Moreover, since the outcome of the decision depends on who participates 
in making it, it would appear that any attempt to specify whose interests are actually affected by a 
decision is viciously circular.  Since an occupied people‘s interests are inevitably affected by the 
occupying government‘s decisions whether or not the occupied people participate in them, I can avoid 
these complications by simply restricting the principle even further: all certainly affected interests are 
actually affected, but not all actually affected interests are certainly affected, so the Principle of Certainly 
Affected Interests is more conservative, and consequently more plausible than its Actually-Affected 
counterpart. 
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I will also assume that, as a general rule, those under a government‘s direct 
coercive control are certainly and significantly affected by it.  Combining this with the 
foregoing discussion of representation, we arrive at the following formulation of the 
Principle of Affected Interests: everyone subject to a government‘s direct coercive 
control has a pro tanto right to effective representation in that government.  As far as I 
can tell, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deny this principle while remaining committed 
to democracy as a political ideal, since doing so amounts to the view that a government 
needs no special justification for disenfranchising large numbers of its own constituents.  
In any case, I will proceed on the assumption that in the absence of special justification, 
governments which fail to satisfy the (duly qualified) Principle of Affected Interests are 
unjust.
27
 
 
3. DEMOCRATIC OCCUPATION 
My argument is straightforward.  In a military occupation, the armed forces of a foreign 
government exercise direct coercive control over the inhabitants of the occupied territory.  
The Principle of Affected Interests holds that people subject to a government‘s direct 
coercive control have a pro tanto right to effective representation in that government.  
Therefore, in this context, the Principle of Affected Interests holds that the inhabitants of 
the occupied territory have a pro tanto right to effective representation in the occupying 
government.  This, I maintain, will resolve the three problems with traditional occupation 
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176 
 
I identified earlier: the threat of unjustified paternalism, the lack of institutional 
accountability, and the indeterminacy of the occupied people‘s political will.  By 
recognizing and respecting an occupied people‘s right to effective representation, the 
occupying government essentially brings them within the sphere of its own normative 
agency, providing them with a way to integrate their individual preferences into a 
coherent, collective political will. This, in turn, not only helps to specify the occupier‘s 
duties to the occupied people vis-à-vis their administration and their reconstructive goals, 
but it also ensures that they are institutionally committed to taking the occupied people‘s 
will into consideration during political decision-making. 
This is my primary argument, but it is worth mentioning three ancillary arguments 
for the right in question.  First, many people believe, with good reason, that if terrorism, 
insurgency, or revolution are ever justified, they are justified only as a last resort.  So 
long as positive change can be brought about through non-violent political means, the use 
of violence—especially when it harms innocent civilians—is morally wrong.  Thus, by 
respecting an occupied people‘s right to representation, thereby providing them with 
political means to defend their own interests, an occupying force may undermine the 
moral grounds for resistance.  From a practical standpoint, the availability of non-violent 
means would also decrease the legitimacy of insurgent movements in the eyes of the 
occupied population, whose support is usually a major contributing factor to the success 
or failure of such movements.  Second, recognition of an occupied people's right to 
effective representation in the occupying government would help to disincentivize 
unnecessarily transformative or prolonged occupations, and war-making in general.
28
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 It may be objected that this disincentive cuts both ways, because it would disincentivize just and unjust 
wars alike.  It should be noted first that both the argument and the objection presume an institutional or 
177 
 
Traditional occupation allows occupying forces to exercise unilateral coercive control 
over the occupied society, which, in turn, allows the occupiers to exploit and manipulate 
the occupied to their own financial and political advantage.  So long as traditional 
occupation is the norm, it provides states that possess the necessary military capabilities 
with a powerful motive for invading, occupying, and transforming other societies.  Fully 
democratic occupation would eliminate these incentives, at least in part, because it would 
provide the occupied people with an effective means to influence the occupier's 
decisions. 
Finally, as Rawls puts it in The Law of Peoples, ―well-ordered people are by their 
actions and proclamations, when feasible, to foreshadow during a war both the kind of 
peace they aim for and the kind of relations they seek.  By doing so, they show in an open 
way the nature of their aims and the kind of people they are...‖  He continues, ―The way a 
war is fought and the deeds done in ending it live on in the historical memory of societies 
and may or may not set the stage for future war.  It is always the duty of statesmanship to 
take this longer view.‖29  While an occupied people may not be happy about their 
occupation, the trust and responsibility an occupying government would place in them by 
giving them effective representation would foster patience and a spirit of cooperation.  
Moreover, Rawls‘s claim has a special relevance for those, like Buchanan, who would 
                                                                                                                                                 
legal right to effective representation, which may or may not bear on the existence of a moral right to the 
same.  Second, given the institutional nature of the question, I will offer an institutional solution: if the 
prospect of an international law granting effective representation to occupied peoples did objectionably 
disincentivize morally permissible or obligatory attempts at reconstruction or regime change, then that 
would support the creation of another international law, one able to reincentivize the good interventions 
through penalties or rewards.  Third and finally, even without such a law in place, it is at least plausible 
to think that the proposed dampening effect of an occupied right to representation on warfare would be 
superior to the status quo. 
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endorse (under certain conditions) the permissibility of imposing democratic institutions 
on an occupied population.  The willingness to use force in pursuit of some ideal 
demands a supreme confidence in the righteousness of the cause, and surely trust in the 
procedural justice of representative democracy must help motivate any argument for so-
called ‗forcible democratization.‘  On one hand, rejecting the need to democratize the 
process of democratization itself tempts inconsistency, and on the other hand, allowing an 
occupied people the opportunity to participate, at the highest levels, in the administration 
and reconstruction of their own society would lessen the humiliation which attends the 
need for intervention and occupation, and acclimate them to the social and political habits 
of democratic self-government. 
Those who are disinclined to apply the model of democratic occupation to various 
particular cases will find a natural wedge in the pro tanto qualification built into my 
formulation of the Principle of Affected Interests, and I will address potential objections 
to a concrete example momentarily. As I said above, withholding the right to 
participation always requires special justification, and it is important to see that the 
general argument I offer here need not suffer from the fact that contingent circumstances 
could occasionally provide adequate grounds to deny an occupied people representation.  
After all, any government inclined to adopt the democratic model of occupation will face 
considerable practical challenges.  Extending representation rights to occupied 
populations could require, among other things, changes to domestic constitutions, more 
flexible systems of representation, civic education and translation services for foreign 
representatives, and ways to forestall or minimize potential backlash by the occupying 
government‘s native citizens. Each of these will entail significant financial, political, and 
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ultimately moral costs; if these costs are high enough, they could completely override the 
occupied people‘s right to representation.  But it is more likely that the countervailing 
moral costs will merely weaken the right rather than overriding it completely.  Effective 
representation admits of many degrees, so even if the occupying government cannot 
reasonably be expected to incur the costs of extending the kind and degree of effective 
representation I argue for below, they may still have serious obligations to come as close 
to this ideal as is practically (financially, politically, morally) feasible. 
Some skeptics will be tempted to dismiss the democratic conception of 
occupation out of hand, because it appears, for all intents and purposes, to be 
inaccessible.  These skeptics will claim that my arguments must be relegated to the 
ephemeral realm of ―ideal theory‖ because there is no ―practical route from where we are 
now to at least a reasonable approximation of the state of affairs that satisfies its 
principles.‖30  As Buchanan writes, a good non-ideal theory  
 
must steer a course between futile utopianism that is oblivious to the 
limitations of current international law and the formidable obstacles to 
moral progress erected by vested interests and naked power, on the one 
hand, and craven capitulation to existing injustices that offers no direction 
for significant reform, on the other.
31
 
 
 
For the time being, it seems fair to assume that few if any contemporary governments—
and certainly not those most likely to engage in foreign occupation—will endorse a 
policy of democratic occupation.  Given their interests and their ability to protect them, 
then, it is reasonable to assume further that my arguments lie closer to the ―ideal‖ end of 
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the ideal/non-ideal continuum.  But, first, it would be a mistake to infer from that that 
democratic occupation amounts to an exercise in ―futile utopianism,‖ because, again, 
effective representation admits of degrees.  Moral progress on this front, as with many 
others, may require reform to be accomplished in stages, gradually eroding the status quo. 
While non-voting membership and advisory roles for foreign representatives are far from 
satisfactory, they would be an improvement over traditional occupation, and could 
provide leverage for further change. Second, even where the obstacles to change are 
insurmountable, they are no excuse for ignoring injustice.  If my arguments are sound, 
then an occupied people has a right to effective representation in the occupying 
government whether or not that government is inclined to respect it. Acknowledging this 
fact should lead us to revise our implicit assumptions about the normative necessity of 
traditional occupation, and to alter our thinking about jus post bellum in general. 
With that in mind, I turn from my general argument for democratic occupation to 
a provocative case in point.  I argue that the Iraqi people were (and are) entitled to 
effective representation in the United States government for the duration of the 
occupation that began in April of 2003.  My purpose here is threefold: to provide a 
concrete example of the kind and degree of representation needed to satisfy the Principle 
Affected Interests, to hone the radical implications of democratic occupation to a cutting 
edge, and to focus potential objections and replies around a familiar example of 
contemporary and lasting relevance.  Needless to say, the foregoing argument may be 
applied, mutatis mutandis, to other cases—the American occupation of Afghanistan and 
the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands are two obvious examples—but I trust that the 
following discussion may be adapted to such cases without too much trouble. 
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During the nearly seven years since its invasion of Iraq, the US military has 
exercised direct coercive control over approximately twenty-eight million Iraqi people.  
Despite recent improvements in the strength and integrity of the fledgling Iraqi 
government and its security forces and pledges of imminent withdrawal by the Obama 
administration, the country is likely to remain dependent on American military might for 
its continued stability, at least for the next several years.
32
  To say that the decisions of 
the US government have had, and will continue to have a significant effect on the most 
important interests of the average Iraqi comes close to drastic understatement: levels and 
distribution of funding, troop deployment and procedures, reconstruction priorities, 
strategies for reconciliation, policies regarding regional powers, and the moment and 
pace of withdrawal itself each have enormous short- and long-term consequences for the 
welfare of millions of Iraqis.  The Principle of Affected Interests provides a good reason 
to think that the Iraqi people have had (and, for the duration of the occupation, will 
continue to have) a right to participate in those decisions—specifically, a right to 
effective representation in the US government.   
What would ―effective‖ representation entail, given the basic structure of 
American political institutions?  One suggestion might be to appoint Iraqi advisors or 
consultants to act as informal liaisons between the Iraqi people and the various branches, 
agencies, and committees of the US government.  However, I suspect that this would 
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offer Iraqis little more than what virtual representation offered American colonists in 
British Parliament, because American officials, and therefore the American government, 
would have little incentive to take the counsel of these representatives seriously.  What is 
needed is a way to ensure that the Iraqi people can (temporarily) exercise the kind of 
formally protected influence over American political institutions that American citizens 
enjoy.  In short, the simplest—and perhaps the only—way to insert this kind of Iraqi 
influence over US policy is to extend the system of federalism already built into its 
constitutional structure, and provide the Iraqi people with representation in the legislative 
branch.   
There can be no direct argument from the Principle of Affected Interests to a 
specific number of representatives, of course, but for my purposes it will only be 
necessary to fix a general idea of the kind and degree of influence the principle would 
require.  Offhand, I cannot see any reason to assume from the outset that the inhabitants 
of an occupied territory are entitled to any fewer representatives (per capita) than are the 
citizens of the occupying government, so I will proceed on the postulate that Iraqi 
representation in Congress should be proportional, as it is with ordinary states.  Given 
recent population estimates and the methods used to apportion seats, this would leave 
Iraqis with two Senators and roughly 35 to 40 members in the House of Representatives. 
Of course, as I said above, practical considerations could mitigate this claim in various 
ways.  But I will leave assessments about the relevant institutional limitations and 
obstacles to others, and turn now to a range of in-principle, and therefore more potentially 
damaging, objections to my argument for democratic occupation.  
 
183 
 
4. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
First, it might be argued that under most if not all circumstances an occupier‘s first duty 
to the occupied is to withdraw.  For instance, many people appear to believe that the 
United States has had a peremptory obligation to withdraw from Iraq because the initial 
invasion was unjust.  But first, no plausible argument for withdrawal could ignore the 
potential consequences of such an action.
33
  If, at any point, a US withdrawal from Iraq 
were likely to result in chaos and civil war, then the moral costs of such an action might 
be too high to justify it, Iraqi self-determination and US interests notwithstanding.  
Second, speculations about the potential consequences of withdrawal were and still are 
open to reasonable disagreement: the sheer complexity of the evolving situation on the 
ground, combined with the obvious ideological biases of policymakers, have created 
intense controversy over many of the most rudimentary facts of the occupation.  These 
are precisely the conditions under which effective representation on behalf of the affected 
parties is most important; Iraqi representatives would have a uniquely credible 
perspective on whether withdrawal would be best for the Iraqi people, and even if they 
did not, their participation would at least allow the Iraqi people to help decide for 
themselves the kinds of risks they are willing to take.  Finally, the failure to perform a 
primary obligation can trigger secondary obligations: even if it were uncontroversially 
true that the US has been violating a peremptory obligation to withdraw, its failure to 
extend representation rights to the Iraqi people despite its continued occupation would 
simply compound the injustice of its actions. 
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Second, it might be argued that the members of a defeated society deserve to be 
occupied, whether because they bear some responsibility for the preceding conflict, or 
because they remain actual or potential combatants, and that this justifies denying them 
representation.  But these are dubious assumptions.  As Walzer points out, the parties 
directly responsible for a war‘s being waged are typically not the soldiers fighting it, 
much less the civilian population.
34
  Even during an intense insurgency, only a relatively 
small percentage of the occupied people could rightly be called combatants.  More 
plausibly, we might think the implicitly temporary nature of occupation is what silences 
the Principle of Affected Interests: perhaps only permanent coercive control grounds a 
right to representation.  But it is difficult to see an in-principle reason why the duration of 
a government‘s control should matter.  First, the individuals subject to control are always 
entitled to respect as free and equal persons. Second, political self-protection becomes 
more, not less important during periods of occupation, since a foreign military can cause 
enormous damage in even a brief period of time. Third, it is often impossible to know 
exactly how temporary an occupation will be in advance—indefinite and permanent 
―occupations‖ usually do not start out that way.  At least prima facie, the reasons to adopt 
the Principle of Affected Interests in the first place motivate a presumption favoring an 
immediate extension of representation rights to relevantly affected persons. 
A third and related objection might deny representation to an occupied people on 
grounds of membership.  According to this view, only the members of a political 
community have a right to participate in its government‘s decisions, and since occupied 
peoples are merely the temporary subjects of the occupying government, and not full-
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fledged members in the community it ordinarily governs, they may justifiably be denied 
representation.  I argued above that the temporary nature of occupation does not silence 
the Principle of Affected Interests because the inhabitants of an occupied territory (1) are 
always entitled to respect as free and equal persons, (2) may be severely harmed by the 
occupying government even over a relatively brief period of time, and (3) may be subject 
to the occupying government for much longer than initially planned.  But the membership 
objection pushes back by emphasizing the distinction between being subject to a political 
community‘s government on the one hand, and being a member of it on the other.  The 
justificatory details of this distinction need not detain us; that we generally accept it is 
made plain by the fact that conditions (1)-(3) hold true for temporary immigrants like 
guest workers, visiting students, and tourists, yet we do not believe that they are entitled 
to participate in the political affairs of the community, let alone to fully effective 
representation in the legislature.  Why not think that an occupied people stands in 
precisely the same relation to the occupying government as guest workers do to the 
government that hosts them? 
The crucial disanalogy is that while temporary immigrants have voluntarily 
chosen to subject themselves to the authority of a foreign government (on the terms that 
government has offered), and may return to their native country whenever they wish, an 
occupied population has become subject through an act of coercion without leaving its 
native country.  It seems reasonable to suppose that a government cannot unilaterally 
vitiate someone‘s right to representation by forcibly removing her from the authority of 
her native government and placing her under its own, and then claiming—however 
truthfully—that her subjection will not be permanent.  In terms of the analogy, it would 
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be as if, rather than waiting for guest workers to arrive and depart of their own free will, a 
government kidnapped them from a foreign country, gave them all jobs, and then denied 
them the right to vote because eventually they would all be deported.  Whether and to 
what extent the Principle of Affected Interests might allow affected parties to alienate 
their own rights to representation is a question I will not pursue here.  Had the Iraqi 
people reached a valid prior agreement with the United States—as legal immigrants do 
upon entering the host country—perhaps they could have forfeited their right to 
representation in the US government, and even negated the need for it by spelling out in 
specific detail how the occupation and reconstruction should proceed.  But there was no 
such agreement, and given the absence of a legitimate Iraqi government before the 
intervention, it is unclear whether there even could have been. To justify denying the 
Iraqi people representation on the grounds that they would have agreed to forfeit those 
rights in return for regime change and democratic reconstruction is perhaps overly 
optimistic.  In any case, the possibility of respecting an occupied people‘s right to 
representation in the occupying government makes unnecessary such tenuous (if not 
disingenuous) appeals to its hypothetical forfeiture. 
Fourth, the state system ingrained in contemporary international law and practice 
attributes sovereign rights of territorial integrity and political independence to each state.  
Another objection might claim that occupying states retain these rights, and that requiring 
effective representation for foreign populations would violate them. In the present case, 
the worry is that Iraqi representation in Congress would violate US sovereignty.  Whether 
and how the concept of sovereignty might be justified is a complex and hotly contested 
subject in political theory, but we do not need a sophisticated understanding of the debate 
187 
 
to see that military occupation, by its very nature, blurs the (already indistinct) line 
sovereignty is supposed to draw between ‗internal‘ and ‗external‘ affairs.  Yet there is a 
persistent sense that Iraq and the United States do and should remain separate political 
entities, in part because they are geographically distant and culturally distinct.  American 
and Iraqi interests have historically formed two largely independent, but internally dense 
networks.  Under such conditions, a suitably qualified Principle of Affected Interests can 
easily identify two different sets of rights, corresponding to each group‘s right to 
participate in its own government, without supporting either group‘s right to participate 
in the other‘s.35  However, once the United States dissolved the government of Iraq and 
assumed control over its former citizens, the two previously independent networks of 
interests became entangled.  Iraq and the United States remained geographically and 
culturally distinct, but Iraqi interests in security and subsistence now hinged crucially on 
decisions made by a foreign government.  Any plausible theory of sovereignty should 
account for the ―rough and ready‖ correlation (to borrow Goodin‘s phrase) between 
sovereign political units on the one hand, and geographically and culturally distinct 
communities on the other.  But the occupation of one state by another appears to be an 
exception to this general rule. 
Fifth, it might be argued that even if the Iraqi people were entitled to some kind of 
representation in the US government, proportional membership in Congress would have 
gone too far.  After all, a common addendum to the Principle of Affected Interests is that 
―only those who are affected by a decision should have a say in it.‖36  Granting Iraqi 
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representatives roughly 15% of the seats in the legislature would have given them 
considerable influence over many issues that have little or nothing to do with them.  Why 
should they be entitled to that degree of influence?  First, we should note that while 
proportional representation would certainly have given the Iraqi people significant 
influence over American policy, it would not have given them anything like the control 
the American government wields over the lives of Iraqis.  Second, and more importantly, 
Iraqi interests are more closely tied to American interests than some, no doubt, would like 
to believe.  For instance, given that the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts hinges to a large extent on funding, Iraqi representatives should have effective 
influence over the distribution of federal resources.
37
  But since the distribution of those 
resources is zero-sum, Iraqis ought to have some influence over any legislation that takes 
money out of the budget.  Third, although it is surely true that some policy issues really 
do not affect Iraqi interests, there is no fair way to determine which interests these are.  If 
any person or group were able, unilaterally, to decide which policy issues should admit of 
Iraqi participation, that person or group would hold a kind of veto-power over Iraqi 
representatives, greatly undermining their ability to protect their people from 
exploitation.  Finally, part of having effective representation in a parliamentary system 
involves collective bargaining.  Since different constituencies care about different issues, 
representatives can ―trade‖ their votes, garnering support for the issues important to their 
own constituents by supporting other representatives on issues important to theirs.  
Denying Iraqi representatives the capacity to bargain by cordoning off the range of issues 
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over which they would have effective control would diminish their power exponentially, 
and reduce each Iraqi representative‘s influence, even over issues pertaining directly to 
Iraq, to less than that of similarly ranked representatives. 
There is another, more general worry about proportional representation: on the 
one hand, if the occupied society is much more populous than the occupying society, then 
it looks as if the occupying society's control over its own government could be almost 
entirely eradicated.  On the other hand, if the occupying society is much more populous 
than the occupied society, then the worry is reversed: proportional representation would 
leave the occupied people with little or no influence over their own reconstruction.  In 
this respect, my use of Iraq may look like cherry picking.  While the suggestion that the 
Iraqi people be granted proportional representation in the United States government may 
be radical, it cannot be denied that with 15% of the House of Representatives, Iraqi 
influence over the US government would be neither overwhelming nor negligible.  But 
what if Iraq had been ten times larger, or ten times smaller?  This would shift the balance 
of representative power significantly in either direction, at least according to my original 
postulate that representatives should be granted proportional representation. 
There are two responses to be made here.  First, various institutional arrangements 
and safeguards can protect minority representation in a way that could prevent large 
imbalances in population from effacing either party's capacity to influence political 
decision-making.  The most familiar example of such arrangements to most people will 
be bicameralism.  The United States Congress is divided into two houses partly to ensure 
that high-population states cannot simply override the will of smaller states: while 
representation in the House of Representatives is granted solely on the basis of state 
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population, each state has an equal number of Senators.  Of course, the objection may 
still be pressed that in cases of very large imbalances, and especially where an occupied 
country is added to an already-large number of administrative units, their representatives 
would still lack any significant influence over policy.   
The second response, then, must be that these kinds of problems are endemic to 
all representative systems.  As I said above, there can be no direct argument from the 
Principle of Affected Interests to a specific number of representatives.  Not only does the 
degree of influence had by each representative depend on the actual formal and informal 
institutions that constitute a state's government, but at this stage the Principle of Affected 
Interests leaves indeterminate the sum total of influence an occupied people ought to 
have within the government of their occupiers.  I have claimed only that their 
representation must be effective, and have not tried to specify the relevant threshold of 
effectivity. I am therefore happy to concede that proportional representation is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for effective representation, although it still seems to be an 
appropriate baseline, deviations from which would need to be justified, in practical terms, 
by the concerns made clear by this objection. 
Sixth, it may be wondered whether fears about undue Iraqi influence on American 
domestic policy could be dispelled by providing Iraqis with effective representation in 
global governance institutions like the United Nations, or in independent transitional 
administrations designed specifically to oversee occupation and reconstruction.  In 
principle, these venues could limit the legislative scope of Iraqi influence to only those 
issues having a direct bearing on their own interests.  I am therefore friendly to this 
suggestion, and concede that at some future date such arrangements might adequately 
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satisfy the Principle of Affected Interests.  However, I do not think that this is a plausible 
alternative just yet.  The problem is not that the basic framework for transnational 
political institutions does not exist, but that representation therein is unlikely to provide 
the occupied people with sufficiently effective influence over the occupying government. 
On the one hand, the ease with which the US and other major powers shrug off 
international law and UN mandates when these are incongruent with perceived national 
interest is discouraging, to say the least.  So long as occupying governments may simply 
disregard the decisions of global governance institutions with relative impunity, 
representation in those institutions will be ineffective.  On the other hand, transitional 
administrations composed of representatives from both the occupying and occupied 
societies would likely fall prey to the same kind of ‗veto power‘ worries discussed above.  
Unless the occupying government simply abdicated much of its de facto authority and 
legal jurisdiction over parts of its armed forces to the transitional government, it would be 
able to countermand any orders it found inconvenient.
38
  Moreover, so long as the 
occupied people has no say over the distribution of the occupier‘s financial resources, a 
transitional government‘s efforts at reconstruction could still be hobbled at the occupier‘s 
unilateral discretion.  If international law were a more reliable constraint on state 
behavior, or if existing states were more willing to alienate authority over the use of their 
financial and military resources, a wide range of institutional arrangements could satisfy 
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reached consensually, since the negotiations took place under the implicit threat of American withdrawal.   
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the Principle of Affected Interests.  It is worth pointing out that under such conditions, it 
would be a mistake to construe the government originally responsible for the 
intervention, and who remain responsible for supplying resources, as ―the occupying 
government,‖ since that term should refer to the political entity exercising de facto 
control over the occupying forces—in this context, either a global government or a 
transitional administration.  But in any case, until these conditions obtain, a right to 
effective representation in the occupying government is the only way to ensure that the 
occupied people‘s political will is given adequate weight in decisions about 
reconstruction.  Given present circumstances, it seems plausible to believe that the only 
way to have ensured that the Iraqi people had sufficient influence over US forces in Iraq 
would have been to provide them with substantial representation within the American 
government itself. 
A final and more practically-minded objection notes that in many post-conflict 
societies, civil disorder could make legitimate representation impossible. Where complete 
order has yet to be restored, political intimidation, terrorism, and incomplete information 
can prevent the creation of even rudimentary democratic institutions.  The lingering 
social effects of authoritarian rule may also undermine a society‘s collective capacity for 
public deliberation—the habits of free speech and political association taken for granted 
in Western democracies may be underdeveloped, if not absent entirely.  If Iraqi civil 
society could not have supported democratic procedures for selecting representatives, it 
might be argued, then offering them effective representation may be impossible, 
impractical, or even dangerously divisive.  As I suggested above, the right to 
representation is pro tanto, and should not be extended where it would be likely to 
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exacerbate ethnic tensions or civil unrest.  However, as I also suggested, the presumption 
should favor the right‘s immediate extension to relevantly affected persons.  These two 
claims amount to the view that the right to representation should be extended to an 
occupied people as soon as possible.  If the occupying government is engaged in the 
political reconstruction of the occupied society—as it should be where disorder makes 
democratic organization impossible—then the capacity for legitimate representation 
should increase over time.   
Moreover, the benefits of effective representation can accrue even when perfectly 
functioning democratic institutions cannot be secured.  The quality or legitimacy of 
representation should be viewed along a continuum, instead of as an all-or-nothing affair.  
During the initial stages of the invasion of Iraq, refugees and expatriates might have 
served as temporary representatives, to be replaced or supplemented by native secular 
and religious leaders during the first stages of reconstruction.  Of course, both of these 
options warrant some skepticism, since neither would be selected by or accountable to 
their constituents through fair procedures.  All the same, these leaders could provide a 
stopgap, since they are far more likely than American politicians to be acquainted with 
and to defend the needs and preferences of their compatriots.  What seems clear, in any 
case, is that if Iraqis were able to hold reasonably just—or, at least not intolerably 
unjust—elections for their own nascent government in 2005, they could also have chosen 
comparably legitimate representatives to the US Congress.  There may be no way to 
avoid completely the undemocratic paternalism involved in occupying and rebuilding an 
entire political system from the ground up.  But in general, as civil disorder becomes less 
problematic, legitimate representation becomes more feasible. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have argued that by satisfying the Principle of Affected Interests, democratic occupation 
can resolve three significant problems inherent to traditional occupation—its threat of 
unjustified paternalism, its lack of institutional accountability, and its failure to attenuate 
the indeterminacy of an occupied people‘s political will. In addition, I argued that 
effective representation in the occupying government would undermine the legitimacy of 
insurgency among the occupied people, disincentivize wars which aim at the long-term 
subjugation of foreign populations, and allow humanitarian occupiers to ―show in an 
open way the nature of their aims and the kind of people they are.‖  I acknowledged that 
there are practical worries about the feasibility and accessibility of the idealized model of 
democratic occupation presumed here (proportional, fully effective representation in the 
occupying government's legislative branch), at least under present conditions.  But I also 
argued that the feasibility and accessibility of democratic occupation is likely to increase 
as we move further away from this ideal. Given that partial or imperfect political 
representation is better than nothing, my arguments have important practical implications 
even under non-ideal circumstances:  if they are sound, we should work to find ways of 
approaching  ideal democratic occupation, by gradually improving the kind and degree 
of representation occupied peoples have in their occupiers' governments.  Finally, I have 
sought to disarm a range of in-principle objections to democratic occupation in the 
context of its application to the American occupation of Iraq.  While it is only natural to 
look for flaws in any argument which proposes such a fundamental change to the status 
quo, and while my efforts here can of necessity provide only a first line of defense 
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against objections from such a variety of sources, I believe I have shown that democratic 
occupation is, at the very least, a plausible alternative to the traditional model. 
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